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5?h is  work deals w ith  only some aspects o f the  c o n t r o v e r s y  w ith  
Great B r ita in  over n eu tra l r ig h ts —p rim arily  contraband and Blockade, 
and, where necessary , B rie f  mention Is  given to  re la te d  problems, th e  
d i f f ic u l ty  Concerning co tto n  th e  commodity i s  not tr e a te d  .as such fo r  
i t  i s  a  paper l a  i t s e l f .  Shis th e s is  examines th e  happenings from the  
f i r s t  Order in  Council, and th e  unsuccessfu l attem pts By th e  United 
S ta te s  to  secure adherence to  th e  u n ra t i f ie d  D eclara tion  o f London, to 
th e  conclusion o f 1915*
The Kim Case, ©as o f th e  most isp o r ta a t cases to  Be ad jud ica ted  
by m  E nglish P r is e  Court during th is  pe riod , i s  a lso  reviewed. Legal 
considera tions o f B r i t i s h  p o licy  regard ing  contraband and blockade are  
analyzed in  l ig h t  o f  the  e s tab lish ed  p r in c ip le s  o f  in te rn a tio n a l  law.
fh@ w rite r  would l ik e  to  express h is  s in c e re  g ra ti tu d e  to  the  
personnel o f the  follow ing in s t i tu t io n s  who o ffe red  invaluab le  a id  in  
research ing  th i s  th e s is ;  fhe  Gene % pl«y l ib r a r y ,  th e  Don Love Memorial 
L ibrary  and The Law L ibrary  o f th e  U n iversity  o f Nebraska, The Omaha 
Public  L ib rary , and espec ia l mention should be made to  the  s ta f f s  o f the  
Council B lu ffs  Public  L ibrary  and The Creighton U n iversity  Law L ibrary  
fo r  numerous se rv ice s  rendered. Highest ap p rec ia tio n  i s  a lso  extended 
to  Doctor A. Stanley f r i c k e t t  under whose advisement th e  th e s is  was p re ­
pared  and to Mrs. Donald B arrish  who typed i t  fo r  f in a l  p re sen ta tio n .
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I s  th e  mid-summer o f 1914 th e  Great Powers stumbled In to  th e  F i r s t  
World War. As the  co n flag ra tio n  o f European s ta te s  began, however, one 
powerful w estern na tio n  stood a lone—th e  United S ta te s  o f America. With 
an id e a l i s t  p res id en t in  the  White House the  United S ta te s  Government 
expressed the  general mood of i t s  c i t iz e n s  by p ro fessin g  s t r i e t  n e u tra ls  
i t y .  For most Europeans i t  was not an unexpected p o s it io n . To th e  
b e llig e re n ts*  however, the  U nited S ta te s , w ith  i t s  la rg e  popu lation , one 
o f  the  world1® most powerful nav ies, and & r is in g  In d u s tr ia l  complex, 
rep resen ted  a  re se rv o ir  o f M ilita ry  resources and supp lies o f  s taggering  
p o te n t ia l .  Business in te r e s ts  In  th e  United S ta te s , a t  l e a s t ,  were ready 
and eager to  meet the  combatants* Merchandise demands.
Trade, whether domestic o r fo re ig n , genera lly  involves the  exchange 
o f  one th ing  fo r  another and th e  tra n sp o rta tio n  and d e liv e ry  o f such goods 
to  the  buyer. That commodities purchased in  the  United S ta te s  by th e  
w arring Powers should be stopped in  the  course o f  d e liv e ry  by th e  opposing 
fo rces in  th e  War was to  be e j e c t e d  as f a l l in g  w ith in  th e  r ig h ts  o f 
n a tio n s as b e ll ig e re n ts  w ith in  p rev iously  e s tab lish ed  p r in c ip le s  o f in te r ­
n a tio n a l law. n ev erth e less , when combatants in t  e r f  e rred  w ith  in te r ­
n a tio n a l tra d e  American sh ippers su ffe red  as w ell as those o f o th er 
n e u tra l n a tio n s . The trad e  o f the  United S ta te s , however, rep resen ted  
much more o f a danger to  bo th  the  C entra l and A llied  Powers than  th a t  o f 
th e  o ther no n -b e llig e ren t s . For European statesm en the  problem c re a te d  
by the  awesome la te n t  power o f the  United State® was one o f  s in g u la r cos- 
p lo x ity  and d e licacy . In  1914, America*s re a l  c a p a b ili ty  was an unknown
zqu an tity . I f .  however, th e  apparent s tren g th  o f th e  United S ta te#  was a  
tru e  measure o f  i t s  a c tu a l capacity  her p o s itio n  in  the  c o n f l ic t  could 
he d e c is iv e . Any provocation by a  b e llig e re n t which re su lte d  in  th e  
United States* aw ed  In te rv en tio n  could have meant u ltim a te  defeat fo r 
the  provocators. O ff ic ia ls  in  London and B erlin  w restled  w ith  th e  same 
d i f f i c u l t  p ro b le s^ -th a t o f  determ ining how fa r  each could go la  pursuing 
p o lic ie s  ca lcu la te d  to  defea t th e  o th er but which, a t  th e  same tim e, 
d ir e c t ly  involved the  in te rn a tio n a l trad e  o f the  United S ta te s  and i t s  
c i t iz e n s .
The policy-m akers in  both  Great B r ita in  and Germany were genuinely 
desirous o f th e  U nited S ta te s  remaining a t  peace. I t  was never thw. 
o f f i c i a l  p lan  o f Prime M inister Asquith and h is  Cabinet to  a c tiv e ly  seek 
United S ta te s  armed in te rv en tio n  in  support o f th e  A llied  cause. The 
goal o f B r i t is h  p o licy  was to  achieve f in a l  defea t o f th e  C entral Powers 
by waging a  f u l l  and u n re len tin g  economic war w ithout destroy ing  Anglo- 
American fr ien d sh ip .
The man who bore th e  g re a te s t  re s p o n s ib ili ty  fo r th e  success o r 
f a i lu r e  o f B r i t i s h  fo re ig n  p o licy  was Asquith1® fo re ig n  Secretary  S ir  
Edward Grey, fro® the  outbreak o f  the  War u n t i l  h is  re s ig n a tio n  in  
December 1916, Grey’s paramount d e s ire  was th e  p e rp e tu a tio n  o f peacefu l 
Anglo-American re la t io n s . His ta sk  became more d i f f i c u l t  as the  War 
lengthened and demands from th e  p u b lic , p ress  and the  opposition  in  th e  
House o f Gammons increased  fo r more s tr in g e n t economic measures against 
Germany. Grey, however, never lo s t  s igh t o f the  n ecess ity  o f American 
goodw ill,
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l a  th e  United S ta te s  th e  mood was genera lly  pro-A lly , t h i s  
fe e lin g  was a lso  evident among high ranking government o f f i c i a l s . $o 
©a# would se rio u sly  h e l l  eve th a t  Wilson could have en te rta in ed  any sympa­
thy  fey  the  p o l ic ie s ,  id e a ls  o r government rep resen ted  by K aiser Wilhelm*
fhe l im i ts  o f Anglo-American frien d sh ip , n e v erth e less , were te s te d  
on so re  than one occasion p r io r  to  armed in te rv en tio n  by the  United S ta te s  
in  the War. th e  fo rce  behind th is  te s t in g  was th e  controversy over 
n e u tra l r ig h ts  which re s u lte d  from th e  B r i t is h  p o lic ie s  and p rac tice#  
implemented to  e ffe c t the  complete economic s tra n g u la tio n  of th e  C entral 
Power#.
Immediately follow ing the  outbreak o f th e  War the  B r i t i s h  began 
to  enlarge th e  contraband l i s t s .  Commodity c la s s i f ic a t io n  became so in ­
c lu s iv e  th a t by th e  c lo se  of 1915, th e  l i s t s  were almost u n iv e rsa l, th e  
meet se rio u s  problem, however, which th rea tened  Anglo-American frien d ­
sh ip  was the  A llied  blockade e s tab lish ed  e a rly  in  1915, Although unique 
In  ch arac te r and unprecedented w ith in  framework o f p rev iously  e s tab lish ed  
p r in c ip le s  o f  in te rn a tio n a l law, the  measure achieved g rea t p ra c t ic a l  
success, th e  curta ilm en t o f tra d e  w ith  th e  C entral Powers imposed by the  
blockade not only a ffe c te d  American shippers but those o f o ther n e u tra l 
n a tio n s as w e ll, th e  A llied  blockade, however, was extended to  include 
p o rts  o f n e u tra l co u n tries  whose proxim ity to  Germany, and exce llen t 
systems o f tra n sp o rta tio n , o ffe red  th e  obvious p o s s ib i l i ty  fo r  th e  tra n s ­
shipment o f goods to  the  enemy. Xfctrlng the e n tire  p e rio d  of Waited 
S ta te s  n e u tra li ty  th e  blockade was the  most c ru c ia l  problem a ffe c tin g  
Anglo-American r e la t io n s .
k5?k@ B r i t i s h  displayed consummate s k i l l  l a  the  use  o r misuse o f  
In te rn a tio n a l lair w hile pursuing th e i r  war programs, they  were success­
fu l  in  ext ending th e  law o f contraband to  f i t  n a tio n a l p o licy  and* a t  th e  
same tim e, established  and m aintained a  h ighly  questionable blockade* 
Althe®ih the  United S ta te s  responded, on occasion, to  B r i t is h  p ra c tic e s  
w ith  a  le g a l defense o f n e u tra l r ig h ts ,  none o f  th e  outstand ing  d i f f ic u l ­
t i e s  w ith  Great B r ita in  were s a t i s f a c to r i ly  reso lved . In  ju s t ify in g  
th e i r  p o l ic ie s  involving in te rfe re n c e  w ith  n e u tra l trade,, o f f i c i a l s  a t  
th e  Foreign O ffice  used a  simple t u t  e ffe c tiv e  d iplom atic defense mechan­
ism. fh e  B r i t i s h  in s is te d  th a t th e i r  a c tio n s  were e i th e r  a  necessary  
response to  German tran sg re ss io n s  o f  in te rn a tio n a l law o r th a t they  were 
merely applying prev iously  established, ru le s  o f in te rn a tio n a l law to  
nn w  cond itions o f war.*
The controversy  between the  United S ta te s  and Great B r ita in  con­
cern ing  n e u tra l  r ig h ts  quickly evolved in to  one o f ju d ic ia l  review . 5fee 
diplom atic disp&bches hebweeh'-thei-two^goveament& read remarkably :1 ike 
lawyers * b r ie f s .  Logical argum entation became immersed in  le g a l  p o in t and 
co u n te r-p o in t. She problem fo r  th e  United S ta te s  was to  appear im p a rtia l 
and n e u tra l in  i t s  dealings w ith  a l l  b e ll ig e re n ts . Although B r i t is h  
in te rfe re n c e  w ith  n e u tra l r ig h ts  demanded American p ro te s ts ,  i t  was im­
p o rtan t th a t th e  remonstrances should not be o f a  sharpness which could 
destroy  peacefu l Anglo-American r e la t io n s .  For Great B r i ta in  the  problem 
was somewhat so re  d e lic a te , fhe  B r i t is h  were forced to  continue to  apply 
economic p ressu res  against Germany which re su lte d  in  undue in te rfe re n c e  
w ith n e u tra l commerce, b u t, a t the  same tim e, i t  was necessary  fo r  Ifcgland
5
bo imsur© continuance of the  complex leg a l debate over n e u tra l r ig h ts  w ith 
the  United S ta te s , and, in  «o doing, p reserve  mutual friendship*
Whether Americans lik e d  to  admit i t  or not Great B rita in*  to  a 
la rg e  ex ten t, c o n tro lle d  th e  e v e r t s  o f the  United S ta te s  while she con­
tin u ed  to  enjoy a  reasonably good re la tio n sh ip  w ith  i t s  government and 
i t s  people. I t  was not by acciden t th a t such a s i tu a t io n  p rev a iled , 
th e re  were severa l co n trib u tin g  fa c to rs  to th e  p rese rv a tio n  o f Anglo- 
American good w il l .  On© o f the  most isp o rtan t o f these  fa c to rs  was the 
in te n t and purpose of bo th  governments to  employ lengthy Ju r id ic a l  argu­
ments fo r  the  in d e f in ite  p ro longation  of a  le g a l d isp u te  u n t i l  such tim e 
as th e  d ispu te  was 210 longer necessary , th e  Anglo-American p o s it io n  was 
g re a tly  f a c i l i t a t e d  by an e sp ec ia l German a f f in i ty  fo r  committing in d e li­
b le  d iplom atic and procedural blunder®.
Many o ther p o in ts  of conten tion  ex is ted  between th e  two English 
speaking governments, fhe  h ighly  i r r i t a t i n g  B r i t i s h  p ra c tic e  o f 
ta s^ e riu g  w ith  the  m i l s  and the  equally  infamous p o licy  o f b la c k lis t in g  
companies which nearly  exhausted American p a tien ce  a re  but a  few. fhe  
l i s t  i s  almost endless. $he beginning of the  most se rio u s problem, how­
ever, th a t o f contraband (and l a t e r  blockade) may be trac ed  to  the  f i r s t  
contraband proclam ation in  August 191^» and th e  abor&tive attem pt by the  
United S ta te s  to  win the  b e l l ig e re n ts 1 approval fo r th e  Beel&r&tion of 
Ito&on as a  standard  fo r  naval conduct during the  f i r s t  World War.
ohm m . t
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I t  i s  not exaggerate to  s«y th a t by 190?, th e  world was badly la
need o f  machinery fo r  the  uniform ad m in istra tio n  o f p r is e  law, Sedative
to  th is  need the  rep re se n ta tiv e s  of the  lead ing  Maritime Powers assembled
a t  th e  Hague in  an im portant attem pt to  e s ta b l is h  a convention fo r  an
In te rn a tio n a l P r is e  Court, fo  a  la rg e  measure t h i s  was accomplished.
However, because o f th e  In a b il i ty  o f the  de legates to  accord sp e c if ic
agreement, th e  Second Hague Conference l e f t  some areas nebulous and u&*
c e r ta in , F a ilu re  to  a t t a in  complete harmony on a l l  p o in ts  was p a r t ly  due
to  the  highly d ivergent views and d is s im ila r  p ra c tic e s  in  naval conduct
1among p a r t ic ip a n t n a tio n s,
Sag!and found some te n e ts  unacceptable, fhe  instrum ent seemingly
had rendered the  re la tio n sh ip  between her navy and n a tio n a l ex istence  
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in e f fe c tiv e . Great B r ita in  then suggested th a t a  eonferenee be held  fo r
the  purpose o f s e t t in g  the  vagueness and u n c e r ta in tie s  o f th e  Second
Hague Conference a r ig h t . S ir  Udward Grey, the  B r i t is h  Foreign S ecre tary ,
expounded the  ob jec t of th e  p ro jec ted  assemblagej
, , , a rr iv in g  a t an agreement as to  what a re  th e  genera lly  
recognised p r in c ip le s  o f  in te rn a tio n a l lew, w ith in  th e  meaning 
o f paragraph 2 o f A rtic le  ? o f  th e  Convention, as those m atters 
wherein the  p ra c tic e  o f n a tio n s has v a ried , and o f  then
*yohn Scott Brown (e& ,), T&& B eclaratlQ h o f  London (lew fo rk : 
Oxford U niversity  P ress, 1919). p* 3*
Ib id .
?form ulating th e  ru le#  which, in  the absence o f sp ec ia l t r e a ty
p rov isions app licab le  to  a  p a r t ic u la r  case , th e  court should
obscure in  dealing  w ith  appeals brought befo re  i t  fo r d is ­
cussion .^
Pursuant to  e s ta b lish in g  needed naval codes de leg a tes  fro® ib is tr ia -  
Bungary, franco , Germany, I t a ly ,  y&paa, B ussia, Spain, th e  le th e r la n d s , 
and th e  United S ta te s , were in v ite d  by E ls Majesty*s Government to  a  
conference in  London, fh e  rep re se n ta tiv e s  convened in  London on Decem­
ber h, 190S, and remained assembled u n t i l  February 26, 1909.^ fh e re  was
an urgency o f purpose and a  s in c e re  e f fo r t  made to  achieve standards or
ru le s  reg u la tin g  in te rn a tio n a l  conduct which they  c a lle d  a  ^D eclaration
concerning th e  laws o f naval war,® and th e  Convention even tually  became
5known as th e  D eclaration  o f  London. fhe document contained d is t in c t  
l i s t s  o f  items which, in  tim e o f war, were to  be tre a te d  as abso lu te  
contraband, co n d itio n a l contraband or non-contraband m a te ria ls .
I t  appeared, upon adjournment of the  naval conference, th a t w ith 
th e  D eclaration  o f London a  way had been secured to  c a rry  In to  e ffe c t 
th e  P r is e  Court Convention and permanently e s ta b lis h  a  sound b a s is  fo r  
Ju d ic ia l  settlem ent o f c e r ta in  c la sse s  o f  in te rn a tio n a l co n tro v e rsies  
through a p p lica tio n  o f  an accepted code, fhe  tendency on the  p a s t had 
been to  re fu se  to  submit eases to  im partia l dec ision  because o f the  la c k  
of ad fuate  machinery fo r reaching se ttlem en ts .^
3ibia.
*W a . . p . k .
5W & -. p- 5-
p. 8 .
80reai B r ita in , n ev erth e less , mm to rn  by fa c tio n a l d isse n t con*
com ing th e  D eclaration . One school f e l t  th a t  the  ro le s  s a c r if ic e d  the
in te r e s ts  o f Saglaad as & b e ll ig e re n t. Another held  the  codes destroyed
7Ungland*s in te r e s ts  as a  n e u tra l. Obviously both could not have bean
tru e . S ir  Idward Drey h a t o ffe red  some rev ea lin g  in s tru c tio n s  to  th e
8B r i t is h  de legation  on December 1, 1908. Ee sa id  a t  th a t  tim e he would 
very  much 11fee to  see a  surrendering  o f a l l  r ig h t  to  s e is e  anything bu t 
ab so lu te  contraband, but added th a t such a  proposal could f in d  no p lace  
in  e x is tin g  in te rn a tio n a l Im  so i t  would have to  be re leg a ted  to  con­
ven tion . th u s  the  D eclaration  would have to  recognize ex istence  of bo th
9abso lu te  and cond itional contraband.
Previously  Mnglmi had not been committed to  the  p r in c ip le s  o f 
d e f in i t io n  o r enumeration in  dealing  w ith  contraband, m i. d e s ired  a  l i s t  
accepted as a c o rre c t statem ent o f e x is tin g  in te rn a tio n a l lew t r e a tin g  
th e  sub jec t!
(1) Arms o f a l l  kinds* including  arms fo r spo rting  purposes 
end th e i r  component p a r ts .
(2 ) P ro je c t i le s ,  charges* and c a r tr id g e s  o f a l l  k inds, and 
th e i r  component p a r ts .
(3) Powders and explosives designed sp e c if ic a lly  to  serve 
w ar-lik e  purposes.
(h) Qun-iwuntings, lim ber boxes, lim ber, m ili ta ry  wagons* 
f i e ld  forges* and th e i r  component p a r ts .
(5 ) M ilita ry  c lo th in g  and equipment,
(6 ) M ilita ry  harness o f  a l l  k inds.
(7 ) 'Camp equipment, and th e i r  component p a r ts .
(8 ) Armour p la te s .
(9 ) Ships and v esse ls  o f war, and t h e i r  component p a r ts ,
7im a.
8M & * . p* 215. 
9ib ia .
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provided these  a re  o f such a  na tu re  as can only he used  on a  
sh ip  o f way.
(10) Instrum ents and apparatus designed exclusively  fo r  th e  
manufacture o f  m unitions o f  war, fo r th e  manufacture o r re p a ir  
o f same, o r o f  m ili ta ry  or naval w arlike m a te ria l.
fhe l i s t  was drawn up by a p ro v isio n a l committee o f th e  conference 
10as s ta te d , t h i s  was A rtic le  22 of the  D eclaration  w ith  A rtic le  23 
allow ing add ition  o f those  a r t i c le s  used exclusively  fo r  war to  the  abso­
lu te  contraband l i s t  by n o t if ic a t io n  addressed to  the  o th e r powers o r to
th e i r  represen tative® , Any n o t if ic a t io n  a f te r  the  outbreak o f war would
11be made to  n eu tra l powers only,
drey remarked regarding cond itiona l contrabands
fhe  primary c h a ra c te r is t ic  o f cond itional contraband i s  i t s  
w arlike  d e s tin a tio n , and in  d ra f tin g  any ru le s  on th e  su b jec t, 
ca re  should be taken to  in su re  th a t condemnation should in  no 
case be allowed u n less  th e re  was such evidence as would estab­
l i s h ,  or lead  to  th e  d e s tin a tio n  of the  goods was fo r  th e  
armed fo rces of the  enemy, and n o | fo r  the  c iv i l  popu lation  o f  
a  p lace  occupied by such fo rce s . 14
fhe  In g lie h  during th e  War, in  adopting to  "new condition© o f w ar,”
sought unifu® evidence in  proving enemy destination .
Although Great B r ita in  c e r ta in ly  gained more than  she conceded a t 
th e  Conference, th e  P r is e  Court B i l l  in troduced in  Parliam ent to  g ive 
binding e ffe c t to  th e  D eclara tion  o f London, passed th e  House Commons bu t 
was re je c te d  by th e  House o f L o r d s . *3 fhe  d iss id e n t force® had achieved
10ibia. . pp. 216-1?.
^ i b i a . , pp. 117-22.
12n>ld.. p. 218.
^ K l d . , pp. 8- 9*
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a  v ic to ry  la  securing the Convention’ s defeat* S o m a  Bentwich, an 
au th o rity  on in te rn a tio n a l law, sa id  before the  vo te  in  Parliam ent:
Creat B r ita in  should now be in  a  p o s itio n  to  r a t i f y  the  Hague 
P r is e  Court convention, when a t  le a s t  she has made th e  necessary 
changes in  her n a tio n a l p r is e  law* She has come out very well 
indeed from th e  in te rn a tio n a l bargain ing: she had the  most to
lo se  by the  previous u n c e rta in ty ; she has gained most by the  
se ttlem en t. At P a r is , in  1S5&, she gave up one o f  her most 
powerful b e llig e re n t righ ts-^-the  r ig h t  to  cap ture  enemy p roperty  
in  n e u tra l sh ip s. low in  London she has not given up a  s in g le  
e s tab lish ed  b e ll ig e re n t  r ig h t  o f  va lue , her so le  concession 
being on the  question o f convoy which i s  more apparent than 
r e a l ;  and, on th e  o ther hand, she gained a number o f safeguards 
fo r  her n e u tra l commerce, and a  number o f l im ita t io n s  o f the  
a lleged  b e llig e re n t r ig h ts  o f  o ther Powers, fh ere i s  indeed a  
naval school which i s  b i t t e r l y  h o s t i le  to th e  r a t i f ic a t io n  o f 
th e  D eclaration , on th e  ground th a t by i t  Bagland g ives up cer­
ta in  n a tio n a l claim s of long standing and cone ode a c e r ta in  
r ig h ts  ag a in st which she has long strugg led . But the  claims we 
g ive up have not been e ffe c tiv e ly  exercised  by u s . the r ig h ts  w© 
concede have re g u la rly  been p ra c tic e d  against u s .*^ v'
In  l ik e  manner the Uni tod S ta te s  never r a t i f i e d  the  Convention 
o f f i c i a l ly .  The Senate, however, d id  advise i t s  r a t i f ic a t io n  on A pril 
21*, 1912.15
C ritic s  had argued fo r  many years th a t p r iz e  law was in  theory 
in te rn a tio n a l but in  p ra c tic e  i t  was n a tio n a l in  ch arac te r. The adminis­
t r a t io n  o f such law was sub ject to  the  p re ju d ices  and p a r t i a l i t i e s  o f
l^ Sn a tio n a l judges, The lo g ic a l  e f fo r t  to  r e c t i f y  such a  s i tu a t io n  by 
s e t t in g  up codes o f  p ra c tic e  had been defeated  a t  the  very moment when 
success had seemed assured.
% M d . 
% l d . . p. 116.
l 6Herman Bentwich, g&fi D eclara tion  of, London (London: JBffinghm
Wilson, 1911K P* 2.
uSome demist e re  complained th a t the  D eclaration  o f hoadoa made food­
s tu f f s  cond itiona l contraband and e x p lic it^  forbade i t s  becoming abso lu te
contraband, fhe  authors o f th e  Convention d id  not wish I t  to  be any t ip #
I fo f  contraband, but non-contraband, f fhe  D eclaration  r e s t r i c te d  food­
s tu f f s  in  contraband to  only those fo o d stu ffs  proved going to  the  armed 
fo rces or government o f an enemy s ta te .  In  keeping w ith  th i s  id ea lly  
d e sired  treatm ent o f  fo o d s tu ffs , th e  D octrine o f Continuous Voyage could 
not be app lied  to  t h i s  c la s s  o f commodities o r to  any co n d itio n a l contra^
mband, th e  re a l  worth o f th e  Convention, o f course, was th a t i t  c l a r i ­
f ie d  e x is tin g  nebu losity  in  many areas and produced a  system atic l i s t i n g
o f  sp e c if ic s  fo r  a l l  to  fo llow  w ith  regard  to  naval war and n e u tra l
right® . In  re sp ec t to  co n d itio n a l contraband, fo r  example, i t  o ffe red
19a  l i s t  which was unexceptionable, and rep laced  doubt w ith c e r ta in ty ,
Art le i#  $$ fu r th e r  insured  the  p ro fic iency  o f th e  Convention, by re<juiring
th a t th e  D eclaration  had to be t re a te d  as whole and could not be 
20separated*'
fo r  a l l  i t s  p ro jec ted  p ra c t ic a l  e ffe c t and grandiose purpose th e  
D eclaration  o f hoadon was never used as an o f f i c i a l  Instrum ent fo r s e t­
t l i n g  m aritime d ispu tes among the  world*s fam ily o f n a tio n s . I t  i s ,  none­
th e l e s s ,  both  important and in te re s tin g  to  note th e  words o f Mormon 
Bentwich who, speaking about cond itional contraband m  regards fo o d s tu ffs ,
p . 31.
18m & . . P . 7k.
19Ib id . . p . 68 .
20M 4 . . p . 15*.
sa id  "and to  allow cap ture  upon suspicion  th a t  m  eventual b e llig e re n t 
d e s tin a tio n  was intended would be m  excessive in te rfe re n c e  w ith  n e u tra l 
tra d e  which would in ev itab ly  cause fr ic tio n *  fhe  D eclaration  had 
c a re fu lly  req u ired  a ffirm a tiv e  p roof th a t goods were destined  fo r  th e  u se  
o f the  armed fo rces  or a  governmental department o f an enemy as the  b a s is  
fo r  th e  r ig h t  to  s e is e  co n d itio n a l contraband.
I f  war breaks out among na tions o f  considerab le  power, m aritime 
commerce must to  some extent be affected* Each b e llig e re n t does a l l  
p o ss ib le  to  c r ip p le  and render in e f fe c tiv e  tra d e  w ith i t s  enemies. In  
p u rsu it o f th i s  g o a l, b e ll ig e re n ts  t r e a t  neutrals w ith  susp ic ion  and mis­
t r u s t .  fhus a r is e s  in te rfe re n c e  w ith  neutral, commerce and th e  re s u lta n t  
resentm ent by those non-warring na tions carry ing  on l ig l t im a te  tra d e .
Armed h o s t i l i t i e s  erupted in  Europe in  Ju ly , 1914* -America*e in ­
te n tio n  to  remain a t  peace su rp rised  few, and, in  many cases, was received  
w ith  genuine pleasure* Or ea t B r ita in  enjoyed unchallenged supremacy on 
th e  h igh  seas and her o f f i c i a l s  immediately reasoned th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f 
applying such economic p ressu res  as to  in su re  a  hasty  Senaan d e fea t.
fhe  le g a l  machinery to  be used was th e  im pllm eniaiion o f a  s e r ie s  
o f Order# in  Council designed to  sever th e  C entral Bowers from n e u tra l 
commercial sources, fhe  f i r s t  Orders commenced in  August, 1914, ( th e  
f i r s t  one—August 6 ) . On August 20 of that- year the  D eclaration  o f lo a -  
don was p ra c t ic a l ly  destroyed in  meaning whm  an Order in  Council bearing
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22th a t  d a te  was issued . th e  Order g re a tly  extended th e  contraband l i s t s ,  
b a t th i s  extension was hard ly  as i r r i t a t i n g  as th e  second m odification  
which perm itted  the  A llie s  to  se ise  cond itional contraband even though 
d ischarged a t a  n e u tra l port* I t  decreed th a t  cond itiona l contraband 
was l ia b le  to  cap tu re  reg a rd less  o f the  p o rt o f d e s tin a tio n  on th e  p re ­
sumption o f u ltim a te  enemy d e s tin a tio n  i f  consigned to  or fo r  m  agent 
a c tin g  under the  co n tro l o f enemy s ta te s ,  fhe  B r i t i s h  had thus modified 
th e  D eclara tion  o f London in  m  e f fo r t  to  achieve the  economic s ta rv a tio n  
o f  Oermaay.
Harly in  August th e  lic ite d  S ta te s  had in i t i a t e d  e f f o r ts  to ob ta in  
couplet® acceptance o f th e  D eclara tion  o f  London by both  s id e s  as a  code 
to  be follow ed during the  War. On August ?, 1914, th e  Im perial Dorman 
Government re p lie d  to  a  verba l inqu iry  by th e  United S ta te s  Ambassador 
in  B e rlin  s ta t in g  th a t  they would accept and observe the  p rov isions o f 
th e  D eclara tion  fo r  conduct o f naval w arfare during the  c o n f l ic t  i f  th e
Oh
o th er n a tions would a lso  acquiosce. fhe B r i t is h  and french  agreed bu t 
w ith  a  few ^m odifications11 th ese  being the  replacement o f th e  abso lu te  
end co n d itio n a l l i s t s  by more in c lu s iv e  ones, fhe  A llied  m odifications 
were m anifest in  the  Order l a  Council o f August 20, 1914.
22Charles Seymour, American Piolomacy fa r in g  the  World War (B a lti­
more} fh e  John Bepklas P ress , 1934), p . ’34. H ereafter c i te d  as American
23n > u .
5k
Forelaft a e la tio n s  o f th e  DMtj&jl |t& te s . 1914, S u p p lia n t  (Wash­
ington; Government P r in tin g  O ffice , 1928), p . 224. H ereafter c i te d  as 
F or. B e l. .  1914, Suppl.
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I t  was unreasonable to  assume o r even hope fo r B r i t i s h  acceptance 
o f  the  D eclaration  jy& to to  fo r th e  document assured  f re e  passage o f  coir- 
d i t io n a l  contraband I f  discharged a t  a  n e u tra l p o r t ,  and thus made I t
25p o ss ib le  fo r Germany to  p ro v is io n  h e rs e lf  through the  no rthern  neat r a le ,  
fh e  Waited S ta te# , however, continued to  s t r iv e  fo r  to ta l  adherence to  th e  
D eclara tion  and pursued th e  n a t te r  v igorously .
In  l a t e  September, I f  14, lawyers a t th e  S ta te  Department drew up & 
p ro te s t  regarding th e  Order In  Council (a c tu a lly  w ritte n  by Cone Johnson 
S ta te  Department S o l i c i t o r ) . ^  I t  was so worded th a t i t  read remarkably 
l ik e  m  ultim atum , fhe note was sen t to  Wilson fo r  approval but a t th e  
moment o f a r r iv a l  th e  P residen t was q u ite  t i r e d  and d id  not wish to  read  
i t . 2 ** He was informed, however, th a t  i t  was to  be d ispatched  th e  next 
morning whereupon he examined i t  and was aston ished  by th e  language
2g
used* Wilson refu sed  to  allow  th e  message to  be tent and ordered i t  
re tu rn ed  to  the  S ta te  Department fo r re v is io n . Bobert Lansing, th e  De­
partm ent *s Counsel, prepared a  new note  o f  le s s  menacing tone and con­
veyed i t  to  Wilson fo r  f i n d  approval to  assu re  i t s  presence In  th e  next 
pouch.
fhe  new note in s tru c te d  th e  U nited S ta te s  M bassador in  London, 
W alter Hines Page, to see S ir  aw ard  Cray and urge upon him th e  grave
^Seym our, Americaa .Diplomacy, p . 32*
2% tephea Cwyna ( e d .) , $£& Lottery. Ifrlcndghing o f S ir  C ecil 
Surin^mies (Cambridge* fhe Kiverside Press, 1929), II, 233.
2? x m d .
28i , ia .
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concern o f the  United S ta te s  regarding  proposed changes in  th e  D e c la re
tio n  o f  London which so m a te ria lly  a ffe c te d  n e u tra l r ig h ts .  S p e c ia l ly
noxious were A rtic le s  3 and 5 o f  th e  August 20 Order i a  C ouncil.2^ fhe
note fu r th e r  © pressed  th e  hope th a t th e  B r i t is h  would “consider th e
a d v is a b ili ty  o f modifying th e i r  Order ia  C o u n c i l . “3°
Ambassador Fag© complied w ith the  d ire c tiv e  and held  a  conversation
w ith  Grey ia  which he impressed upon the Foreign S ecre tary  th e  p o in ts
covered in  th e  note and Urey emphasised th a t  he did  not wish to  provoke
th e  offense  o f the  U alied S ta te s  Government o r pub lic  c r i t ic is m . Grey
m aintained th a t B rita in*  s only concern was th e  p reven tion  o f food and
31m ate ria ls  fo r  m ili ta ry  u se  from reaching th e  ©nesQr*
fhe s trong  p o s itio n  taken by the  United S ta te s  came as a  complete
su rp r ise  to  Bcglaad a f te r  so long a time had elapsed  s ince  th e  promal-
32g a t ion o f th e  August 20 Order in  Council. fh e  note had concerned the  
p roposal to  make th e  D eclara tion  o f London th e  law o f naval w arfare in  
th e  War as m odified by the  B r i t is h  Order in  Council, fh e  B r i t i s h  p o si­
t io n  regard ing  th e  D eclaration , according to  Grey, was th e  same as th e  
United S ta tes toward a  t r e a ty  th e  Senate had refused  to  approve*^ In  a  
not# to  Spring-Hice, B r i t i s h  Ambassador to  Washington, dated  September 
28, 1914, Grey informed him th a t  he .had reminded Page th a t  Parliam ent had
29? o r. K « l.. 19X^, Suppl., p . 232.
^ I M d .
^(hiynn, $&. e l t . , I I ,  234.
33n>ia.
unot observed the  D eclaration  and B ritain  stro v e  for two o b jec tiv es  only?
( ! )  l e e t r i e t  th e  supply to  Germany o f m a te ria ls  e s s e n t ia l  to  war m unitions
m anufacture{ (2 ) t e a t r l c t  supp lies fo r  th e  German -to y  w hile a t  the  same
time th is  was to  be aeces^llehed  w ith  minimum in te rfe re n c e  to n e u tra l corn­
ea
mere©. fhe  B r i t is h  were not w illin g  to  withdraw th e i r  proclam ation a t  
once in  th e  absence o f some measure to  in su re  p reven tion  o f needed sup­
p l ie s  from reaching Germany*
Grey than  proposed to  Page th a t he would draw up a  new proclam ation 
o f  contraband to  supersede the  previous one. E© f e l t  i t  should not 
mention the  d e c la ra tio n  o f  London fo r  the  Foreign Secretary  d id  not f e e l  
th a t an u n ra t i f ie d  document to  which so much exception had been taken  by
Parliam ent should be held  to  c o n s t itu te  a  new d oc trine  of in te rn a tio n a l 
35law* Page cabled Lansing on September 30* 191%* th a t  Grey had agreed
to  make a  new l i s t  of absolu te  contraband and prepare a  new Order in
Council rep lac in g  a l l  previous Orders which had modified th e  D eclara tion  
36o f London*
Eat 11 th e  new proclam ation was issued  B rita in  r e l ie d  upon m  em­
bargo by the  Government o f th e  le th e r la a d s  on the  expo rta tion  o f  food­
s tu f f s .  Those sh ips which were a t  th e  tim e deta ined  were re le a sed  and 
n eu tra l v e sse ls  were not in te r fe r re d  w ith  on the ground o f  contain ing
ffifo r. E e l. * E s l., 191%, Suppl*, p . 23%.
35 m a . . p . 238.
. p* 235.-
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fo o d stu ff* « fo  p ac ify  pub lic  opinion in  the  United S ta te s , Grey agreed
to  p u b lic ly  announce th a t B r ita in  intended t© re v ise  M r Order in  Council
37w ith  regard  to  contraband*'
fh e  new Order was to  be form ulated in  view o f suggestions made in  
a  meeting between Spring-lic©  and Lansing. th e  p o in ts  were as follow st
Cl) Certain, a r i d  eg l ik e  motor o i l ,  w ire fencing , motors, 
e tc * , which may be shown by recen t events as exclusively  used 
fo r  m ilita ry  purposes in  th e  p resen t opera tions might be added 
to the  l i s t  o f  abso lu te  contraband as eomplated in  A r tic le  ZJ 
o f the D eclaration  o f  London*
(2) A rtic le s  l ik e  fo o d s tu ffs , i t  the  Butch Government pro­
h ib ite d  th e ir  -supply to  e ith e r  b e ll ig e re n t  could be f re e ly  im­
ported  in to  Holland i f  consigned to  th e  B itch  Government o r 
persons designated  by t h e m .  3*5
On October 9* 191&* cabled a  d ra f t  o f  the  Oonbraband Order
39in  Council devised by the  B r i t is h  Government. A fter studying the  pro­
posal., Lansing in s tru c te d  Page to  see Grey and p resen t to  Mm c e r ta in  
enumerated o b jec tio n s;
{1} fhe  proposed Order d id  not accept the  D eclaration  o f Lon?- 
don without m od ifica tions.
(2) th e  proposed Order l e f t  unrepealed A rtic le s  2, 3» k and 
6 o f  the  previous Order.
{3} fh e  proposed Order purported  to  repeal A rtic le  1 o f the  
August proclam ation but in  fa c t  re-enac ted  i t  w ith the  extension 
o f  the contraband l i s t  which add itions could have been obtained 
i f  the  B r i t is h  had accepted the- D eclaration  of London o r ig i­
n a lly .
(k) Under th e  terms of the  A rtic le  rep lac ing  number 5 in  th e  
previous d r ie r  i t  in  fa c t perm itted  cap ture  o f  a  sh ip  bound fo r 
th e  p o rt o f one n e u tra l country i f  the cargo was consigned to  
a  person re s id e n t in  another country not a t  war.
37Ib i& .. p . 238.
^ I b i d . . foo tno te  no. 1 , p . 238. 
3^$e© %pendlat. fo r rev ised  l i s t .
3.8
(5) $h© proposed Order Introduced a new end unpreceadented 
r e s t r i c t io n  upon n e u tra l commerce under Section k. I t  in  e ffe c t 
s a id  th a t a t the  d is c re tio n  of one of His M ajesty 's P rin c ip a l 
S e c re ta rie s  of S ta te , a  n e u tra l country may be given treatm ent 
o f eneuy c h a rac te r and th a t  bona f id e  trad e  of a  n e u tra l country 
w ith  such a  country may be sub jec ted  to the  m leejw hlch  a re  
app lied  to  contraband tra d e  w ith enemy t e r r i t o r y , ^
I t  was apparent th a t  Great B r ita in  d id  not in tend  to r e t r e a t  ITem 
her p o l ic ie s  regarding  th e  contingency o f economic s tra n g u la tio n  o f Ger­
many whatever th e  in te rfe re n ce  w ith n e u tra l commerce. I t  was a lso  
equally  evident th a t Bag!and did  not Intend to  accept th e  D eclaration  of 
London without m odifications which she f e l t  necessary  in  her conduct o f 
th e  War,
Grey had re p lie d  p rev iously  to  the  American note of September 28
defending B r i t i s h  a c tio n  as a  necessary measure to  achieve i t s  purpose
of not allowing Germany to  rece ive  supp lies fo r  her war machine through
contiguous n e u tra l p o r ts , fhe  s i tu a t io n  was such th a t Baglaad had t©
depart from the  s t r i c t  ru le s  of the  D eclara tion  o f London regard ing  the
abso lu te  contraband l i s t  and apply more s tr in g e n t methods to  co n d itio n a l
contraband where a  n e u tra l country was- used as a base fo r  supplying th© '
h ienemy* s war machine. Grey was fu l ly  aware o f the  p o s s ib i l i ty  and Im­
p lic a tio n s  of a  German v ic to ry  as was th e  e n tire  Foreign O ffice .
In mid October lp lh , Lansing had once again communicated to  Beg© 
th e  d e s ire  o f the  United S ta te s  to  secure an Order in  Council adopting 
th e  D eclaration  of London w ithout amendment. He explained th a t the
^°For. S a l. . 1914, Swppl., p . 252.
* S 'o r. 2 e l . ■ £ .1 . .  Idmsiftg l e p e r . . I .  251 .
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United S ta te s  wm m% w arranted to  o f fe r  m® suggestion to  th e  B r i t is h  Gov­
ernment which would serve s e l f  in te r e s ts  and a t the  same time serve B r i t is h  
d e s ire s . Banging In s tru c te d  P«ge to  s&prsaoh Greg? w ith  * proposal to  
.secure acceptance o f the  BecXar&tioa and p resen t i t  i a  such a  we$> a s  to
kg
make i t  appear that- i t  was th e  Isfoassader* s own idea*
.Leasing had reasoned th a t  the  B r i t i s h  Government should lego* an 
Order in  Council adopting th e  M X eratlom  o f  London w ithout re se rv a tio n , 
B r i ta in  could then  prom lg& ie a  subsequent proclam ation adding a r t i c l e s  
to  th e  l i s t s  o f abso lu te  and co n d itio n a l contraband %  v ir tu e  o f th e  
anthoritr contained i n  A rtic le s  23 and 25 of th e  B eo lara tioa . this 
afmomoemeni would in  tu rn  he followed Br another s ta t in g  th a t  Borland 
woe convinced th a t a  p o rt o r th e  t e r r i to r y  of «  n e u tra l country was Being 
used a# a  hose fo r th e  t r a n s i t  o f  supp lies fo r an mm® government.
Finally# in  l ig h t  o f the  above s te p s , an snnotuttSBumft could he made- de­
c la r in g  th a t a p o rt o r  te rr iio rg r  had esqu ired  mm® sherao&sr 'in so far 
as tra d e  in  oontrshand was concerned, and any v e sse l tra d in g  w ith  sa id  
p o rt o r territory  would ho su b jec t to  th e  ru le s  o f  the  M l a r a t l e *  
governing trad® w ith  mm® t e r r i to r y .  ^
le isiing  adm itted th a t  such a c tio n  would lie a  new p r in c ip le  In  
in te rn a tio n a l ler*  hu t offered th e  ®$mm th a t where th e  Beeiarmbieia, o f 
London hod f a i le d  to  provide fo r  *e*ae«ptle&*i cond itions a s  e sU ts*  n 
nation had th e  r ig h t  to  reasonable  in te rp re ta t io n  to  preven t supp lies
Srik* * XW*t Sappl*# p . 250*
^ m a .  .. • '•
zo
from reaching the  enemy. Xn closing  h is  in structions*  Lansing once 
cautioned Page to  in  no way suggest th a t th e  Government o f th e  United States 
Whs by any means responsib le  fo r the  proposal, th e  Counselor said*
MI rep ea t th a t any suggestion , which you make to S ir  M vard Grey, must he 
done In m  e n tir e ly  personal way and w ith the  d is t in c t  understanding th a t 
th is  Government i s  in  no way responsib le  fo r  what you may say.
fhe B r i t i s h  responded coo lly  to  th is  p iece  of le g a l chicanery.
3?hey had re je c te d  the  D eclaration  o f  London th ree  tim es and in  Lansing’ s 
attem pt fo r  the  fo u rth  pursuant to  h is  reasoning Grey re p lie d , HDo you 
mean th a t  we should accept i t  and then  issu e  a  proclam ation to  get around 
i t ? " 45
Bag© sent a l e t t e r  to  Secretary  o f S ta te  Bryan dated Gctober 19,
191h , in  which he s ta te d  th a t Grey would not accept th e  D eclaration , 
f i r s t  because Parliam ent had f a i le d  to  r a t i f y  i t  and secondly because 
th e  document forbade the add ition  o f items such as iro n  ore and rubber 
to the  contraband l i s t  and these  m ateria ls  were necessary fo r the  manu­
fa c tu re  of war goods. Grey in s is te d  upon the  ad d itio n  to the  co n d itio n a l 
and abso lu te  contraband l i s t s  of c e r ta in  a r t i c l e s  which Ragland f e l t  
necessary  to  include. He also  reserved  the  r ig h t  to stop cargoes o f
contraband or cond itional Contraband consigned in  blank (H o o rder*1} to
M
a n e u tra l country and which were eventually  destined  fo r  t l f t t  country.
*% or. R e l . . £ .& ,  1914, Soppl., j>. 250.
^ B u rto n  J. Hendrick, ;h e  L ife  and L e t te r ,  of Walter Hines Pag. 
(B m r  Yorks Doutleday, ?age and Company, 1925), I I I ,  182.
^ Q g .  He!. , £•,§>, 191&* S upp l., pp. 253- 5h.
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Bag# had not achieved h is  ends and I t  h##aa# obvious th a t  Great 
B r i ta in  planned no concessions r e la t in g  to  J& to to  ace s t a n c e  of th#  
D eclaration . fh#  Ambassador f e l t  th a t th#  u n ite d  S ta te s  had lo s t  ground 
by in s is t in g  upon i t s  a^epbaaee  fo r  the  fo u rth  t f e e . ^  Bag# in te n se ly  
d is l ik e d  gam#t o f subterfuge and had boon something le s s  than  enthaslas*- 
t i e  about rep re sen tin g  S ta te  Department in s tru c tio n s  in  dealing  w ith  hi# 
personal f r ie n d  S ir  Mward Grey. So a c tu a lly  informed Wilson through 
Colonel Souse* th e  P resl& m t1 s most t ru s te d  ad v iso r, th a t  i f  he (Fag#) 
had to  again seek B r i t is h  acquiescence to  the  D eclaration  of London h# 
would r e s i g n .^
She f u t i l i t y  o f  gain ing  complete adherence to  the  Convention be­
came apparent and the  request fo r  I t s  acceptance was form ally withdrawn, 
on October' 22, 191^. whereupon th# United S ta te s  re tre a te d  to  th#  ttpre­
v iously  e x is t lag  ru le s  and precedents of in te rn a tio n a l law,® without
h9re fe ren ce  to  th# London c o d if ic a tio n . 7 America had chosen a  lo g ic a l i f  
aaiv© approach to  th® se ttlem ent o f d ispu tes over n e u tra l r ig h ts  and had 
been defeated .
I f  th#  D eclaration  o f London had been accepted w ithout re se rv a tio n  
i t  would have been im possible fo r  Great B r ita in  to  have c o n tro lle d  sup- 
p l ie s  to  Germany* !fo n a tio n  was nor# aware o f  th is  fa c t than log!and. A 
sever# blow would have been s tru ck  a t  th# most im portant t a c t i c  o f th#
^Headricks, c,it., III* 182.
% l d , . p . 188.
% o lt* T  M llli., Bond to  War ln«rloa 1914-1917 (Caa4rld«.t 9b. 
a i T t f t l d .  Pr«»s, 1935). p
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A llies-econom ic  s ta rv a tio n  o f  the  C entral Powers. S ir  H&wnrd Cray most 
eernimb lonely  amrnaad up th e  whole question  concerning th© code saying , 
®fb# <p@sticn i s  no t worth pursuing? i f  th e  d e c la ra tio n  had been r a t i ­
f ie d , i t  would hare  hem  broken. One p ra c t ic a l  r e m i t  o f th e  United 
States* o f f i c i a l  withdrawal fo r  complete acceptance of th e  convention, 
according to  a  communique fro© Page, was th a t th e  B r i t is h  re leased  every
American sh ip  end cargo deta ined  hut on© w ith in  fo r ty -e ig h t hours a f te r
51
formal aanouaeemsni.
& •  B r i t i s h  p lm  regard ing  contraband was qu it#  simple* f i r s t  , 
they  were fo rced  to  p lace  on the  contraband l i s t s  a l l  a r t i c l e s  e s s e n t ia l  
fo r  m ili ta ry  u se  under modem cond itions o f war. Secondly, they had to  
o b ta in  acceptance o f  such a  l i s t  by th e  U nited S ta te s  even i f  some a r t i ­
c le s  p laced  in  the  abso lu te  l i s t  were on debatab le  ground. With j u s t i f i ­
c a tio n  th# B r i t i s h  co n tin u a lly  po in ted  out th a t  many a r t i c l e s  p rev iously  
considered non-contraband or co n d itio n a l contraband had sine# become 
m i l i ta r i ly  e s s e n t ia l .
I t  was decided to  f i r s t  concen tra te  upon copper, iro n  o re , and 
rubber. Booms* th e  A llie s  were dependent upon the United S ta te s  fo r  
m unitions, Great B r ita in  had to  gain  American acceptance to  these  a r t i ­
c le s  and ye t prevent any q u arre l se rious enough to  end the  source o f 
supply. America d id  f in a l ly  ac<$ai©to# to  th e  add itions o f copper and
^°Lord Grey, fw entv-flv# life rs  (Mow Torks F rederick  A. Stokes 
Company, 3.9 * 5 )• « .  1» «
^ H eo a riek , &E.. f i t . ,  189*
52a r« r . ja* a i t * .  109-
rubber thus allow ing th# B r i t is h  to  d e ta in  v e sse ls  carry ing  th ese  commod­
i t i e s  when hound fo r  German. However, as Grey po in ted  ou t, t h i s  was of
l i t t l e  value Because o f  Germany1’© “contiguous re la tio n sh ip  w ith  o ther
■ 53co u n tries  through whose p o r ts  goods could p a s e .* ^  f h is  was accomplished 
d e sp ite  th e  fa c t th a t  th e  ad d itio n  o f copper, Iron o re , and rubber were 
d i s t in c t ly  forbidden by th e  D eclaration  of London fo r which th© United 
S ta te s  had so earn estly  sought acceptance, fh e  n e ce ss ity  fo r  th e  
B r i t is h ,  however, was to se ize  such cargoes going to  n e u tra l p o r ts , and 
th is  was the po in t o f  conten tion  between th e  two governments.
Great B rita in  always in s is te d  upon the  conform ity o f naval w arfare 
to  s t r i c t  in te rp re ta t io n s  o f existing; in te rn a tio n a l law, but in  her own 
case , repeated ly  departed  from them when i t  was advantageous to  do so. 
Resentment again st B r i t is h  ac tio n s began to  increase  in  America d esp ite  
g en e ra lly  pro-A lly  sympathies.
In London, Page in s is te d  th a t a l l  of th e  ambassadors he knew d id  
not l ik e  B r i t is h  p o lic ie s  but frank ly  f e l t  th a t they  had no o th e r  choice 
but to concede them. STobody in  th e  fo re ign  diplom atic c i r c le  saw & 
ten ab le  case against the  A llied  p o s itio n  according to  P a g e .^
Ambassador Page, however, was an Anglophile o f  th e  f i r s t  o rder.
He would not h e s i ta te  to water-down in s tru c tio n s  a t h is  own d is c re tio n  
when he f e l t  th e  p o s itio n  o f the  United S ta te s  was presented  too s tro n g ly .
53m a .
■5i*Eo'bert le a s in g , War Memoir. of Robert banging (Sew Yorki She 
B obbs-H errill Company, 1935)* PP* 110-11.
^ H ead rick , gp. c l t . . XXX, 178-79.
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P age 's  p re d ile c tio n  fo r th ings .B ritish  even tually  destroyed to some ex­
te n t tlx© worth o f h is  counsel w ith the  P resid en t. M Ceorge M. Travel 
wrote in p a rt!
Page indeed became too open In h is  sympathy w ith th e  A llie s  
to  carry  much weight w ith  a  P residen t who hoped to  p reserve  
n e u tra l i ty ,  but the  d e ta ile d  treatm ent o f one d ispu te  a f te r  
another a r is in g  between Ingland and America over contraband was 
g re a tly  f a c i l i t a t e d  by th e  good understanding between Peg® and 
Grey a t  th e  London end ©f the  cab le . - ■
A short tim e a f te r  Page d e lig h ted ly  informed the  Foreign O ffice 
th a t  th e  United S ta te s  had withdrawn i t s  in s is te n c e  fo r  adherence to  th e  
D eclara tion  o f London he cabled Lansing adv ising  him th a t  Grey f e l t  th e  
S ta te  Department would not form ally p ro te s t  th e  proposed new Order in  
Council contain ing  rev ised  l i s t s  of abso lu te  and co n d itio n a l contraband. 
Th© im pression c re a te d  was th a t the  United S ta te s  would re se rv e  her- r ig h ts  
under in te rn a tio n a l law and t r e a t i e s  en te ring  p ro te s ts  in  p a r t ic u la r  
oases where such r ig h ts  were ia te r fe r re d  w ith  by B r i t a i n .^  She announce­
ment c rea ted  a  favorab le  atmosphere in  Bigland*
Page then advised Lansing on October 25, I f  14, th a t  th e  new Order 
In  Council would be su b s ta n tia lly  the  same m  th e  d ra f t  proposal cabled 
e a r l ie r .  Lansing re p lie d  th a t the United S ta te s  Government could not 
f o r e te l l  th e  e f fe c t  o f the  new Order in  Council o r o f th e  rev ised  co n tra ­
band l i s t  upon pub lic  opinion, sad wanted the  Foreign O ffice  to  understand
3%e©yge M. Trevelyan, j p y  o f  FtflLftdftft (Boston? Houghton M ifflin  
Coui>aay, 1937), P* 353.
*7lor. gel.. 1£L4, Supcl., p. 258.
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demand d ec is iv e  a c tio n  against B r ita in  fo r , a lth o u # . commerce was sub­
je c te d  to  in te rfe re n c e , they were enjoying a very p ro f i ta b le  trad e  w ith  
th e  A llie s  and d id  not w ish to endanger th e  arrangement.
On Movember 3, 191^. th e  Admiralty declared  the  whole Horth Sea a 
m ili ta ry  a rea  which was, according to  Count Berms t e r f f  t German Ambassador 
to  the  tftkited S ta te s , " in  f lag ra n t v io la t io n  o f  in te rn a tio n a l law .H^
A ll sh ips were warned o f the  dangers contingent upon en try  except in  
s t r i c t  accordance w ith  Admiralty d ire c tio n s . Mines had been sewn in  th e  
w aters so v e sse ls  had to  stop and g e t p i lo t s  to  sa fe ly  n eg o tia te  the  
f ie ld s ,  This o ffe red  a  convenient excuse to  have n e u tra l sh ips stop  in  
B r i t i s h  p o rts  p r io r  to  en te rin g  and, o f course, be searched, fhe  United
S ta te s  Government took no o f f ic ia l  n o tic e  o f the  d e c la ra tio n  making the
61Horth Sea a  m ili ta ry  zone.
Great B r ita in  had i n i t i a t e d  and expanded th e  po licy  o f tak ing  
v e sse ls  in to  A llied  p o rts  fo r  v i s i t  and search^-a  s in g u la rly  in fu r ia tin g  
p ra c tic e  to American sh ippers, The r ig h t  o f  a  b e ll ig e re n t to  v i s i t  and 
search Hom the high seas* was rea d ily  conceded, bu t the  B r i t is h  p ra c tic e  
was mot in  keeping w ith  e s tab lish ed  p r in c ip le s  o f in te rn a tio n a l law. Th© 
United S ta te s  p ro te s te d  again st th e  p o licy  o f d e ta in in g  v e sse ls  “upon 
p reem p tio n s c rea ted  by sp e c ia l m unicipal enactments which a re  c le a r ly  a t
Johann H.A.H.A. von B e rn s io rff , My, Three Years in  America (lew 
Torki Charles Scribner and Sons, 1920)♦ p . 12?*
^Seymour, ifaerio&n Diplomacy * p . 36.
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v ariance  w ith  ta te y a a tio n a l l m  and p r a c t ic e . 1^ 2 $Jtm A llie s  in s is te d
th a t th e  sis© o f modern v e sse ls  made m odifications o f o ld  p ra c tic e s
necessary , and d esired  nothing more than the  adoption o f m  e x is tin g ,
e s tab lish ed  r ig h t to  nmt commercial conditions., lo  f in a l  settlem ent o f
th e  question was ewer re a c h e d .^
fh© n e u tra l sh ips were u su a lly  taken to th® Bowns o r Kirkwall on
th e  S c o ttish  coast in  the  north . In  the  M editerranean a rea  v i s i t  and
search  took p lace  a t  G ib ra lta r  o r A lexaadria. fh e  in spec tion  was a t  'a l l
tim es very  thorough as one may ga ther from th#  fa c t  th a t  from January to
Ju ly , 1915* 2466 sh ips a rr iv e d  in  n e u tra l p o r ts  on the  fo r th  Sea and
ZIJZ were m inutely searched*
Spring-Sice wrote &r^r on Bee ember 11, 1914, advising  him th a t
w hile i t  was necessary fo r  B r ita in  to  take  ships in to  p o rt fo r  v i s i t  and
search  the long and c o s tly  process o f d e ten tion  o f v e sse ls  on susp icion
66o f  contraband was causing wide spread complaints in  im erlca. Although 
i t  i s  t ru e  th a t nearly  everything England I n i t i a te d  regarding  in te r f e r ­
ence w ith  shipping ©eased concern, whether extending and adding to- con­
traband l i s t s  o f d ec la rin g  m ili ta ry  zones, th e  <p#sti©& of r ig h t o f v i s i t  
and search  was* perhaps, one o f the  most exasp ©rating.
I n irirn-"iir--- 1- r--1- t-Tfi  “'■I  
62.Malbon® Watson Graham, J r .  ghe Oontroveray Between the  U nited 
S la t ta  m i  the  m i i i  M m a l t o  Hmfaai. H lahte and Coamerc.
M . i s &  f M M .  s i  M t r l s m  B W taM U V . 32M t m i  t t t a i v o r s l t y  o f  fe x a M
B u lle tin , Bo. 2354, A ustin , l u w s  U nlTereity o f Sexaa Preen, 1923),
P* 92*
63Seyaour, Amwloaja tiSktihsmffZ* P* 37.
^ I b l d . . p . 38.
^3Gvynn, ajj. e l t . , I I , 246.
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In  In i#  Beeember, 1914, Sre&t B r ita in  Issued another proclam ation
66regard ing  contraband of war* I t  again enlarged .rad extended previous 
Orders p e rta in in g  to  the  contraband l is ts *  lew ca teg o ries  were appended 
rad  old ones expanded, The l i s t s  were becoming so u n iv ersa l th a t the  
B r i t i s h  were dec larin g  th e i r  r ig h t  to  s tep  almost ©very th in g . Slowly, 
but inexorably* th e  la g l ls h  had rev ised  and extended abso lu te  and con­
d i t io n a l  contraband while purporting  to  g ive concessions to* and champion 
fo r , n e u tra l commerce. th e  fo re ig n  O ffice  co n tin u a lly  accused Germany of 
th e  grave misuse of in te rn a tio n a l law w hile, a t  th© same t in e ,  B r ita in  
was unquestionably g u ilty  o f f la g ra n t v io la t io n s , Wherever rad  whenever 
exigencies o f  war n e c e ss ita te d  reco n stru c tio n  o f e x is tin g  in te rn a tio n a l 
law t r e a t  B r i ta in  d id 'n o t h e s i ta te  to  make the  d e s irab le  co rrec t ions*
th e  U nited S ta te s  sen t a  note disapproving of general B r itis h  
methods rad  conduct dated December 28, 1 9 1 4 .^  I t  was d e liv e red  in  a 
f r ie n d ly  s p i r i t ,  fhe  note was o r ig in a lly  w ritte n  by done Johnson, but 
was rev ised  by Brassing, rad  f in a l ly  again by Bryra- The H alted S ta te s  
expressed some d isp leasu re  th a t  a f te r  f iv e  months o f war the B r i t is h  had 
not a lte re d  th e i r  po licy  rad  lessened  in te rfe re n c e  w ith  in te rn a tio n a l 
trad e  among n e u tra ls , fu r th e r ,  the  Halted S ta te s  Heverraaeat d id  not in ­
tend to  t r e a t  w ith  the  sub ject o f the  p ro p rie ty  o f the  in c lu sio n  o f cer­
t a in  a r tic le s  in  th e  abso lu te  rad cond itiona l l i s t s  although they were 
certa in ly  open to o b jec tion . Th© complaint re s te d  w ith  the  treatm ent o f 
both  c la sse s  o f goods when destined  to  a  n e u tra l p o r t . There were
^ S e e  appendix. C.
67m -  M * >  B4>. 191*. Suppi., p. 373.
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unwarranted de ten tions on the  ground th a t  abso lu te  contraband cargoes,
although shipped to  n e u tra l c o u n trie s , were de ta ined  because th a t country
68
had a c t p ro h ib ited  th e  a sp o rta tio n  of such a r tic le s*  Squally per*
pleasing was B r i t i s h  in d ec is io n  in  th e  treatm ent o f  l ik e  cargoes, th e
United S ta tes d e s ired  inform ation regarding  B r i t is h  p lans fo r  carry ing
out th e i r  proclaim ed p o lic ie s  w ith consistency .
I t  was a lso  mentioned th a t  B r i t is h  p o licy  concerning cond itional
contraband was equally  unjust* A number o f im erican cargoes o f fo odstu ffs
had. been se ised  when bound fo r a  n e u tra l p o rt without p o s it iv e  p roof th a t
6cth e  cargoes were in  r e a l i ty  intended fo r ©uesy u se , * I t  could not be 
held  th a t  mere suspicion  was conclusive evidence, fhe  B r i t i s h  declar­
a tio n  th a t  consignments o f co n d itio n a l contraband “to  order** when shipped 
t© a  n e u tra l p e rt presumes enemy d e s tin a tio n  was untenable  in  and con­
tra ry  to  a l l  in te rn a tio n a l law. l a s t l y ,  America could not condone the  
English p ra c tic e  of  tak ing  v e sse ls  in to  p o rt fo r  search  in  m  endeavor to  
uncover necessary evidence of contraband or "upon presumption c rea ted  by 
sp e c ia l municipal enactment® which were a t variance w ith in te rn a tio n a l 
law .*70
Page rep o rted  th a t  comment about the no te  by the  .Inglish P ress was
71l a  general Mkindly  but p e rfu n c to ry .11* Some segments ©f th e  B r i t is h  f e l t  
%o>. K»l.. 2.3., 1914, Sappl., p. 373.
69Ib id .
70I b id . . p . 374.
^Ibld.. p. 377.
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the  message was p ro s ite d  by German propaganda and u n o ff ic ia l  c i r c le s
thought I t  due to  domestic po lic ies*  Sher© was some fe e lin g  in  B r ita in
th a t th e  United S ta tes  wished to  grow wealthy a t  England1 s expense,
In mid-December, 191^# Consul General Skinner (London) rtjported
th a t th e  B r i t i s h  Government had appointed a  committee to  consider claim s
made by n e u tra l th i rd  p a r t ie s  against sh ips and cargoes which had been
condemned or de ta ined  by B r i t i s h  P r is e  Courts. At f i r s t  the  committee
handled only those claim s ag a in st ships or cargoes upon which sentence
had a lready  been passed. Also, according to  Skinner, many shipments o f
lumber, tobacco, a g r ic u ltu ra l  inclem ent*, co tton , and the  l ik e  had been
deta ined  four months o r more without being re leased . Since th e  goods
did  not appear l ia b le  to  condemnation he could not understand how th e
B r i t is h  could le g a lly  hold th e m ,^
Great B r ita in , a t  her own admission, was not concerned w ith  the
n ic e t ie s  of in te rn a tio n a l law, but w ith  rendering the  enemy in e f fe c tiv e
by whatever means a v a ila b le , th e  B r i t i s h  from the ou tse t o f  th e  War had
embraced th e  p o licy  o f  tra n s fe r r in g  every p o ss ib le  a r t i c l e  o f  peace time
commerce to  th e  abso lu te  contraband l i s t  without undue r i s k  o f d ec is iv e
American p ro te s t .  P ra c tic a lly  everything became cond itional contraband.
Conditional contraband must be proved bound fo r  enemy d e s tin a tio n , a
ra th e r  simple p ro je c t s ince  th e  B r i t is h  P r is e  Courts ru led  upon th e  
73"proof."
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Th© contraband m le s  as enforced by th© Snte&te Power© a l l  h a t 
ended d ire c t trad e  w ith  S® nsa^, U nfortunately , however, i t  was not 
only d ire c t  trad e  w ith  German which was affected* Th© a p p lica tio n  o f 
role© o f in tern ation al law was he ld  m  general by Great B r ita in  th a t  th© 
B arest suspicion o f  a cargo was enough to  condemn i t  as carry ing  enemy 
d e s tin a tio n .
The bu ild -up  o f an e x tra  le g a l su p e rs tru c tu re  By the  A llie s  was a  
Cautious, c l  or or undertaking* Great B r ita in  was not w illin g  to  cause a 
complete breakdown o f peacefu l re la tio n s  w ith  the  United S ta te s , In  
September, a f te r  the  o u tb re^ : o f  the  War, Grey had taken the  p o s itio n  
th a t  American frien d sh ip  was more isp o rtan i than the  in te rru p tio n  o f Ger­
man im p o r ts .^  When th e  Contraband Gosodttee was formed over a  year 
l a t e r  (lovembor, 1915)* lock ing  to  th© c o n tro llin g  o f  German imports
through n e u tra l c o u n tr ie s , Grey advised the:.committee members of .the 'im-
75portance of Anglo-American frien d sh ip s ,
Th© Foreign O ffice  was constan tly  under p ressu re  to Increase  
economic w arfare, bo th  from franc© and th e  B r i t i s h  Admiralty. The War 
■Office believed  th a t  the  only avenue to  f in a l  v ic to ry  was the  exhaustion 
o f  Germany, Inside. B r i ta in  p ub lic  demand grew fo r  a  blockade. There was 
a  fe e lin g  by the  B aglish Bros© th a t  pro-A lly  sympathy in  th© United S ta te s
^firm est B. May, T&® M biM IM , Mfk im erfean lrMl&tloar. 191^1917 
(Cambridge? Server* U niversity  F re ts , 1959), P* IB.
T r e v e ly a n ,  c .lt , , pp. 3^6~ky. This Contraband Gomiaibb®© be­
came one o f  th e  most im portant concern® fo r winning th© War according to  
Trevelyan*
was too stro n g  to allow m  erup tion  o f Ax^lo-American frien d sh ip , Gen- 
© rally epoakiag th e re  i s  l i t t l e  doubt th a t th e  American people were in  
favor w ith  th© A llied  oeu.se, Wilson one® remarked to  Spring-n ice th a t  
n in e ty  p er ©■eat o f the  people were sympathetic toward the  A l l i e s . ^
The m unitions question  d ivided sec tions o f the  United S ta te s ,
The in d u s tr ia l  Vert heart, o f course, d esired  such shipments w hile many 
l a  the  South and West wanted a  m unition embargo, A h i l l  to  e ffe c t an 
embargo was in troduced  by Senator Hitchcock o f Mehraska hut was defeated# 
S ir  Mward Grey M uted th a t  passage o f such, le g is la t io n  would he con­
side red  an u n -n eu tra l m%X?
The S ta te  Department published  a  note to  American c it iz e n s  ex­
p la in in g  th e i r  r ig h t to  s e l l  contraband a r t i c l e s  to  b e ll ig e re n t govern­
ments. The paper po in ted  out th a t  c it iz e n s  were ac t p ro h ib ite d  by in te r ­
n a tio n a l law, or by n a tio n a l s ta tu te  or t r e a ty  from s e l l in g  such a r t ic le s#  
Furthermore, a  n e u tra l government was not compelled to  p ro h ib it such
sa le s , bat a r t i c l e s  o f  contraband to b e ll ig e re n ts  were sub ject to  se izu re
78under e s tab lish ed  p r in c ip le s  o f in te rn a tio n a l law,
Th© A dm inistration as a whole was again st any arms and m a l t  ions 
embargo. American business was w illin g  to  s e l l  th e  necessary engines o f 
war to  b e llig e re n t na tions and th© Government r©cognized th e i r  estab­
lish e d  r ig h t to  do so. Such commodities wore needed by both w arring
WGwynn, op. c l t * , XI, 2&5#
^ K i l l i a ,  ajj.* S i l - » P> 10°*
W a i te d  S ta te s  Congress, Senate, 63d Congress, 2d Session, Coa- 
Record. Vol. IX » P a rt 16 (Washington* Government P r in t in g '
o m c e ^ l l T p V  I681h*
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groups but p a r t ic u la r ly  so by Bagland. Germany, la  f a c t ,  pushed hard to
achieve m  embargo oh munitions in  m  e f fo r t  to  sever the  ,4111#® from th e  
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American m arket. Groat B rita in * s  dependency upon am tr& l m unitions was
fa r  g re a te r  than  th a t o f th® Q entral Bowers,
la r ly  In  the  f i r s t  autumn of the f a r  th# S ta te  Department issued  
an order p ro h ib itin g  th® p u b lic a tio n  o f sh ip ’ s m anifests t h i r t y  days be­
fo re  s a il in g , icco rd isg  to  S ir  C ecil Spring-Rie® the ban had been se­
cured by an agent o f G e r m a n y * $ M s  p o licy  hardly' d e tra c ted  from eon- 
tinned  B r i t is h  in te rfe re n c e  w ith  commerce. Many American s h i v e r s ,  to  
p ro te c t them selves, wanted B r i t i s h  agents to  inspect the  cargoes before  
s a i l in g  and c e r t i f y  manifest® as to  th e i r  co rre c tn e ss , fhe  p ro h ib itiv e  
o rder had in  e ffe c t mad© every shipment suspect to th e  B ritish*  fo  ob­
v ia te  unnecessary d e te n tio n s , His M ajesty1 s Government proposed negoti­
a tio n s  d ire c tly  w ith American p r iv a te  firm s fo r  th#  issuance of export 
pe rm its . She companies p a r t ic ip a tin g  had to  g lv#  assurances th a t they 
would no t export to  Germany or to  n e u tra l  co u n tries  not haring  r@f®sport
embargoes, products to  be used fo r  war.
Before the B r i t is h  would n e g o tia te , however, the  tra iled  State® had
to  re e le d  the  order forbidding- p u b lica tio n  o f  Ship1# manifest® th i r ty
days p r io r  to  s a i l in g , fh e  Uagltsh also  demanded th a t  th e  m anifests be 
c o rre c t , and f in a l ly ,  d e s ired  the  United S ta te s  Government to  admit Io
79Ssyraour, Mmtitsm Siplom acj, p . 12. 
®°(ls«jran, as.. c l , t . , I I ,  2k6.
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the  B r i t is h  r ig h t  to  se ize  products consigned ’Ho o r d e r . X n  february* 
1913, th© United S ta te s  d id  in  fa c t ree in d  the  m anifest order and a f te r
Op
th a t tim e no mm  protest©  mr® mad# over H o o rder11 -consignments.
Many Americans f e l t  th a t i t  was h o t te r  to  accept B r i t is h  ru le s  and Con- 
t im e  business than to  f a l l  hack upon a b s tra c t leg a liz ed  arguments oirer 
n e u tra l righ ts*
fhm B r i t is h  were se m ir in g  a  phenomenal supremacy over the high 
seas and n e u tra l shipping. G radually , hut' very su ccessfu lly , they had 
achieved a  co n tro l over a  la rg e  segment of the  ta e r ic a a  economy*
%  th e  c lo se  o f 191^. the  United S ta te s  had won nothing By J u r i ­
d ic a l  review in  her f ig h t fo r th e  p ro te c tio n  of n e u tra l r ig h ts .  Ships 
were se ised  upon mere susp ic ion  and deta ined  a t  g rea t cost to  shippers* 
Without fo rm ality  of cap ture  the B r i t i s h  sent n e u tra l sh ips In to  p o rt 
fo r  purposes o f v i s i t  and search . In te rfe re n ce  w ith  cargoes consigned 
to  n e u tra l c o u n trie s  was continued. In tensions and add itions to  the  
contraband l i s t s  had fo r  th® most- p a r t  been accepted, fhe  p ra c tic e  of 
tak ing  v e sse ls  in to  p # r i  fo r  v i s i t  and search* although p ro te s te d  
a g a in s t, wm  a l l  th e  more ea rn es tly  pursued, th e  tM te d  S ta te s  su ffe red  
a  S tinging defeat, in  f i r s t  a ttem pting  to secure th© D eclara tion  of Lon­
don as a  naval cod# to  be follow ed Curing th# War, t h i s  f a i lu r e  augured 
many more fa ilu res*  fo r  fro© th a t po in t on the United S ta te s  never ob­
ta in ed  a  major concession fro© th e  B ritish*
81Alloe H. M orris*?. £he Jm ZlSM  M M M sI  WtS M A  I k M i  i2 ii ir
I f l ?  (Oambridge: Harvard U n iversity  P ress , 1939)* FP« 36-39*
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B rita in  had achieved contraband c la s s if ic a t io n  fo r every planned 
item hut one—co tto n . M  attem pt was not a c tu a lly  made a t th is  time to 
p lace  i t  on th#  l i s t  fo r Qrey was o f the opinion th a t  i f  co tto n  had been 
ea rly  declared  contraband i t  might have provoked a  munitions embargo by 
th e  United S t a t e s . ^  In the  summer of 1915» however, Great B r ita in  did  
in  fa c t  declare  co tton  contraband.*
Content to  re ly  upon Ju d ic ia l  arguments w ith in  th© framework of 
e x is tin g  in te rn a tio n a l law, the  United S ta te s  fa i le d  to  i n i t i a t e  and 
u t i l i z e  powerful economic p ressu res  to accomplish her ends. What is  
more, th e  diplom atic correspondence was something le s s  than demanding*
The B r i t is h  always r© p ilo t in  soothing tones but y ie ld in g  nothing.
S ir  Edward Grey was in  a very d e lic a te  s i tu a t io n , fh© M m ira lity , 
War O ffice , and general p u b lic  were increasing  demands fo r  more severe 
economic p ressu res  ag a in st Germany. Grey could n o t, a t  the  same tim e, 
p ressu re  too rap id ly  a t the  expense of *%ierican frien d sh ip , The p rese r­
v a tion  of a sound re la tio n sh ip  was always uppermost in  h is  mind* 'The 
p o s it io n  o f th© United S ta te s  was a t a l l  times the  u ltim a te  determ inant 
in  any” f in a l  v ic to ry . Grey understood th is  and refused  to  embark upon 
any d ire c tio n  which might have a lie n a te d  im erica. He enjoyed th© fr ie n d ­
sh ip  and confidence of th# fo re ig n  diplom ats in  London. The fo re ign  
Secretary  was c a re fu l not to  p ress  or push too f a r .
Resentment o f B r i t i s h  p o l ic ie s ,  nonetheless, was apparent in  the  
United S ta te s . The English had p ra c t ic a l ly  ceased observing any d is t in c ­
t io n  between contraband and condition®! contraband which enraged many
^ T re v e ly a n , ££.. p i t *. p* 3k9»
American sh ippers. th e  S ta te  Department, according to  Lansing, was &e~
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luged w ith  p ro te s ts  concerning in te rfe re n ce  w ith  n e u tra l r ig h ts*  ' As 
t r e a t  B r ita in  extended and tigh tened  measures in. a ttem pting economic 
s ta rv a tio n  of Germany, anger and disapproval roe# .p roportionate ly  'in  the  
U nited States* ten s io n  continued to  mount and diplomat i s  no tes 'between 
th e  two governments became longer, du& lelal n ic e tie s  had m&t c e r ta in ly  
f a i le d  to  fo rce  B r i t i s h  adherence to  n e u tra l in te rp re ta t io n s  o f in te r s  
n a tio n a l law* Legal v e rb o s ity  had preserved  peacefu l r e la t io n s  between 
th e  two co u n tries  m& t h i s ,  o f  course, was the  in te n t on both  sides o f 
the  cab le .
l e a s i n g ,  jg^ cftt..*, p» '121.
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America, during the  f i r s t  f iv e  m a th s  o f th© War, had been unsuc­
c ess fu l in  i t s  attem pts to  achieve a  s a t is fa c to ry  so lu tio n  of the  e a rly  
problems w ith Ur ea t B ritain* J  am ary, 1915* marked the  beginning o f a new 
year which would see th e  o ld  co n troversies continued, The United S ta te s  
had n e ith e r  taken a  decisive  p o s itio n  In  i t s  defense o f n e u tra l r ig h ts  
nor seemingly d esired  to  e ffe c t one, The Government, rep resen ted  by the  
S ta te  Department, wished to  prolong the  le g a l argument® as long as p o ss i­
b le .
Apprehension had been apparent among business in te r e s ts  regard ing
the December note u n t i l  i t  was made p u b lic . Many had fea red  th a t  the
1U nited S ta te s  might have p ro te s te d  too s tro n g ly . Their fea rs  were 
a llay e d , however, when the  note turned out to  be c o n c ilia to ry  in  tone 
and eapreeetd  hard ly  more than a  restatem ent o f the  United S ta te s  posi­
t io n , includ ing  evidence o f the  in te n tio n  to  have recourse to  r ig h tfu l  
claim s a f te r  th® War,
S ir Idward Urey dispatched  a  note to  Secretary  o f S ta te  Bryan
under d a te  of Junuary ?, 1915* contain ing  prelim inary  comments regarding
2
th e  Am@ric.an note of December 28, I t  po in ted  out th a t  B r ita in  had not 
in  fa c t unduly in t  e r f  e rred  w ith  n e u tra l  commerce when th a t  commerce had
^Charles C allan T a a s il, America Goes, tp. Wag. (Bostons L i t t le ,
I r o m  and Company, 1939)* P- 19?.
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to e ta  le g itim a te . I r $ j  m aintained th a t foodstu ffs  should not too deta ined  
w ithout presumption of u ltim a te  enemy d e s tin a tio n  and th is  ru le  had "been 
s t r i c t l y  followed, His Majesty* s §ow©rm©nt was prepared to  examine any 
sp e c if ic  in stances to the  con tra ry , drey also  upheld th e  B r i t i s h  p ra c tic e  
o f tak ing  ship# in to  po rt fo r  T is f t  and search. He considered i t  essen­
t i a l  under modem conditions o f  war th a t where re a l  ground fo r  suspecting  
contraband cargoes ex is ted  the  Ship m e t  toe taken in to  p o rt to  adm in ister 
a  thorough Inspection , fh© lo  r  s ign  Secretary  re fe rre d  to  s e re ra l  in s ta n ­
ces where rubber had been shipped from th© United S ta te s  under another 
3designation . Great B r ita in  was not con testing  the  general law upon 
which th e  U nited S ta te s  based her stand , but was merely s tr id in g  to  stop  
a l l  contraband trad e  w ith  th e  enemy.
Counselor Uansing suggested to  Wilson on danaary 11, 1915» th a t 
Gr©yr s not® was an attem pt to  J u s ti fy  B r i t is h  ac tio n  w ith  a  d e f in i te  
purpose o f reducing p ub lic  i r r i t a t i o n  in  th e  United S tates* and a t th e  
same time* re fu s in g  any assurances th a t  trad e  cond itions w ith  n e u tra ls  
would toe re lle red *
lo  d is t in c t io n  was mad© between abso lu te  and co n d itio n a l c o n tra ­
band. l i t t l e  was sa id  in  th e  B r i t is h  note concemitjg th e  u n c e rta in ty  o f 
the seas which was one of th e  c h ie f  com plaints. S p e c if ic a lly , th a t the  
danger of se izu re  end d e ten tion  d e te rred  shippers from sending goods, and 
steam ship companies refused  to  carry  cargoes. A fu r th e r  com plication was
33Tor. R e l.. jr .f . ,  1915, S tippl., pp. 299-302.
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that shippers war#, In many instances* refused insurance Decause of  
trade conditions.
Lansing considered nsuspected cargoes” a term that required ex­
planation. Th© United States also complained o f  the way in which the 
admitted role of foodstu ffs was applied by the British* .Almost any ex­
cuse could detain cargoes. I t  was not a question o f the ju s tic e  rendered 
in  B r itish  Friz© Courts, but the action prior to Brig© Court proceedings 
which was objectionable to the United States.^  Lansing further reasoned 
i t  was not th© concern of the United States that a danger existed  for  
transshipment and re-exportation o f goods to the enemy through contiguous 
nations. I t  was a problem for th© B r itish  to solve between those nations 
and themselves, and the neutral shipper should not be mad© to su ffer .
Many times explanations of detentions were not promptly given causing 
great ir r ita t io n  on the part of the shippers.
Grey1* note was not the o f f ic ia l  deta iled  message the Foreign 
Of fie© counselors were preparing. In th is  regard, Bryan instructed Fag© 
under date of January 12, 1915, to inform the Foreign Secretary that th e  
United States apprecia ted  B rita in ’ s agreement respecting In te rn a tio n a l law
as set forth in the .American note, however, an o f f ic ia l  reply would be
6withheld u n til  a further declaration from the B ritish  was received.
The very lenghty and detailed  answer to detentions end seizures
m
o f neutral commerce arrived in  February. Urey endeavored to convincingly
I'or. Hel. ■ g ,.£ ., LanalnK ?apar» . I ,  261. 
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show th a t  B r i t i s h  naval opera tions coo.lt in  m  way be h o lt  responsib le
fo r any di® inim tioa in  th© volume o f  Gnit©& State©1 exports* S® ©Iso
m aintained th a t  s t a t i s t i c s  revealed  a  temporary d istu rbance  in  n e u tra l
sM ppim  had e a r l ie r  occurred, however* a  steady recovery h a t commenced
a n t was than s t i l l  in  p ro g ress , th e  fo re ig n  S ecre tary  po in ted  out th a t
d e ten tio n  o f ships w ith  a  view to  stopping contraband t r a f f i c  had not
n early  so reduced shipping tonnage as th® d e s tru c tio n  o f  n e u tra l vessel©
&by subsarin#  mimes indi© crlslnat© ly laid- by th e  m m j ,  furtherm ore, 
because i t  was p o ss ib le  fo r  b e ll ig e re n ts  to  e a s ily  supply them selves 
through contiguous n e u tra l c o u n trie s  w ith  modern systems of tra n s p o rta ­
t io n , i t  was im possible fo r  a  b e l l ig e re n t1 s opponent to  r e f r a in  fro® in ­
t e r  f  e rr in g  w ith  commerce inttm ded f o r  the  enemy although d estin ed  to  a  
n e u tra l p o r t.
In  ad d itio n , Grey in s is te d  th a t  th# d is t in c t io n  between fo odstu ffs
in tended fo r  th e  c iv i l  popu lation  o f Germany and those  in tended fo r  i t s
9armed fo rces m  longer existed* I#  hoped i t  would be seen th a t  B r i ta in  
in  her naval conduct had mot reduced n eu tra l commerce, and th a t  i t  had been 
th® endeavor o f Great B r i ta in  to  avoid personal lo ss  and in ju ry  to  neu­
t r a l s  m  co n tra s ted  w ith  th e  enemy whose p o lic ie s  mad# no p ro v isio n s fo r  
personal sa fe ty .
fh# re fe ren ce  Grey mad© concerning personal sa fe ty  was l a  regard  
to  th#  German d e c la ra tio n  dated  February b , 1915, e s ta b lish in g  a  naval
8m a.
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war zone around the B ritish  I s le s .  Gerard, United States Mbassador la  
Berlin-, cabled Bryan advising in  parts
German .Admiralty issu es the follow ing proclamations the 
waters gjcrroua&ing Great B ritain  and Ireland including the whole 
Ifcglish Channel are hereby declared to be comprised within the 
seat o f war and that a l l  ma « y  merchant v e sse ls  found in  those 
waters a fter  th® eighteenth instant w il l  be destroyed although 
i t  may not always be possib le  to save crews and passengers.
Hetxbral v e sse ls  eaepese themselves to danger within th is  sons 
o f war sin ce in  view o f the misuse o f th# neutral f la g  ordered 
ty  th# B r itish  Government on January th ir ty -fir st- and of the con­
tin gen cies of maritime warfare i t  cannot always be avoided that 
neutral v esse ls  su ffer  from attacks Intended to  str ik e  enemy 
sh ip s .
fhe United States strongly protested the German announcement and 
warned of the grave consequences contingent upon such action. I t was a l l  
very w ell to in terfere  w ith neutral commerce without lo ts  o f l i f e  to 
M eric an c it iz e n s , but the German declaration threatened lo ss  o f both 
l iv e s  and commerce, fhe German Government was held in s tr ic t  accounta­
b i l i t y  for i t s  naval operations regarding lo s s  o f .American l iv e s  and 
property pursuant to non-belligerent1 s r igh ts upon th# high seas.
fhe problem of neutral flags began immediately, the B r itish  
argued that for the purposes o f  escaping capture by an enemy vesse l a 
merchant ship could use another nation1# fla g . I t  had been a w ell estab­
lish ed  T%m de guerre w ithin certain  lim ita tio n s, fh© B r itish  had no 
objection to a foreign merchantman using th e ir  merchant fla g  for the
purpose of evading capture at sea by a b e llig eren t. Sim ilarly, the con-
11
verse should be true.
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Bryan, however, cabled Page on February 10, 1915* th a t th e  p o s itio n  
o f the United S ta te s  in  th© a f f a i r  was th a t th© occasional u se  of a  
n e u tr a l1 s f la g  to  avoid cap tu re  under immediate p u rsu it was quit© d i f f e r ­
ent from an e x p lic i t  sanction  by a  b e llig e re n t government fo r i t s  mer­
chant ships to  genera lly  f ly  a n e u tra l f la g  in  a l l  w aters considered to
12
be frequented by enemy w arships, Bryan in s tru c te d  Fag© to  impress upon 
Gray th e  problems such a  p o licy  would involve and urge h is  r e s t r a in t ,
©ray cabled Bryan on February 20, 1915* assu ring  him th a t th e  
B r i t i s h  Government had no in te n tio n  o f adopting a  p o licy  p erm itting  gen­
e ra l  u se  o f n e u tra l f la g s  fo r merchant ships o th er than to  escape cap ture  
as recognised among ■nations. However, i t  was th# b e ll ig e re n t  w arship1 s 
duty to  a sc e r ta in  d e f in i te ly  th e  n a tio n a li ty  of a  ship,, and any lo ss  
su ffe red  to n e u tra l shipping caused by d isreg ard in g  th a t  o b lig a tio n  was 
th#  re sp o n s ib ili ty  o f the enemy vesse l and government.
The German Government had announced th re e  days p rev iously , on Feb­
ruary  17, 1915. i t s  in te n tio n  o f proceeding upon th# e a r l ie r  promulgated
13p o licy  of submarine w arfare . This would be don© in  l ig h t  o f f a i lu r e  
to  achieve a  compromise allow ing foodstu ffs and raw m ate ria ls  to en te r 
Germany*
The urgency of the s i tu a tio n  prompted the  o f f ic ia l s  a t the  S ta te  
Department to  seek a  se ttlem ent of tr ia n g u la r  d iffe ren ces  by proposing a  
tnnfe» vivendi between the  two warring powers. Id en tic  no tes o u tlin in g
^ F o r , Hoi. , !,♦!*» 1915* Suppl. ,  p , 100, 
13ibia. , p. 112.
th e  modus were sent tc  Great B r i ta in  and t e a a y  under dot© o f  februi&ry
20* 1915* S&o notes contained th e  follow ing p rov isions:
(X) fh a t  n e ith e r  w il l  sew suay f lo a t  lug Bines, whether upon 
th® high tea* or l a  t e r r i t o r i a l  water A; th a t  n e ith e r  w in  p lan t 
i l l  the high seas anchored nine® ere apt w ith in  cannon range of 
harbors fo r  defensive purposes only; a n t th a t  a l l  s in e s  sh a ll  
hear th e  stamp o f th© gwernsoBt planting the® and he to con- 
© tru s te d  as to  become h a m le ts  i f  separa ted  fron  th e i r  moorings ;
(2) th at neitkar w il l  use submarines to  a tta c k  Berclusat 
v e sse ls  o f any natioaaX lty  except to  enforce the right o f v i s i t  
and search;
(3) th a t  each w ill req u ire  th e i r  re sp ec tiv e  merchant v e sse ls  
not to  u se  c e n tra l f la g s  fo r  the  purpose o f d isg u ise  o r r ^ s s  do 
$mMMs
Germany to  agree t
fh at a l l  importations offbod or foodstuffs t rm the  
United States (and from such other neutral countries as may ash 
for i t ) ,  into (lor*" n* sh e ll be consigned to agencies to- ho 
d e s ig n a te  by th e  United States Government; th a t these M ericaa  
agencies sh a ll have en tire  charge and control, without in terfer­
ence on the part c f  the Sernen Government c f  the receipt and 
d istr ib u tion  o f such importation, and sh a ll d istr ib u te  th is  
so le ly  to r e ta i l  dealers bearing licen ses from the Chsrmiwt Govern- 
m n t  e n tit lin g  them to receive and furnish such food im& food­
s tu ffs  to non-combatants only; that any v io la tio n  o f the re­
t a i le r s 1 lic en se s  shall work a forfe itu re  of th e ir  rights to  re­
ceive such food and foodstu ffs for th is  purpose.; and. that such 
food &r4 foodstuffs w ill  not be requisitioned by the Bszmm 
Government for any purpose whatsoever, or be diverted to  the use  
o f the armed forces o f  Germany.
Great Brit-41 a was to agrees
t h a t  food and fo o d stu ffs  w ill  not be p laced upon the  ab­
so lu te  contraband l i s t  and th a t  shipments of such .Commodities 
w i l l  not be i n t e r f e r e d  w ith  o r de ta ined  by B r i t i s h  a u th o r it ie s  
i f  consigned to  agencies designated  by th© United S ta te s  Govern­
ment in  Germany fo r th e  r e c e ip t  and d is tr ib u t io n  o f  mesh cargoes 
to  licen sed  German r e t a i l e r s  tor d is t r ib u t io n  so le ly  to  th e  
non-combatant population*1^
S ir  Idward Grey informed Bag® th a t he favored th e  proposals a t 
l e a s t  in  p r in c ip le , th e  fo re ig n  S ecretary  added, however, th a t  the  p lan
m
Tor. BoX. . £ .3 . ,  1915. S u p p l., p . 120.
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had to ho submitted to the Omhimt and then to Franc# and Bussia.^
Uerard cabled Washington on february &?» 1915* advising Bryan to
notify  th# prevision providing that d istribu tion  of food b© supervised
by agents of the United i t  at m Government. fhi® would have meant a
16p a r tia l surrender of German sovereignty* fbe embassador suggested 
that d is trib u tio n  he handled by a neutral oosmitte® appointed by h is per­
sonally* I f  Germany accepted the proposition and Bogland and her i l l  l e t  
did n o t, the United I ta te e  would place an embargo on arms to the Mtmto 
Power®.
Germany wa© the f i r s t  to answer on March 1, 1915. sta ting  that 
the proposal generally offered a suitable basis for the p rac tica l solu­
tio n  of outstanding problems, fhe German Government was- prepared to 
forego mo of th® submarine in  at tacking merchantmen of any flag  ©accept 
to enforce the righ t of v is i t  and search, fhe suggested regulation of 
the importation of legitim ate foodstuffs was also accepted in  princip le . 
Germany, however, reserved a defin ite  statement u n ti l  the B ritish  re -
17
plied . f
fk® B ritish  Gabinei* with th® except ion of Grey, f e l t  i t  more ad­
vantageous to retain , th© economic food blockade of Germany even I f  i t  
meant continued .submarine warfare, and on March 15* 19.1.5* they refused
15?or. Bel.. £.&., 1915, Suppl.. p. 122.
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th e  compromise. Thxn the  yjyjan4l was defeated  la a f i r s t  a t t e s t
a t gravely needed success.
two weeks. e a r l ie r  Prim® M in ister Asfulbh, in  an address be fo re  
Parliament, had replied to German submarine warfare stating that the
IQ
Allies would out off a ll trade with the Central Powers. She Alliance
20wm m i to he strangled by a "network of juridical nicet ies. 1 Wilson 
announced the next day that the United States would, defer a protest note 
until the British made known, what measure® they intended to employ to 
accomplish stoppage of t r a d e . t h e  President stated that conditions of 
war had changed but not the rules.
In a telegram 'dated March 15» and received the following day, the 
B ritish position was amplified in- a fu ll text attached to a new Order in 
Council. I ts  effect was the same as the previous speech outlining 
Allied re ta lia tion  for Carman policies. A blockade of German and neu­
tra l  ports was asserted in everything but name, fhe language was such 
as to refrain from using the word blockade in a s tric t legal sense, 
le ither Great Britain alone nor her Allies in concert could in fact ac­
complish a legal blockade.
IS
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fhe Order i s  Council o f  Harsh i l  i s  e ffe c t  said that the A llie s
would blockade neutral ports as w ell as German since lega l blockade was 
22im possible. fhe im possib ility  o f ■blockading Germany within the frame­
work o f international law stemmed from a combination o f  geography and 
the German lavy. Great B ritain  admitted that th is  action was "outside 
the ordinary naval law which could not have been p it in to  force leg a lly  
had i t  not been for the prior infringemeats o f G e r m a n y . G e r m a n  po licy  
had been the A llied  excuse for such unprecedented action* I t  cannot be 
doubted, ■however* that w ithin the le t te r  o f international law the Beprls- 
a l Order wai i l l e g a l .
O ffic ia ls  at the State Department began work on a note to His 
Majesty* s Government concerning American views o f the blockade. Lansing, 
Bryan and Wilson held something of divergent opinions- as to  how the 
message should be written* 2he use of the word “blockad©” was advised
by Lansing in  any answer so the United States could in s is t  upon the rules
24or ig in a lly  governing blockades. ' Wilson* however, said  that Lansing1© 
proposed drafts were convincing but would only lead to  a le g a l debate 
with B ritain  of no p ractica l b e n e f it. She President f e l t  the United 
States was faced w ith something the English were in  fact doing. Bryan, 
on the other hand, suggested the only d ifference between the views o f  
Wilson and Lansing was the B r itish  fa ilu re  to use the word “blockade” 
which, to the Secretary o f  S tate, was not important for i t  was merely a
22See Appendix Order in  Council dated March 11, 1915.
23Seymour, American Piulomacy, p . 40..
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method o f procedure. He could not understand the B r itish  p osition  
regarding the r ig h t  to  stop mon~contrab&m& goods when shipped to a neu­
tr a l port. Unless a ‘blockade could he ©idended to neutral ports only 
contraband could he stopped.
lancing f e l t  the United State© should protest i t s  r igh ts from 
being waived and m  acquiescence given to B r itish  po licy  by any fa ilu re  
to  d iscuss the method of enforcing th e  proposed blockade at that time. 
Under the ru les  of contraband, non-contraband good© consigned to a neu­
tr a l port whatever the ultim ate destination  could mot be in t erf erred with  
pursuant to blockade.
Wilson proposed th a t the l in e  taken should be*
Xou c a ll  th is  a blockade and mean to maintain i t  as such* but 
i t  i t  obvious that i t  i t  unprecedented in  almost every respect,,, 
but ch ie fly  in  this# that i t  i t  a blocked© o f n m tral as w ell as 
b elligeren t coasts and harbours,, which no b e lligeren t can claim  
as a r igh t. We sh all m & m t therefore that the d iscretion  
lodged by the Order in  Council In the adm inistrative o f f ic e s  and 
courts o f the crown w ill  be exercised to correct what i s  irregu­
la r  in th is  situ ation  and leave the way open to our leg itim ate  
trade. I f  th is  i s  not done we sh a ll have to hold you to a 
s t r ic t  accountability for  every Instance o f r igh ts v io la ted  and 
injury donej but we Interpret Sir Mw&rd Urey* s note to mean that 
th is  i s  exactly what w ill  be don©;2*
lea sin g  outlined h is  proposals as follows:
(1) A declaration o f the r igh ts o f the United States based on 
p rin cip les of international law—to assure people of the United 
States and the B r itish  Government that w© were not ind ifferent 
to our r ig h ts .
26n > ia .. p . 288. 
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m(2) f l it  p o l i t ic a l  o ffse t of a strong declaration of our 
r ig h ts —a general statement which would amount to p ractica l 
acceptance of the B ritish  asserted right to intercept a l l  com­
merce from neutrals to Germany passing through neutral ports, 
would g iro  opponents m rnnition in foreign p olicy  f ie ld .
(3) I f  w© admit toy our wording that the measures o f B ritain  
are J u stified  toy conditions and give i t  a degree of le g a lity  
recovery o f claims would he d if f ic u lt .
(h) We must declare our neutral r igh ts m  heretofore recog­
nised so that a fter  the war we can assert that such rights  
ex ist end th e ir  le g a lity  has not "been impaired by any J u s t if i ­
cation o f the Order in  Council.
(5) Assert le g a l righ ts so in  the future they w ill  to# of 
value t© those injured toy the Order in  Council.
(6) We should avoid asserting our legal, right# in  such a way 
as to force our Government to unusual action to compel th e ir  
recognition.
2$fhese views were in  the form o f a memorandum dated March 2h» 1915*
Four days la te r  Wilson seat a message to Ians lag concerning h is  
previous drafts:
I have r e c i i t  the not# as a statement and interpretation so 
that there i s  no argument involved, tout i t  i s  meant to means 
w© have the Order and the note accompanying i t .  We cannot 
understand these as n otice  o f  leg a l action . W@ sh a ll assume 
the contrary u n til  thing# done compel us to lock upon th© 
matter d ifferen tly , then we sh a ll hold the B r itish  government 
responsible in  accordance with the w ell known princip les o f  
international law, o f  which we now remind her, so that she may 
know Just what we 'understand them to h e ,^9
Lansing answered that he would e ffec t the desired change# and the draft
was accepted toy Wilson ©n March 29, 1915*
the note sent to Fag© on March 30, could not toe construed as- a 
formal protest. I t  pointed out that the March Order in Oouncil consti­
tuted a p ractica l assertion  o f l im it le s s  b elligeren t r igh ts in control­
lin g  neutral commerce in denial o f the sovereign right# of peaceful
PR
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n a tio n s . The United S ta te s  conceded th e  r ig h t to  lake  v esse ls  in to  p o rt 
fo r  v i s i t  and search i f  suspected of carry ing  contraband c a rg o e s .^  The 
U aitM  S ta te s  could not accep t, however, any blockade w ith in  the  p r in c i­
p le s  of in te rn a tio n a l law which disallow ed leg a l t r a f f i c  to  and from 
n e u tra l p o r ts , fh e  B r i t is h  defense th a t the  blockade was a  J u s t i f ia b le  
r e ta l ia to r y  measure fo r  German ac tions was a lso  u n sa tis fa c to ry . The 
U nited S ta te s  fu r th e r  s t r e s s e d  hope th a t the  in s tru c tio n  given to author­
i t i e s  by the- B r i t is h  Government would be in  such a  manner as to  modify
the p ra c t ic a l  ap p lica tio n  o f th e  Order in  Council which, i f  s t r i c t l y  ea-
*11force®, would v io la te  in te rn a tio n a l  law.
The U nited State®,- in s te a d  o f immediately assuming a  f in s ,  posi­
t iv e  p o s it io n  against the  blockade, merely, a sse rte d  her expectation  th a t  
Croat B r ita in  would not v io la te  t r a d i t io n a l  p r in c ip le s  of in te rn a tio n a l, 
law. In  the  opinion o f  von B e m s to rff , Germany was d isappoin ted  th a t th e  
United S ta tes made no attem pt to  v in d ic a te  her r ig h ts  in  such, m atters*
confin ing  h e rs e lf  to  demanding compensation fo r  ind iv idua l infringem ents
33
©£ ru le s  r e la t in g  to  n e u tra l commerce*
The n o te , however, was w ell received  la  Great B r ita in  by both th e  
pres® and general pub lic . One B r i t i s h  jo u rn a l is t  po in ted  out th a t p r io r
30
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to the Jm&rlcm note of December 26, 19X4, public opinion in Bnglaad bad
3 3
been most friend ly  toward the United States# Upon publication. o f the
^Contraband n o te ,1' howeverf the average Ir it ish e ?  gathered that American
in te re sts  were governed by s e l f is h  finan cia l desires and the United States
34would champion the side which offered the greatest material b en e fits , "
$h&8 view p ersisted  because o f  the continued diplomatic r^reeenbation#  
by th e  State Department,
Upon prom lgation of the March 30 note the reaction o f the B r itish  
populace was quite d ifferen t. Bag# cabled Bryan under date of April ?♦ 
1915, that '"practically a l l  newspaper comment on not# i s  friend ly and 
show# appreciation of the American p osition . ^  fhe Ambassador suggested 
that at worst i t  was regarded as a lawyer1 s b r ie f , hut e l ic ite d  a general­
ly  friend ly  response. He f e l t  that at no other time sine# the beginning 
o f the War was there a b etter  rel&t ienship with StagXaad than at the time 
o f th is  note*
In th# United State#, when the Order in Council was f i r s t  published, 
p ra ctica lly  a l l  newspapers demanded m m  type of p rotest. Easy Congressmen 
alec pressed for claims against 2ta&La&&« Few commercial papers, however, 
wore prepared to protest strongly against Allied, action , Bhslnes# in ter­
e s ts  desired nothing which might endanger trad® with the la ten t#  Fevers*
36fhe wealthy generally did not concern themselves with the Reprisal Order.
33ffor. B e l . , im & im  fojftasft* I * 2 9 1 - 9 2 .
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Daring the spring  and stusmer o f  1915* the blockade forced down cotton  
prices and consequently enraged much of the South, th is  fee lin g  was 
lessened to a great extent when a price s ta b ilisa tio n  agreement was 
reached 'between the United States and England. f there was no question  
that America was .generally pro-Ally even i f  some sharp faction al reseat** 
meat existed .
It  i s  true, o f coarse, that the blockade was injurious to  neatral 
shipping. Of singular iimportance, however, was the observation of Ken­
worthy and Toung in  pointing out that ®one e ffe c t  o f the B r itish  blockade 
was to so ir r ita te  Germany into so ir r ita t in g  America that the B r itish  
could continually screw the v ise  tig h ter . ^
Although th e  blockade was c le a r ly  a t variance  w ith  in te rn a tio n a l 
law, th e  U nited S ta te s  took no formal ac tio n  against i t  fo r  s ix  months, 
fhe  S ta te  Department r e l ie d  upon rep re sen ta tio n s  concerning ind iv idual 
cases warning B r ita in  th a t the- U nited S ta te s  would p ro te s t  form ally i f  
her a c tI ta *  ware not changed. In  l a t e  October o f I f  15* th e  United S ta tes  
did in  fa c t  openly d ec la re  her opposition  to  the  p rin c ip le #  l a id  down by 
th is  exceptional measure.
In  May, 1915* the  U nited S ta tes  once again experienced another 
diplom atic defea t in  an ab o rtiv e  attem pt to n eg o tia te  a  compromise between 
th e  Alii@e and the  C entral Bowers. Colonel Bouse and S ir  Edward Urey
371 M 4 - . p - 3^3-
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worked out ®n agreement advancing th ree  pro v ie  ions:
( l )  Permit s ta p le  foods tu f f s  to  go to n eu tra l port© without 
question .
(£) A ll foodstuff© detained a t the  time of conversation would 
he brought before  p r iz e  court a© quickly a© p o ss ib le .
(3) Claims concerning co tton  cargoes then, detained  were to  be 
made as soon as shippers c e r t i f y  as to  each cargo, th a t they a re  
the  re a l  owners to  whom payment should be made.
I f  Sogland agreed to  th e  f i r s t  p rov ision  Germany was to  d is ­
continue the  use of submarine w arfare and asphyxiating gases. ^
fh© B r i t is h  Cabinet a t the tim e, however, was in  d isso lu tio n .
She May c r i s i s  was much more acu te  than had been the  one in  February, 
fh e re  was wide spread d is s a t is fa c tio n  w ith Asquith1© Government. Clamor 
became more in tense  fo r th e  ap p lica tio n  o f even g rea te r p ressu res  upon 
th e  C entral Power®. A c o a lit io n  government was formed in  which Asquith 
remained as Prime M inister and S ir  B&w&rd Grey as Foreign S ecre tary , but 
the  Cabinet a lso  included mm who d id  not fe e l  i t  necessary to  r e ta in  
Anglo-American frien d sh ip  a t any c o s t. fhey represen ted  a  p re v a ilin g  
a t t i tu d e  which demanded s tr in g e n t measures whatever the  p r ic e  might b e . ^
Colonel House wrote Wilson under da te  o f May ZO, 1915* s ta tin g ;
. . .  I t  i s  un fo rtunate  th a t  the  Cabinet i s  to  be reformed, 
fo r I am confident w ith 'th e  p resen t member© the  p lan  would go 
through, provided Germany make# the proposal* 'fh e  new element 
to go l a  i s  le s s  apt to  favor th e  proposal than those a lready 
th e re .
fh e  P re s id e n t1© advisor was, n ev erth e less , hopeful fo r a favorab le  B r i t ­
is h  re a c tio n .
^S eyaou r, In tim ate  Vrntma.. I ,  W7. 
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The next day House penned in  h is  d iary :
I lunched w ith  Grey read him the P re s id e n t1® d isp a tch  
. . . . fie has mm nearly  a l l  th e  p resen t M inistry  and enough 
o f the  Opposition who would probably he in  the  Cabinet, to he 
ab le  to  say th a t in  h is  opinion, i f  Germany made the  proposal 
I had suggested i t  would he considered by h is  Government.
He i s  always cau tious in  h is  sta tem ents, and 1 conclude th a t 
what he says means th a t  the  B r i t is h  Government w ill  accept th e  
p roposal. I t  w ill  be a  g rea t diplom atic trium ph fo r  the  P re s i­
dent i f  brought about , and I t  w ill  s e t t l e  our contentions w ith  
bo th  Governments.v3
The German Government, however, put an sod to  any chance of com­
promise by brusquely re fu s in g  the proposal rendering  any p ro jec ted  
B r i t is h  ac tio n  academic. This marked the  second f a i lu r e  in  th ree  months 
by the Hutted S ta te s  to  e ffe c t a compromise between the  w arring n a tio n s. 
She submarine remained and fo o d stu ffs  continued to  he stopped, Charles 
Seymour summarised the  defeat saying:
Thus ended th e  most favorable opportunity  fo r  s e t t l in g  the  
controversy th a t l a t e r  was to  exercise  momentous e ffe c t upon the  
course of the  v«r and the  f a te  of Germany. Had B e rlin  accepted 
th e  compromise, not merely.would Germany have obtained th e  food 
o f which, as she complained, her s ta rv in g  c iv i l ia n  population  
was deprived by an i l l e g a l  blockade, but she might have avoided 
the q u a rre l,w ith  the Unite& S ta te s  th a t brought M erid a  in to  the 
war , . * . "
House became convinced, i f  indeed he had not been befo re , th a t the  U nited 
S ta te s  could not fo rever remain a t peace and he re tu rned  from lurope.
Although some members o f th e  new Cabinet d id  not share h is  opinion, 
S ir  Biward Grey remained convinced o f the  paramount importance o f the  
b est p o ss ib le  Anglo-American r e la t io n s .  E© was prepared to  go to  nearly
*° m a . . p .
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any leng ths bo accomplish th e  p rese rv a tio n  of these  re la tio n s*  fh©
Foreign Secretary  sought arrangements w ith  American sh ippers to hare
th e i r  goods p ro -in spec ted  and c e r t i f i e d  by B r i t is h  o f f ic ia l s  to  assu re
minimum delay* Also* a  sp ec ia l commit te e  was set-up  in  London to  expe-
li*
dib© th e  handling o f ship© not p re rio u s ly  searched* tfpon se izu re  o f 
goods f u l l  explanations were made as soon as p o ss ib le  in  o rder to  re ­
lie v e  p o te n t ia l  in ju ry  to  American in te r e s ts ,  th e  demands* however, by 
c iv i l ia n s  and the m ilita ry  a lik e  grew more in ten se  fo r increased  economic 
w arfare,
fhe Spring o f  1915 marked a  very im portant change in  the  B r i t i s h  
p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere* S ir  Edward Grey began to  lo se  h is  a b i l i ty  to  re ­
f le c t  in  B r i t i s h  p o licy  h is  a s tu te  evaluation  o f  Jmerloan f r ie n d s h ip .^  
n e v erth e less , even as men who d id  not view American good w il l  as abso­
lu te ly  © scential to  f in a l  v ic to ry  gained more power in  the  B r i t i s h  Gov­
ernment, Germany1© p o lic ie s  were so blundering and misguided th a t th e  
b a s is  o f Anglo-American -friendship was probably strengthened. I t  must 
be po in ted  out th a t during the  f i r s t  ■ s ix  months o f the  War Grey “had 
insured th a t B r i t i s h  p i l la y  should not destroy Anglo-American good re ­
l a t i o n s . ^  While i t  i s  tru e  th a t  a  new se t o f  cond itions a ffe c tin g  th e  
re la tio n sh ip  between th e  two governments developed a f te r  the spring  o f 
1915, mutual good w ill  was not com pletely forsaken .
pp. &$&.* p . 31.
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Problems, n ev erth e less , concerning in te rfe re n c e  w ith  noatr&l com­
merce continued. Lansing sca t a  message to  Bryan under d a te  o f Kay 15, 
1.915» ia  which he suggested th a t  another not© he sent to  Great B r ita in  
sine© she had been g u ilty  o f f la g ra n t v io la tio n s  o f in te rn a tio n a l law 
con tra ry  to  S i r  Mward Gray* e assurances o f  c o rre c t treatm ent o f n e u tra l 
cargoes and vessels*  ' She Oomselo.r f e l t  "we have already  been too  com­
p lacen t w ith Great B r ita in  In  the  ©afore m ea t o f th e  Order in  Council, 
fo r  two months they hare h em  v io la tin g  the  r ig h ts  o f n e u tra ls .
.Baaslag %hm prepared a d ra f t  telegram  to  he sen t to  Bags fo r p re ­
se n ta tio n  to the  fo re ig n  O ffice . I t  impressed upon the  B r i t i s h  th e i r  im­
pairm ent ©f such p r in c ip le s  o f In te rn a tio n a l law th a t th e  United S ta te s  
could no lo n g er remain s i l e n t .  Before the cable was s e a t ,  however, i t  
was lea rn ed  a t the  S ta te  Beg art-® eat th a t the  B r i t i s h  had prepared a  rep ly  
to  th e  American note o f la rc h  30, I t  was then decided not to  d ispa tch  
th e  new telegram  -allowing th e  B r i t i s h  th e  opportunity  o f p resen tin g  th e i r
SOnote  befo re  a  f re sh  American complaint was delivered*
Lansing sea t a copy o f m o th e r proposed telegram  to  Wilson fo r  
approval on dune 12, 1915- ^w© days l a t e r  th e  P residen t gave h is  consent
to  i t s  c o n ten ts , hut suggested th a t  the- cab le  he held  u n t i l  Souse could 
g ive advisement concerning th e  m atter a® he had a rr iv e d  in  I m  lo rh  the  
■toy before*
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Th© ielegram  was mover cabled “but Page was In s tru c te d  to  hold up 
th e  B r i t is h  rep ly  to  th e  note o f March 30 i f  I t  d id  not include con­
cessions to  th e  American view. Th® Ambassador was fa r th e r  Informed th a t 
bmn Ing and o th ers  a t  th e  S ta te  Depart s e a t a c tu a lly  had knowledge as to  
what the  note contained , and i t s  conten ts would only b ring  to  a  climax 
increasing  a g ita t io n  ag a in st B r i t is h  in te rfe re n c e  w ith n e u tra l commerce.
Advanced inform ation advised i t  averred a  defense o f A llied  p o licy  in
52l ig h t  o f German i l l e g a l i t i e s .  The B r i t is h  Government d id  not rep ly  to  
th e  American conten tions u n t i l  Gray^s note of Ju ly  23, 1915, was received .
A'.long memorandum was prepared by the  B r i t i s h  and dispatched under 
da te  of June 22, 1915* I t  was q u ite  l e n g th  and d e a lt w ith  both  general 
and sp e c if ic  re s tra in t®  upon commerce. Assurances were given th a t the  
B r i t is h  Government was to  minimis© any inconveniences caused n eu tra l 
shipping. Under sec tio n  7 some in te re s tin g  fon ts concerning deten tions 
were given:
(7) As regards the  more general a lle g a tio n  o f delay in. dealing  
w ith  cases o f de ta ined  cargoes, th e  follow ing fa c ts  and fig u res  
may be quoted:
The to ta l  number o f  v e sse ls  which, having c le a re d  from the  
United S ta te s  p o r ts  since  the  i n i t i a t io n  o f th e  re b a lito ry  
measures ag a in st German trad e , a re  s t i l l  deta ined  in  United King­
dom p o rts  i s  27i of th i s  number 3 a re  d ischarg ing  co tton  . . . .
Of the r  ©maiming 19 v e sse ls , 7 placed  in 'th e  Prise Court have 
been discharged. The o ther 12, o f  which 3 only a re  American 
sh ip s, a re  de ta ined  pending in q u ir ie s  as to  suspicious consign­
ments, and p a r t ic u la rs  as to  the  da tes and approximate causes 
of de ten tions a re  fu rn ished  in  the  accompanying l i s t :  I t  w ill
be observed th a t  8 have been deta ined  fo r  a  period  o f  le s s  than 
a  week, and 3 fo r a  p e rio d  of le s s  than a  fo r tn ig h t , w hile the
^ f a r . I q l . . £ .£ . ,  Pausing Papers» I , 300.
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detention 0f  i  i© due to the d i f f ic u lt ie s  fa regard to tran sit  
across Sweden and lu s s ia . 33
Jm mcoapamytag l i s t  was appended as a seeosd enclosure. I t  r©- 
realed that products In&ispenslbl© for Waited States industry were ex­
tended preferen tia l treatm ent*
Although %be B r i t is h  had seemingly f l r e a  a  documented defease o f 
th e i r  p o l ic ie s  sad practices*, they were- la  fa c t in c reasin g  ia te r fe re a c e  
w ith  n e u tra l commerce. Between March 11 and Jane 15* 1915* two hundred 
am f i£ ty -s e * m  fe e  ee ls  were detained  a t  Kirhwmll alone and th e  deten­
tio n s  la s te d  from two or th re e  to  th i r t y  days a t  g rea t in ju ry  to  th e  
shippers* A suspicion  p e rs is te d  among c e r ta in  c ir c le s  th a t the  B r i t is h  
po licy  was to  render u n p ro fita b le  Seendiaenrlan trad e  fo rc ing  in c r e a s e
trad© with the latent© Power®* and, in  so doing, augment th e ir  merchant
55f le e t  which had h e m  se rio u sly  reduced by German1 s submarine w arfare,
Ixaatlaabion o f v e sse ls  was often  unnecessarily delayed, fh® 
B ritish  detained ships without Just om se and applied Municipal le g is la ­
tion  to v esse ls  and cargoes on the ground that being within B r itish  te r r i­
to r ia l waters they were subject to B r itish  law, arm  though they had hem  
placed under B r itish  Jurisd iction  by means at variance with established  
international 1
-*%hiied States department o f S ta te , M sm a m  May Bo* 2* diplomatic 
Oorrespomdsiiee w ith  B e llig e ren t QomrmmtM Bel&tiag to  'l e u t r a l  iS S jg  S a i 
1 ^ 1 ^  fltesSngtons Government Xh-luting O ffIc e 7 iW T 7  p. 173* Hereafter 
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A small controversy arose  over the  d e ten tio n  o f a v e sse l octroying
goods no t consigned through the  B etto rlands Oversea. Sruat which wm a
Batch o rg an isa tio n , th i s  body had been created., w ith  B r i t is h  co-operation ,
as a  se m i-o ff ic ia l agency w ith  extensive powers includ ing  superv ision  o f
a l l  commodities imported Into Holland except wheat, wheat flour, and 
5?wheat meal,
th e  American ship  Seaurancn. bound from Mm York to  Holland 
carry in g  a  cargo consigned e n tire ly  to  named consignee® in  Holland end 
accompanied by a  c e r t i f i c a te  'from the  B r i t i s h  Consul General in  lew York 
a t te s t in g  to  i t s  eomtemts, was deta ined  by th e  B r i t is h . Yhe S ta te  Depart­
ment immediately informed His Majesty* a 0ew@rnm©at th a t  th e  H alted State® 
could not admit to their r ig h t  to  req u ire  th a t cargoes be r©consigned to  
th e  1 s t her lands Oversea f r u s t , ^
th e  p rev ious month (March), Grey had advised Page th a t i f  ship­
ments were consigned to  th e  Sfetherlan&s Oversea frnsb  a l l  danger o f goods 
reaching the  enemy was ended, but i f  they were not so consigned the  prob­
a b i l i ty  o f them reaching  Germany was g re a t. I f  a l l  consignments o f con­
d itio n a l  contraband were sad© to  th i s  o rgan isa tion  no delay to  shippers 
would be encountered*^9
Page cabled  Bryan th e  r e s u l ts  o f  consu lta tion*  a t  th e  fo re ig n  
O ffice  cosicerning th e  Se^uranca. on A pril 28, I f l 5. th e  B r i t i s h  informed 
him th a t on A pril 22, the  v esse l was allowed to  proceed when a l l  the
Bthel 0, P h i l l ip s ,  **American P a r t ic ip a tio n  in  B e llig e ren t Con­
t r o l s ,  i9 i^ !9 i7 » *  m e M s  te f f l iA  a t  U tm m M m A  Im *  2? 0-933). 678.
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consignees agreed bo receive  th e i r  goods through the  Motherlands Oversea 
&QTrust# The B r i t i s h  po in ted  out th a t they d id  -not tt2'eqtilr©n cargoes to  
he consigned to  th e  agency, but they accepted such consignment as p roof 
th a t  th e  cargo was intended fo r  bona f id e  consumption in  S e ll  and. The 
course o f a c tio n  in d ica ted  g re a tly  f a c i l i t a t e d  commerce bound fo r  Butch 
p o r ts .
The f in a l  no te  on th e  subject was exchanged on May 6, 1915* i t  
read In parts
Ambassador rage  I s  a lso  in s tru c te d  to  inform th e  fo re ig n  Of­
f ic e  th a t th e  B aited  S ta te s  Government does no t ob jec t to th e  
eonsigzunaxgfc o f American shipment s to  the  Motherlands Oversea 
T rust, provided th e  p lan  be v o lu n ta r ily  acqpleteed in  by the  
sh ippers, but th a t i t  does ob jec t to  th e  holding up by th e  B r i t ­
is h  Government o f non-contraband cargoes u n t i l  rcoonslgnsd to  
th e  H etherlshds Oversea T ru st; th a t  the  U nited S ta tes Govern­
ment f in d s  no le g a l J u s ti f ic a tio n ' fo r  the  de ten tio n  o f non-con­
traband c a r i e s  and th a t in  th e  circum stances o f th is  case th e  
burden o f  p ro o f i s  not on shipper to  e s ta b lis h  the  non-contra­
band c h a rac te r , but i s  on th # * B ritish  Government to  show co n tra ­
band ch a rac te r of shipments. *
Another in te re s tin g  case during th is  pe riod  involved th e  v esse l
¥ leo . She was carry ing  a  shipment o f o i l  to  Stockholm fo r  th e  Krooks
Bebrelen® and O il C o lony . The B r i t is h  se ised  th e  l io o  on th e  ground
th a t they had to  have complete assurances th a t th e  ship and her cargo
52would not be captured by Germany. On March SO, 1915* ^agc informed 
Grey th a t  th e  U nited S ta te s  could not admit to  th e i r  r ig h t  to  d e ta in  th e  
vesse l under such circum stances. lo  na tion  could g ive  assurances th a t  a  
ship  would not be held  up by force© of another b e ll ig e re n t government.
6° s . a .  B b  a .  p. 117 .
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fh® Btaglifth re p lie d  to  the  American rep re se n ta tio n  on A pril IB,
I f  15. 1% was decided that in  th is  particu lar case the ship could pro­
ceed to her destination , hut His M ajesty'$ Hoveriaapib ressrrcd the right 
to reconsider the whole question of permitting o i l  cargoes to proceed to
6^st
th a t  destism tlom  I f  th e re  occasioned any fu tu re  Herman mimvm. Bryan
them In s tru c te d  Fag© to  inform the  B r i t is h  §oremmemt th a t  th e  Halted
S ta te s  considered cay se izu res  o f American c a r i e s  by Herman naval fo rces
a  m atter between th e  Uoverhmenbs of the  United S ta te s  and Germany. fhe
U nited S ta te s  could a c t e n te r ta in  any a c tio n  by Herman a u th o r i t ie s  which
could allow  ju s t i f i c a t io n  fo r  cargo se izu res  by §r©at B r ita in .
la  a  rep ly  dated May 16, 1915* the  B r i t is h  s ta te d  th a t  they held
no such thoughts as possessing  th e  r ig h t  to  la te r  for® w ith  n e u tra l ships
on the ground th a t  the  v e sse ls  were l ia b le  to  be captured  by b e ll ig e re n t
force®, ■the no te  read in  parts
fhe r ig h t  which l i e  Majesty* s  Oovernment Claim, and which 
they  fe e l confident w il l  not be questioned by the- United S ta te s  
£k>vernmenl, i s  th a t n e u tra l sh ips may be held  up in  eases where 
th e re  a re  good ground® to  suspect th a t th e i r  o b sten sib le  d e s ti­
n a tio n  i s  not the  genuine d e s tin a tio n , and th a t fraudu len t 
arrangements have been concerted w ith th e  enmy c ru is e rs  fo r 
d e liv e rin g  ship  and cargo in to  th e i r  h a n d s .^
With th is  ©change the  United S ta te s  dropped th e  case.
th e  B r i t i s h  were understandably slow in  many in stances sou®©ruing
advisement o f ships and cargoes detained. Bren Pag® ©aprassad the
opinion th a t S ir  Mward Urey 11 had not acted  w ith th e  prom ptitude promised
63lM i-
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itt regard  to  a o t l f io a t io a  of sh ips and cargo*. to  the ioerioon  t tb a s a y ."^5
However, owing to  the  mass of oases ac ted  upon i t  was not su rp ris in g  th a t 
Sreai B r ita in  was sometimes d i la to ry , o r seemingly so, in  the  prom ulgation 
o f ©hip l i s t s .
th e  question  o f p a r e n t  o f cost® fo r  d ischarg ing  cargoes a t B r i t i s h
p o rts  pursuant to  v i s i t  and search  continued to  vex neutral, sh ippers.
Consul te n e ra i  Skinner in  a  cab le  from London under d a te  o f May 15, 1915,
advised Bryan th a t  the  Admiralty marshal had Informed th a t d ischarg ing
6^expmem m e t b© hom e hy the  sh ippers. ' Shi* unusual’ po licy  was prac­
t ic e d  under the  Order in  Council of March 11* 1915. Skinner promised to  
advise ships* m asters engaged in  innocent commerce to  re fu se  to  pay th e  
h ill® , and fu r th e r  f e l t  confident th a t  i f  refused  the  Admiralty marshal 
would pay them* The a c tio n  by a b e llig e re n t in  p lac in g  the- r e s p o n s ib ili ty  
o f paying d ischarg ing  co s ts  upon a  n e u tra l had ab so lu te ly  no ju s t i f i c a t io n  
in  in te rn a tio n a l law. The problem, however, remained to  plague th e  S ta te  
Department ®nd American sh ippers.
William Jennings Bryan resigned  M s post as Secretary  o f S ta te  
ea rly  in  June o f 1915- Shortly  th e re a f te r  Hebert Lansing was appointed 
to f i l l  th e  p o s it io n . A* Counselor fo r the  S ta te  Department he had formu­
la te d  much o f the  American defease of n e u tra l r ig h ts .
Soon a f te r  Lansing1 s appointment* Skinner d ispatched a  no te  con­
cerning the  apparent im o s s ib i l i ty  o f achieving a  m odification  or
6% e r. M l . .  1915, S upp l., p . 390.
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67withdrawal o f the March Order in  Council, Although i t  was c lear ly  at 
Tar lane© with established p rincip les o f international law i t  was serving  
B ritish  m ilitary purposes su ccessfu lly . In part the Consul General 
added:
I f  our B r itish  friends would only put their  adm inistrative 
machinery in  order, and deal with neutral cargoes and sh ips in  
a sp ir it  of fa irness; and also with some e ffic ie n c y , they proba­
bly could carry out th e ir  program,, while at th^same time re­
ducing complaints to a very low figure . . . •
Certainly the B ritish  were not modifying or withdrawing any of  
th e ir  practices and p o lic ie s  concerning the economic strangulation o f the 
Central Bowers* On the contrary, th© A llie s  increased and strengthened 
them*
fhe B r itish  p ersisten tly  expanded the contraband l i s t s  u n t il  they 
became almost universal, the United States made representations to S is 
Majesty’ s Government from time to  time, but to no a v a il, the d if f ic u l­
t ie s  between th© United States and Great Britain* re la tiv e  to contraband, 
was not so much th© addition of individual items* as open to debate as 
they undoubtedly were, but th# general B r itish  p olicy  in  arbitrary treat­
ment and extension#.*
In a not© to Fag® under date of January 13* 1915* dealing with th# 
English addition of rosin and turpentine to th® contraband l i s t s ,  Bryan 
stated  th a t th© United States recognised th© exercised right of making 
additions from time to time to th© contraband l i s t s ,  but i t  could not 
accept indiscrim inate additions without reference to the character of
67?o r. S a l. . S ., 1915, Suppl., p . 466.
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the article® , the United States was disposed toward lib era l application  
o f  ex istin g  ru les n ecessita ted  by modern conditions of war, but i t  could 
not agree on a l l  particu lars as adopted by Great B r ita in .^  The B r itish , 
o f course, remained unmoved by such opinions*
On May 27, 1915. another decree was promulgated by Bngl&nd with re­
gard to contraband extensions. I t  included Toluol, la th es and other mar-
70
chine to o ls  capable o f manufacturing munitions of war, maps and plans.
Slowly at f i r s t ,  but with constant acceleration  the B r itish  gained 
almost complete control over neutral commerce* The United States had 
rapidly developed the practice  o f  making representations concerning ind i­
vidual cases Involving interference with neutral r ig h ts , rather than 
formulating a p o s itiv e , in c lu sive  p osition .
One B r itish  p olicy  which tended to  pacify to some extent enraged 
American shippers was that o f o ffering  something o f a solatium for car­
goes which might have r ig h tfu lly  gone to another port. Great B ritain  did 
compensate for many shippers1 claims concerning confiscation  and deten­
tion . Consequently, the shippers, in  their anger', were not as demanding
71
as they sometimes might have beau*
It was apparent by mid 1915 that the Mar was going to be a long
and costly  c o n f lic t .  Greater pressure was applied to the o f f ic ia ls  in
the B r itish  Government to e ffe c t  any course of action which would insure
69For. E e l. . 19X5, Suppl., pp. 306-07.
^Ibid., ix. 166.«
^ W bert Bushnsll Hart, Nations* v s . B e llig eren ts1 law s,11 lew fork  
Times Magazine* (March 21, 1915).
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Public demands in  th© United S ta te s  fo r  a  redrassem eat o f th©
B r i t i s h  p rac tices , ceasing  undo* in te rfe re n c e  w ith n e u tra l shipping grew
nor© numerous during th© summer of 1 915* A l e t t e r  to  S ir  liw.ard Grey
from Colonel Sous© dated duly 8, 1915* contained th e  admonition:
. . . in  th© ©rent our immediate d iffe ren ces  w ith  (ksrmasy are  
composed* th e re  w il l  a t  once a r is e  a demand fo r  an adjustment 
o f our shipping tro u b le s  w ith  jEtoglcmd* $ h tr*  i s  an in f lu e n tia l  
element her© th a t  p e r s i s t s  in  p ressing  th i s  issu e  to  a  con­
c lu s io n , and i t  i s  so m eth in  o f  which th e  P residen t must take 
cognisance.
l a  th e re  not a  way by which some of th© re s p o n s ib ili ty  $ag- 
land  hears may he tra n s fe rre d  to  Prance? Tou w ill remember 
th e  pac la  in c id en t was Immediately fo rg o tten  when Prance se ised  
h e r . 1
Sitaaa&s fo r <Jan adjustm ent** of n e u tra l commerce problems w ith  
Groafc B rita in  were co n tin u a lly  met w ith in  th e  boundaries of the  e a r l ie r  
p o s it io n  taken by th e  United S ta te s , le g a l arguments and in s is te n c e  upon 
customary in te rp re ta t io n  o f law p e rs is te d .
Ambassador Page was in s tru c te d  by cab le  under da te  o f Ju ly  14, 
1915, to  inform His Majesty* t  Covernment th a t  as regards Orders in  Coun­
c i l  th© U nited S ta te s  in s is te d  upon r ig h ts  e s tab lish ed  by International 
2law. th e  .note s ta te d  th a t  in  vi©w of th e  d iffe ren ces  which ex is ted  be­
tween th© two governments re la t in g  to  .p rincip les of law app licab le  in  
P ric e  Court proceedings, in  cases Involving American in te r e s t s ,  the
^Seymour, In tim ate  P apers, XX, 52*
2Zag. B el. ,  1915. Suppl., p . 472.
U nited S taten  would not accept any l im ita t io n  of e s tab lish ed  principle©
of In te rn a tio n a l law by Orders In  Council or o ther municipal le g is la t io n .
fo rtte rm e r# , th e  United S ta te s  could not recognise th e  v a l id i ty  o f such
proceedings in  dep riv a tio n  of American r ig h ts  under in te rn a tio n a l  law.
Lansing sent a  message to  Page two day© l a t e r ,  informing him o f a
cab le  from Spring-E ice to  S ir  B&vard Cray urg ing  the- fo re ig n  Secre tary
to  more considera te  treatm ent o f JmmlGm commerce, p a r t ic u la r ly  co tto n ,
ko i l ,  and meat products.* th e  S ecre tary  o f S ta te  s tre s se d  th e  import ©ace 
o f th e  nnderetan& ihi by th e  B r i t i s h  Government th a t the  se is in g  of neu­
t r a l  cargoes on- mere presumption o f enemy d e s tin a tio n  and the  general 
r e s t r a in t  o f  Jmerleen tra d e  w ith  n e u tra ls  was u n ju s t if ie d  in  in te rn a tio n a l 
law, f in a lly *  th e  in s tru c tio n  po in ted  out th a t th#  s i tu a tio n  in  th# 
U nited S ta te s , according to  Lansing, was becoming c r i t i c a l , ^
Page cabled Lansing on du ly  22, 1915* advising him th a t §r#y sug­
gested  no court had y e t passed on th e  v a l id i ty  o f  th e  o rder In  Council
£
o f  la r c h  11* 1915, but would probably do so in  the  leeohpff Case. I t  I s  
ap p ro p ria te  her© to  mmmim th e  problem.,
fh#  B r i t i s h  had se ized  a v e sse l w ith  lmtrican--owned goods passing  
from a  n e u tra l p o rt in  th e  le th e r la n d s , Rotterdam, to  a  n e u tra l p o rt in  
th#  United S ta te s  on th# ground th a t th e  goods had o rig in a te d  in  p a r t  in
h t o .  g a l . , a . f . ,  1915. Shaw l.. p . 4?2.
I*
i l i a . . p. ii73.
5a t# >  »• ^
f^for. Rtf.. .  2-1*. 1915. &appl.. p. Wt.
7Belg&im, therefor# from territory  in  possession o f th© enemy* Th©
action taken by th© B r itish  was. pursuant to paragraph k  o f  th© March 11
Order which stip u la ted  that 11 every merchant v e sse l sa ilin g  from a port
other than a German port, carrying goods o f enemy orig in , may he required
8
to discharge such goods in  a B r itish  or i l l i a d  port.
The United States held th© provision invalid  within the framework 
o f international law, in  Order In Council could not permit th© seizure  
o f imericai^owned goods from neutral port merely because the goods o r ig i­
n a lly  cam© from territory  in possession o f the e s e f *  It obviously 
v io la ted  the right o f  neutrals to trade with each other except in  contra­
band or in contravention o f a leg a l blockade of an mm&  seaport. The 
United States earnestly r e v e s te d  th© goods released and forwarded to the  
orig in a l destination . In a note dated. July 31, 1915, the B r itish  Foreign
Secretary reported the w illin gness of h is  Government to consider the
9claims of the neutrals- concerned.
Sir Cecil Spring-Ele© advised Lansing on August 6, that h is Govern-
10
meet could not admit to any i l le g a l  procedure in  th is  case. Bis Majes­
ty 1© Government would not consent to presume that any o f i t s  own le g is ­
la tio n  was invalid  nor admit any lim ita tion  upon the lega l righ ts of 
v i s i t  and search, detention, and condemnation which it claimed. Contraband
71- !• la- &• p* i?7.
8m a.
9for .  Bel. . g e l . .  1915. Suppl., p. k$5- 
10IMd. . p. 501.
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was held  to  la© sub ject to  th e  ru le s  o f continuous voy&g© and th© p r in c i­
ples: suggested by th© tla ited  State© could not be accosted,
fh© v esse l vm de ta ined  approximately' one month then  allowed to  
proceed, Burihg th is  i t  was involved in  l i t i g a t i o n  and* in te re s tin g ly ’
enough;* ©©stained damage# amount&hff to  n early  on© thousand f iv e  hundred:
pound# from a c o ll is io n  with another v@ts.el whit© under control o f th©
11
B r i t i s h  Admiralty*
hansing informed fag© in  a communique dated duly 26, 1915* that
although B r i ta in  had given assurance* of f a c i l i t y  in  handling cases in -
12volving deten t ions* in  p ra c tic e  th is  had not been done, ' Over th ree
thousand im porters had p ro te s te d  to  the  S ta te  Department and
were in fluencing  p ub lic  opinion.
S ir  Bdward Or©y, on Ju ly  23* 1915* answered th© American not © o f  
A pril 2 . I t  confirmed th© B r i t i s h  in te n tio n  of p ro h ib itin g  trad© w ith  
Germany and M strla-3t*ngary including  t r a f f i c  through contiguous n e u tra l
13
p o r ts . She rep ly  fu r th e r  s ta te d  th a t th e  United S ta te s  had recognised 
th e  r ig h t  of a  b e ll ig e re n t  to  blockade enemy p o r ts ,  but adde d, th a t th is  
r ig h t  would be u#©l##s I f  the  b e llig e re n t were not perm itted  to  sever a l l  
th® sea-born© trad e  of it® adversary , ffeas, th© B r i t i s h  Government could 
not accept th© American Contention th a t a  b e ll ig e re n t  could not stop  or 
in te r f e re  w ith  commerce going to adjacent po rt#  o f an enemy, i f  th a t com­
merce could in  tu rn  pas# through those channels fo r  purposes o f supplying
U tM A .. p. 5J>.
I2Ibi1d . . pp. 227-28.
13?or. Bal. . 1915. Suppl., pp. 169-73.
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i t*  war machine. His Majesty1 s Government was unable to  a t e l t  th a t a  
b e ll ig e re n t v io la te# , any fundamental p recep t o f in te rn a tio n a l Xm by 
applying a blockade in  such a  way as to  cat o f f  the  commerce
w ith  fo re ig n  coun tries through n e u tra l p o r ts  i f  the  circum stances
rendered such application of the p rincip les o f blockade th# only mmm
xb
o f making i t  e f fe c tiv e .
In  essence th e  only question  to  th e  lu g l is h  was whether th e ir  
p o licy  or a c tio n  conformed to  the  s p i r i t  o f th e  ru le s  o f war. She B r i t­
is h  in s is te d  th a t th e re  was no in te rfe re n c e  w ith  any trad e  which they 
would not b© e n t i t le d  to  In te r fe re  w ith (by blockade), Hi f  th e  geograph­
ic a l  p o s itio n  and condition® o f Germany a t p resen t were such th a t her
„Kcommerce passed through her own p o r ts . '
Grey pointed out th e  manner In which the United State® developed
principle®  o f contraband and blockade daring the  C iv il ¥ar—goods
d estin ed  fo r ©nemy te r r i to r y  were in te rc e p te d  before they reached n e u tra l
l6p o rts  fro  a which they were to  be re -© p o rte d . She D octrine o f Con­
tinuous Voyage in  th© Jmerican ejperieac©  was seen to  have app lied  equal­
ly  to  blockade and contraband. I t  appeared to  th e  B r i t i s h  Government 
th a t i t  was n a tu ra l to  ©set-end th© blockade to  n e u tra l p o r ts  i f  i t  were 
to  be e f fe c tiv e , and th is  was in  accordance w ith e s tab lish ed  p r in c ip le s  
o f in te rn a tio n a l law, th e  Oase was c ite d .
X» I .  l£L« i* P. 1?9.
Ib id -, P - 130. .
16
For. SSl»t £*!L*» 1915, Suppl., p . 1?0.
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In ly  to the charge by the United States that the blockade was 
unique and unprecedented, the B r itish  maintained that th is  could not be 
held for i f  they were successfu l in  their  effort© to d istin gu ish  between
the m m m m  of. neutral and enemy countries, there would not be subs tan*
t l a l  interference with trade to neutral ports except when they const!-
I f
tubed ports o f access to and ex it  from the enemy terr ito ry . there were 
numerous ports which could not be regarded as offering  f a c i l i t i e s  for 
neutral commerce only, and the so le  B r itish  purpose was to r e s tr ic t  the 
trade through such ports which had an ultim ate enemy destination .
Ike note also pointed out the B r itish  had sot applied the old  
ru le  respecting blockade which sta ted  that ships a s !  goods on th e ir  way 
to or from the blockaded area were lia b le  to condemnation, fhey had so 
changed the rule so as to  avoid confiscation . Tacts were til so included 
purporting to show that the increased opportunities for American com­
panies created by the War had more than compensated for the lo sse s  o f  
German and Austrian market®. Consul General Skinner, however, said the  
figures did not bear th is  out because the enormously increased amounts
taken by the A llie s  were not equivalent to their  usual imports plus the
18normal demand by. Germany.
In c losin g , the message in s is ted  that many questions regarding 
the exact method o f e ffectin g  a blockade were un settled . However, the 
basic p rin cip le  un iversa lly  recognised w@M5 .that b e llig eren ts  were
j|* jt* la*  JL* P* 1B0.
18
Morrisey, s&L* g if t . , p . 89*
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e n tit le d  to sever, "by e ffe c tiv e  mean®, the sea-borne commerce o f I ts
enemy* fh ls  was true of both blockade and contraband.
another B r itish  note was presented at the State Department tinder
date of July 31, 1915» concerning Prise Courts sad th e ir  application of
19
the laws to bo administered. Sir Sdw&rd &rey c ited  American precedents 
and was of the opinion that revealed the p r in c ip le  of law between the-two 
governments was the same* ALso mentioned was the attitudes o f B r itish  
judges in P rise  Courts concerning the two sources of law—municipal leg­
is la t io n  o f I t s  Sovereign and princip les o f international law. Tears 
before Lord St swell* in the fo x  Case. had said in  part*
fhese two propositions, that the court i s  bound to administer 
the 1 m  o f  nations, and that i t  i s  bound to enforce the King* s 
or&e&s in council, are not at a l l  inconsistent with each other, 
because thee® orders end instructions are presumed to conform 
themselves, under the given circumstances, to the p rincip les o f 
i t s  unwritten law. fhey are either directory applications o f  
these princip les to cases indicated in  them, cases which, with 
a l l  the fa c ts  and circumstances belonging to them, and which con­
s t itu te  th eir  leg a l character, could be but imperfectly known to 
the court i t s e l f ;  or they are p o sitiv e  regulations, consistent 
with these p rin cip les, applying to matters which r e t i r e  mere 
exact and d e fin ite  rules than these general princip les are capa­
b le  o f furnishing . . . , these courts have th e ir  unwritten 
law, the approved prin cip les o f natural reason and ju s t ic e ; they 
have likew ise the written or sta tu te  law in  acts o f farllam ant, 
which are the directory application o f the same p rincip les to  
particu lar subject®, or p o s itiv e  regulations consistent with 
them, upon matters which would remain too much at large i f  they 
were l e f t  to the Imperfect information which the courts emxld 
extract from mere general speculations. What could be the duty 
of the individuals who preside in  these courts, i f  required to  
enforce an act o f Parliament which I presume they would not 
entertain  a urine 1. the supposition that any such w ill a r ise . In 
l ik e  manner th is  court w il l  not l e t  i t s e l f  loose Into speculation  
as to what would b e ' it s  duty under such an emergency: because i t
cannot without extreme indecency, presume that any such
£* 1S.1* &•&*» 1915» Suppl., pp. 49&-9S.
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mtoTgrnm? w ill  happen, ia& I t  i s  the le s s  disposed to  enter­
ta in  then because i t s  own observation and experience a tte s t  the 
general eenformity o f each orders and instructions to i t s  prin­
c ip le s  o f unwritten law. 0
Gr«y held* furthermore, that both the United States and treat 
B rita in  had adopted the princip le  that the decision o f a national P rise  
Court may b® open to review. I f  the orders and instructions Issued by 
His Majesty* s Government, in  matters relatin g  to p r ise , were not held by 
the United States to be in  harmony with the accepted prin cip les o f in ter­
national law then the B r itish  Government was prepared to act in  concert 
with the United States Government in  revolving d ifferences over such 
matters.
fh© B r itish  foreign Secretary was faced with many comple* prob­
lems in addition to the law administered by Friz© Courts. The demand 
to  p lace cotton on the contraband l i s t  had reached d ec is ive  proportions 
within both public and governmental c ir c le s . The B r itish  believed such 
a step to be an absolute n ecessity , and by the la te  summer of 19151 they 
were prepared to t$te© I t .
Wilson informed Lansing on July 27 that he entertained deep con­
cern over the treatment accorded cotton by the B r itish  for they had 
given assurances that cotton would never be regarded as contraband.
Grey had said? “It  i s  {cottonj therefore as far as we are concerned in  
the fra© l i s t  and w ill  remain there*n^ *
2CW .  ? .e l . . 1915. S ttppl., pp. 496-98.
21f o r . g § i . . £*4*, Lansing P apers, I ,  301.
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ta w in g  advised Spring-Rleo that by placing cotton cm the c o n tr a  
bead l i s t  they would in  e ffec t admit th e ir  a lleged  blockade was a f a i l ­
ure for i f  i t  were e ffe c t iv e , and th e ir  theory of blockade correct, there  
would be no need to sc declare cotton—for a l l  a r t ic le s , whatever th e ir  
type and kind, would he barred t r m  entering or 1 ear .lag Germany i f  a 
blockade in  fact ex isted , la  addition, Dancing pointed out that i f  cot­
ton were immediately made contraband the Waited States would have to
assume that the blockade theory m  far as neutral port® were concerned,
22had been abandoned sad would proceed under that assumption. lea sin g  
also  greatly  feared that strong resentment in the United State® was cer­
ta in  i f  cotton was so declared* t h is ,  however, was a belated eonversar- 
tion  between the Secretary o f State and the B r itish  Ambassador while 
preparation continued to p lace the commodity on the l i s t .
She proclamation adding cotton to  the absolute contraband l i s t
23
was o f f ic ia l ly  received on Jagust 2h, 1915* I t  included raw cotton, 
cotton l ln te r s ,  cotton waste, and cotton yarns.
During the spring and summer, the blockade, and Increased in ter-  
for once w ith trade by the B r itish , had greatly  depressed the price  o f  
cotton which understandably enraged the Southern sta te s . Th& announce­
ment concerning cotton, however, v/as followed, by negotiations leading to
a purchasing agreement which s ta b ilise d  the price , and with th is  arrange-
Zk
meat much of the American d istress  and b ittern ess disappeared.
22yt>id.. p. 303. 
for. Sol. .  £ .1 ..  1915. Sapjil.. p. W -
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Sprt&g-Biee wrote Urey on Jaigust 20, 19151 t i f f  or fro© the
United State®, not as to the 1m t but as to whether the a ltered  circum­
stance® do or do m i Ju stify  a change in the law. ^  Sprlng-Blc® did 
not desire  to  see any advantage the B r itish  had gained destroyed for  
some temporary v ictory .
In  th e  miwm. and ea rly  w in ter o f 1915* i t  seemed th a t a  Ctamaa 
v ic to ry  m s  certa in#  th e  B ussim s su ffe red  die& stercus d e fea ts  lead ing  
to  th e  lo s s  o f Serbia  and to B u lgaria1 s entrance in to  th e  War on th e  s ide  
o f  the  C entral Bowers# th e  successes o f  the  B r i t i s h  and french  were a t  
b est small and horrendously c o s tly . Under such circum stances Great B ri­
t a in  was prepared to  go to  any length® to  prevent a f in a l  Uerswm con^
$Gt*S t .
According to  lousef the  United S ta te s  a t  the  tim e was ^in a  laby­
r in th  between r isk in g  a  Uepnaa v ic to ry  and constant b ickering  w ith  Ureat 
B r ita in # tt f h is  was in  keeping, o f course* w ith  th e  p o lic ie s  o f th e
o f f ic ia l s  a t both th e  fo re ig n  O ffice  and th e  S ta te  Department, th e  
longer and so re  verbose th e  correspondence th e  b e t te r .  Short note® e re ­
ct® short tempers 'and lea d  to  warlike, eruption#.
In  September an o ld  problem reappeared. I t  d e a lt w ith  the  B r i t i s h  
p ra c t ic e  of fo rcing  the  sh ippers to  absorb the co s ts  o f d ischarging  in  
search  and se izu re  proceedings. Lansing cabled Skinner on September 2 t 
1915. i t  read;
Uwym, £&# c i t * . IX, 284# 
26S«ymoup. M t e M I S B E l .  H ,  80.
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Are you aware o f any instance in  wMch charges for unloading 
In connect Ion w ith ee l sure shipments have hem  imposed on neu­
tr a l vesse ls?  Bepartmmt understands port chargee are imposed 
on v esse ls  in  such cases* Please tMegraph.**
Skinner r e l i e d  under date o f  September 3s
Admiralty m arshall ru le iss
On a r r iv a l any vesse l with, contraband or se ised  under order 
March 11 master required to discharge Innocent cargo as neces­
sary eaqp«nss« warehousing and resMpmmt o f Innocent cargo as 
w ell as a l l  dues must be paid by ship. Payment may be made un­
der p rotest, Should master refuse to discharge co llec to r  
should make arrm gm m ts to discharge it#*®
Besides costs o f discharging* ships 'had to also pay lo ca l wharf 
ic e s , p ilo tage  and other chargee incurred in ordinary trade* However, 
i f  a ship were merely arrested m  charges were Imposed, but when r e ­
quired to unload her cargo charges were administered. M l neutral ves­
s e ls  released were subject to large storage © peases,
in  example of such charges was given in  the cue# of the ship  
AatlXXa. fhe vesse l was detained fmm  February Eh to April 2?, 19X5. and 
paid tw enty-five pounds for b o iler  water, Dundee tonnage ra tes, and shore 
dues; one kindred and sixty-one pounds for p ilo tage , reloading cargo,, 
one hundred and s ix  pounds; and f in a lly , twenty-seven, pounds for lig h t  
house dues*^ d in n er  suggested a protest b© made concerning warehouse 
charges and other various expenses when innocent goods were involved,
30
but for the instant the matter there remained*
Z?Io r .  M . . .  P. S .. 1915. Suppl., p. 531.
IMA.. p. 532.
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Lansing, on October 8 , 1915. rocnicsted Skinner to  in v e s tig a te  r e -
p o r ts  th a t in  casos of se izu re  since the  blockade Order in  Council P rize  
Court proceedings wore "based upon both  the  v io la tio n  o f  blockade and sus­
pected  contraband ch arac te r o f th e  goods, fhese  grounds were s ta te d  In
31th e  cam® w rit* Skinner re p lie d  th re e  days l a t e r ,  adv ising  Ian s lag  th a t  
a  sane w rit c a lle d  an “omnibus w it* 1 was frequen tly  used to  cover se iz ­
u re s  fo r  bo th  cases—the prosecu to r then proceeded under th e  heading
32
b est adapted as the  p a r t ic u la r  case developed. I t  was a  ra th e r  con­
venient system fo r  B r i t is h  Ju rist® ,
Contraband l i s t s  were again extended by His KaJ esty* s Government
33
by a  proclam ation dated October 14, ■ ■ th e  l i s t s  were quit© leng thy , but
continued schedules fo r ab so lu te  and cond itional contraband, In  theory
th e re  was a d is t in c t io n  but in  p ra c tic e  any r e a l  d iffe ren c e  had long
since ceased to exist*
A fter a  period  o f f i f te e n  months, ch a rac te rised  by f a i lu r e  and
v a c i l la t io n ,  the U nited S ta te s  f in a l ly  took a  p o s it iv e , forward position*
In  a  c la s s ic  note under d a te  o f October 21, 1915# the  S ta te  Department
challenged th e  B r i t i s h  in te rp re ta t io n  of blockade and general p o lic ie s
34o f in te rfe re n c e  w ith  n e u tra l right® and commerce. I t  mm unquestioned 
b ly  th e  best w r itte n , most w ell conceived p ro te s t  to  th a t d a te , fbm note 
re p lie d  to , and re fu ted  In d iv id u a lly , every con tention  th e  B r i t i s h  held*
3Xn>ia. . p. 564.
32For. S e l. . &. S . , 1915, Suppl.. p. 566.
33IM&-. p - 3.75-
IL ld . . pp. 578-601.
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Lansing pointed out tha t seizures had not been uniformly based 
upon proof obtained at the time of capture, but that vessels were de­
tained while search  was made for contraband or conclusive evidence of 
in tention to erade the non-intercourse measures of Or ©at Britain.* Search 
a t sea had not hem  contemplated fro® 1388 to the outbreak of the War* 
th e  B ritish  claim* furthermore, that search in part was in  keeping with 
the practice of the United States during the C iv il War- was based upon a 
misconception. Sfhe contention that greatly increased experts to adjacent 
neutrals carried  presumption of ultim ate enemy destination which ju s t i­
fied  detention and search was rejected.*®
Bagar&isg the blockade, Lansing fa it that the United States had 
erred in understanding the intention of the- British Government. Shus, 
Jmerica now challenged the legality of i t .  the United States alluded 
to definite points comprising legal blockades Cl) International law 
declared that a blockade to be legal must be effective but in this case 
i t  was not for German naval forces cruised areas of the lorth  and Baltic 
Seas, seised neutral ©hips and brought the goods into German ports, fhe 
placing of cotton on the contraband l i s t  was also tantamount to admit­
ting to the failure of the blockade. (2) fhe blockade was not impartial 
in i t s  application to vessels of a ll nation®. German ports were notori­
ously, open to tr a f f ic  with the ports of Benmarkt lorway and Sweden. I t  
was also fact that Great Britain escorted large quantities of merchandise 
to ports blockaded to American commerce. (3) 9?be measure blockaded
3% r .  S e l. ■ £ .S . ,  1915, S ap p l., pp. 581-82.
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neutral ports la  s t r ic t  v io la tio n  o f both international law mi, the 
Declaration o f London, which with respect to blockade, the B r itish  #©v©rm- 
mmt had adopted by i t*  Order in  Council of October 29, 191h. Heither 
lim ita tion  as to the blockaded area nor any prescribed penalty for breach 
o f blockade had been given. In view o f a l l  these represent at ions, the 
United .States was forced  to  consider the blockade i l l e g a l .
fam ing to the question o f continuous voyage and contraband, Lane- 
lag held that the B r itish  analogy to  the Case during the C iv il
War, re la tin g  to seizure of contraband goods going to a neutral port a l­
though actually bound for a blockaded port o f the South, was in  error for 
the circumstances surrounding the ease ware e sse n tia lly  d ifferen t from 
those to which the B r itish  sought to  apply the rule. She gnriagbok 0a*# 
involved an a l l  sea voyage terminating in  m  a t t e s t  to  pass le g a lly
blockading squadrons. lo  neutral port®, however, were closed , but a
“IVcontinuous voyage through a neutral port necessitated  such action .
International law, the note continued, controlled the b e llig eren t’s 
right o f seizure and detention of v e sse ls  not municipal enactments which 
seemed to confer such r ig h t*  and authority for estab lish ing le g a lity  in  
the se im re  o f neutral v e sse ls , fhese detention® also produced an adverse 
e ffec t upon neutral commerce.
Lansing, furthermore, protested against the costs and expenses in ­
curred by neutral, v e sse ls  brought into port for v i s i t  and search. She
36War. H a l.. £ .3 . ,  1 9 1 5 . 9upp l., pp. 58> 84 . 
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St at® Department had been advised that the release of ships held was con-
As regards contraband extension the United States would not waive 
her right to object to the propriety and prerogative of l i e  Majesty* s 
Government to include certain  a r tic le s  in  the contraband l i s t  which had 
been so included, ©he relationsh ip  between the two governments had to
be based upon established  p rincip les of international law and not upon
39
expediency*
I t  was indeed a b r ill ia n t  defease o f neutral r ig h ts , but unfortu­
nately the not® cam® too la te  to have great p ractica l value. I t  did, 
however, assert a p o s itiv e  p o sitio n  o f offense for the championing o f  
neutral r igh ts w hile, at the same tim e, not seriously  endangering peace­
fu l  Anglo-American relations*
fhe strong l in e  taken by the United States produced intense a n ti-  
American fee lin g  in  England. She B r itish  public voiced great resentment* 
Colonel House reported a  ty p ica l anecdote i llu s tr a t in g  the unfriendly  
fee lin g  toward the United States involving a Londoner speaking to an 
American salesman in  which the Englishman proclaims*
X don't wish to be offen sive to you, but 1  have only one
way to show my fee lin g  o f indignation towards the United 
S tates, and that i s ,  to have nothing more to do with Ameri­
cans.
But for a ll  the clamor, resentment, and demands, only long ju r id ica l 
notes were fired  across the A tlantic .
tingent upon the payment of expenses by the neutral p a r t ie s .^
Seymour, Intlm&i®. Pamrss, XI, 75*
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Grey informed House on November IX* 1915, that the October note
4 ihad been sent to h is leg a l advisers for r e p ly .  ■ How ever the answer 
was: not forthcoming u n til Apr i l  £4, 1961*. fo  the Foreign Secretary 
any admisdlaa to  the complete body o f contentions held by, the United 
States concerning B r itish  practice® would have ended any A llied  hope for 
f in a l v ictory  In the War*
Many in  the Halted States welcomed the October note for i f  not 
overly demanding* i t  was a t leas t*  a  masterful eap c s ltlo n  of American 
complaints. Senator Walsh of Montana reflec ted  the thought® o f a number 
o f  hi® colleagues when he said  in  parts
For m yself, I am convinced that we should not have adjourned 
la s t  spring before authorising the President to  in terd ict com­
mercial re la tion s with any o f the warring nations- whenever, in  
h is Judgment, i t  became impossible to secure, through the  
diplomatic channels, recognition of and respect for our right 
to trade with foreign countries pursuant to end in accordance 
w ith accepted p rincip les of in ternational law*
fhe Halted States, however, was s t i l l  b a s ica lly  pro-Ally in  sym­
pathy. fhe commercial lo sse s  would have.been m eh too co stly  a price to  
pay for any protest o f a severely demanding nature* Although B r itish  
interference with neutral shipping was indeed ir r ita t in g , trad© with Al­
l i e s  was a lso  highly p rofitab le , fhe business in terests  were w ell aware 
o f th is  fa c t , fh© in flu en tia l statesmen o f both the. United States and 
Great B ritain  were determined to maintain a peaceful relationsh ip  in
41
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United States Congress, Senate, o4th Congress, 1 st Session,
a ifp sl i#e-or&. Vol. 1111, Part 2 (Washington; Government Printing  
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sp ite  o f public v o c ife r a t io n s .^  Lons lag wrote House that Hin  no event 
should we take a course that would seriously  endanger our friend ly re­
la tio n s with Croat Britain* francs, or te s s ia , for as you say, our fr iead -
jU»
ship with Germany i s  a matter of the past,"
On December 9, 1915. % rlag-Btee gave Lansing a memorandum which 
advised that Sir Sdward G-rey was ready to form a small u n o ffic ia l com­
m ittee to consist o f  persons with experience to  examine sp ec ific  cases 
where an a llegation  was mad® of unnecessary delay in  dealing with detained 
ships and cargoes, the committee would also  suggest any improvements in
the machinery looking to the prevention of sim ilar delays in  future 
i*5
cases,
Lansing, In a circular telegram under date o f December 2 2 , 1 9 1 5 , 
advised imerican ambassadors in the cap ita ls  o f  the b e lligeren t nations 
that Colonel House was sa ilin g  on the 28th for the purpose o f  instructing  
the representatives in the position  of the United States regarding inter­
national questions and to study the a ttitu d es o f the other countries. The
la s t  sentence o f  the dispatch reads P le a s e  impress on Foreign O ffice
»h6that Colonel House i s  not on a peace m ission ,"
Parliament passed le g is la t io n  en titled  trading With the laemy 
(Extension of Powers) Jet on December 23, 1915. Eesultant correspondence 
between the United S ta tes  and Croat B ritain , however, did not occur u n til
^Seymour, . f a t i n g ,  'gJBBJJL* H .  69* 
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Uaimary of the following year (1916), Page Informed Grey that the ap­
parent ohleet of the Act was to prerent those persons doing “business in 
the United Kingdom fwm trading with the enemies of Great S r it& ia .^  
fhe United States feared the p o ss ib ilit ie s  of farther interference with 
neutral trade. I t  appeared th a t  the right of persons domiciled In the 
United States* whether jmerioaa c itizens or subjects of the countries a t 
war with Bagl©ad* to engage in  trade with belligerent countries had been
overlooked* end that the exercise of th e ir  right e<ml& he subject of
an
denial or ahrl%emtat in the enforcement of the Act.
Urey r e l i e d  that the Act was merely an attempt to “bring trading
regulations into greater harmony with those of France “by applying* in
some degree*, the te s t of na tionality  for determine enemy character in
addition to tha t of domicile* the la t te r  alone was not su ffic ien t in
modem conditions of war. He fu rther pointed m% that any defin ition
which would confer enemy sta tus upon a l l  persons on ©nemy nationality  or
association was specifica lly  avoided, fha Foreign Secretary in sisted
tha t i t  was a piece of domestic leg is la tio n  in the. national in te re s t. In
summation Urey advised;
. . . Hie Majesty* 9 Government readily admit the right of per­
sons of any nationality  resident in the United S tates to engage 
in  legitim ate commercial transaction with any other persons-.
7Mlseellw90ttB Ho, 11 (1916), Ss&smst8ftM& Mllfif. Hfllfla.
Ambassador Saa-aectllg "iTtsSXas with the 2aeray (Ksctensioa of fowers) Act, 
1 9 1 5 /0 3 7  8225 (itondotti Hi* Majesty's Stationery Office, 1916), Ho. 1.
m -
49Ibid.. . Ho. 2.
mThey cannot admit, however, th a t th is  r ig h t can in  any way lim it 
the  r ig h t  o f o th er 0overn®eate to  r e s t r i c t  th e  commercial a c tiv ­
i t i e s  o f th e i r  n a tio n a ls  in  any manner which may seem d e s ira b le  
to  them "by th e  im position o f p ro h ib itio n s  and p e n a l i t ie s  which 
a re  op ©rat lye  so le ly  upon persons under th e i r  ju risd ic tio n .-^
As the  f i r s t  f i f te e n  months of the  War ended th e  con troversies 
between the United S ta te s  and Great B r ita in  not only remained* but in  
some areas were in te n s if ie d . The .B ritish  enjoyed a  unique co n tro l over 
th e  commerce of the United S ta te s .
American p r iv a te  firm s had en tered , to  some degree, in to  negotia­
tio n s  fo r  the establishm ent o f b e llig e re n t commercial c o n tro ls . Chi© such 
example was th e  American t e x t i l e  A lliance which en tered  in to  ©a agree­
ment w ith th e  B r i t is h  Board of Trade dealing  w ith  the  exporta tion  of
*£1wool fo r  American m ills . I t  was denounced by some as B r i t is h  con tro l 
over th e  tra d e , but the  Jfoglish re p lie d  th a t i t s  so le  purpose was th e  
prevention  o f in ju ry  contingent upon to ta l  p ro h ib itio n  o f wool expor­
ta tion*
Perhaps th e  most im portant fo o d s tu ff  to  th® b e ll ig e re n ts  was 
wheat. Baring th® to ta l  p e rio d  of American n e u tra l i ty  th e re  ex is ted  no 
o f f i c i a l  tra d e  o rgan iza tion  In  the  U nited S ta te s  in  the  wheat Industry . 
U n til November, 1916, each company d e a lt in d iv id u a lly  w ith  the  A llies* 
A fter th a t  da te  dealings tra n sp ire d  through the  Wheat Expert Company, 
an o rg an isa tio n  founded by th e  J*atent© Powers to  purchase wheat fo r  th e i r  
governments. The A llie s  held  a v i r tu a l  monopoly over th is  tra d e  which
50Ib id .
^ P h i l l i p s ,  SB.. $!S,'» PP> 679-86. 
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p ra c t ic a l ly  severed Germany from a l l  im portations o f  th# g ra in .
Eventually agreements in  commodity co n tro l reached in to  & v a rie ty  
o f a re a s . By May, 191? > agreements ex is ted  in  t e x t i l e s ,  g ra in , copper*
rubber, t in ,  le a th e r , antimony, a sbesto s, mica, and an a s se r t  meat of
53m etals. I t  was tru e , however, th a t th e  U nited S ta te s  and Norway were 
the  only n e u tra l co u n tries  where m  general trad in g  a sso c ia tio n s  or govern­
ment bureaus e x is ted . An in te re s tin g  face t of the  American system o f con­
t r o l  i s  th e  f a c t  th a t  co n tro l agreements were under taken on p r iv a te  i n i t i ­
a t iv e  and were e n tire ly  dependent upon th e  cooperation  o f p r iv a te  in d iv ld - 
54
u a ls .
She B r i t i s h  a lso  engaged in  the  p ra c tic e  o f b la c k lis t in g  c e r ta in  
firm s, fhi® was a  l is t-  o f  companies o r  persons In  a  n e u tra l country w ith 
which a  b e llig e re n t power forbade i t s  n a tio n a ls  to  tra d e . The United 
S ta te s  was among th e  la s t  of th e  n e u tra ls  to  be so in c lu d e d .^  A ctually  
i t  was not u n t i l  du ly  18, 1918, th a t  Great B r ita in  o f f i c i a l ly  announced 
a  b la c k lis t  fo r the  United S t a t e s . ^  Before the  l i s t  became o f f ic ia l .  7 
and mad# p ub lic  i t  had been a  c o n fid e n tia l one. Although the  period  i s  
w ithout the- tim e In te rv a l w ith  which th is  th e s is  i s  concerned, su ff ic e  I t  
to  say th a t upon p u b lic a tio n , the  l i s t  so aroused pu b lic  resentm ent in  
th e  U nited S ta te#  th a t  Wilson sa id  h is  p a tience  was n early  exhausted and
53m a ., p. 692.
Thomas A. l a i l e y ,  Th© United S ta te s  and th# B la c k lis t  During 
th e  World War,*1 Journal. o.f Mo&mm. H is to ry , VX (MeaKsh-Beeember, 1934)* 20.
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that th© 'blacklist was th© la s t  straw. He was prepared for th© f ir s t
time to request Ooagress for power to r e s tr ic t  loans and ©asportations 
57
to the A llie s .
% the end o f 1 9 1 5 * Sir Mward Grey* % influence had diminished 
appreciably. h^© Cabinet was constantly swayed-by the' caprices o f pub­
l i c  opinion, fh© t id e  o f war had not yet turned in  favor o f  the A llie s  
and pressures for new and d ecisive  measures were constantly f e l t .
I f  controversies were'to cen tim e then so must notes, the notes 
had to he kept long in both numbers and words le s t  an eruption should 
occur. She United States had early in th® War formulated the policy  o f  
making representations concerning individual cases involving interference  
with neutral rights* But for a l l  the atten tion  paid to. relian ce upon 
established  p rin cip les o f international law, i t  i s  in terestin g  to not© 
that on May 19, 192?, Secretary o f State Kellogg deliberately  gave up 
attempts bo ascertain  the- v a lid ity  of the claims by the United States re­
garding v io la tio n s o f  neutral lig h ts  by Great B ritain  during the en tire
m
period of American n eu tra lity .
Brery high o f f ic ia l  of both governments rea lised  the importance o f  
the United States remaining neutral. Under the circumstances everything 
was don© to preserve n eu tra lity . Juridical separation was far batter  
than armed divorce. Aiding to m  almost incalculable degree, o f course, 
Germany with her a lien atin g  p o lic ie s  and p ractices.
57m a . . p. 23.
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Charles Warren, "Troubles of  a  Hau.tr*!,* Foreign A ffa ir . 
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4Iso  in s e r t  ant as a  fa c to r  to  th e  p rese rv a tio n  of ilaglo-Amerioim 
fr ien d sh ip , in  ad d itio n  to  sentim ental sym pathies, was th e  commercial 
In terest© . While i t  was t r e e  th a t th e  extent o f In te rfe ren ce  w ith  neu- 
t r a l  commerce by the  A llie s  was appalling , trad e  w ith th e  la te n t#  Powers 
was Quite profitable* In  the  opinion o f most sh ippers i t  was s t i l l  
h a t te r  to  enjoy th is  p r o f i t  than, to  haw# non# a t a l l .
By the  beginning o f 1916, many high o f f ic ia l s  in  the- United S ta te s  
considered German frien d sh ip  a  th in g  o f the  p a s t. German diplomacy had 
become suspect and could not be trusted.
fh# United S ta te s  Government had entered in to  n eg o tia tio n s  w ith 
both th e  J&bent# and C entral low ers in  ab o rtiv e  attem pts to  achieve a  
se ttlem ent of e x is tin g  d i lu te ® . Colonel House p articu larly , as a  re p re ­
se n ta tiv e  o f  th#  P resid en t, had personally  endeavored to  so lve everything 
from e ffe c tin g  the  end o f th© War to  compromising problems of In te rn a tio n ­
a l  law. But as W alter h ippmm observed!
. . * He went to  &glaad» Germany and Franc# severa l times and 
he had in terv iew s w ith th e  lead ing  statesm en. But when i t  i s  
a l l  ©aid and don©, i t  was the  B r i t is h  alone, an t then only w ith  
a  certain  sec tio n  o f the B r i t is h ,  and w ith  th is  sec tio n  not in  
f u l l  confidence, th a t he had continuous d iscussion .*^
Secretary o f S ta te  Lansing, upon whose shoulders re s te d  th® re ­
sp o n s ib ility  fo r  Ju d ic ia l  arguments and pro longation  of d ism ission , in  
many ways accomplished a  remarkable Job. Although n e ith e r  he nor anyone 
els© obtained ©a im portant concession regard ing  apparent v io la tio n s  of 
th® general principle®  o f in te rn a tio n a l law in  Quest ion , he d id  achieve 
“continuous discussion® which he so fe rv en tly  d esired . Indeed* th#
59W elter Llppiaann, “th e  In tim ate  Papers of Colonel House,® fo.reiCTt 
A f fa ir ,  Q uarte rly . I?  (October 1925-July. 1926), 387.
United States was m% able to reach'a final settlement of the 
frabies# with Great Britain, but with, her designed diplomacy i t  was a far' 
mere important oomtfilmtlea that America m t  IsglsM  had avoided a com-' 
p lots break* Although the c r is is  between the United States and Great 
Britain was net yet-.-reached, the reliance upon legal mrgomentation and 
te o ^ ie a lit le e  had set- the- pattern for coat lasted peaceful 
relations.
c m m m  i?
M f l i l  BOLICIIB AH& m S M I O m  LAW
fhe British system tor the economic strangulation of th# Central 
Bowers during World War I produced many problems relating to tbs appli­
cation and extension of accepted principles of international law. Great 
Britain attached old principles to modern conditions of war, justifying  
her action on the ground, that the conduct of war had so clanged as to 
necessitate new interpretations of existing rules whether by custom or 
convention.
In international law, according to Oppenheim a leading Jurist of 
the period, a neutral was not obliged to prevent Ms merchantmen from 
carrying contraband nor was he obliged to prevent then from rendering 
services to belligerents within certain limitations.^ Individuals en­
gaged in such .activities did m  at their own risk, however, a neutral
Zstate was is  no way responsible for the actions of i t s  eitIsons, Oppen-
heisa described the duties of the belligerent-noutral relationship and 
vice-versa spring in parts
But le t  of neutrals art., f ir s t ly , to act toward belligerents 
in accordance with their attitude of impartiality; and secondly, 
to acQulesoe in the exercise of either belligerent1 s right to 
punish neutral merchantmen for breach of blockade, carriage of 
contraband, and rendering wautttral service to the enemy, and, 
accordingly to v is i t ,  search, and eventually capture them.
^L. Oppefchsim, Int.er23^tlonal. Law (second edition; London; Long­
mans, Green and Company, 1912), II, 43%.
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m$ht dutle# of either b e lligeren t ar©» f ir s t ly ,  to  a lt  towards 
neutral® in  accordance with th e ir  attitu de o f im partiality; and, 
secondly, not to  s w * * *  their  intercourse* and in  ©special 
th e ir  cohere© with th# enemy. * 5
A majority o f theoretica l w riters supported the doctrine that a
neutral country was not responsible for the carriage o f contraband by
i t s  subject®, and a b e lligeren t could not complain of the sa le  o f con?-
k
trabaad a r t ic le s  to the enemy on neutral terr ito ry . A great d ifference  
o f  opinion had always existed  concerning the relationsh ip  o f neutral mer­
chants and belligerent® . I t  was held by some that in ternational law was
one exclusively  between s ta te s , and a belligerent s ta te  and a neutral
5
individual were not bound by any ob ligation  to each other. fhe carriage 
o f  contraband was, then* merely a commercial adventure.
I .  E* fyke, eai H sglish authority on international law daring th is  
tim e, held that there was rea lly  a d irect relationsh ip  between a b e l lig ­
erent s ta te  and n m tral individuals, and th# actual act o f transporting  
contraband in  ■spite o f  th® prohibition by a b elligeren t nation, which was 
in  & p osition  to  confiscate  said  cargoes, was a d irect v io la tio n  o f in ter-  
national law.6 th is view was support«d by earlier ju r ists.
Westlake, another renown leg a l scholar of th® period* ©aid;
A p o s itiv e  rule o f international law may treat certa in  con­
duct of an individual, .as n m m t r a l ,  allowing th® injured b e llig ­
erent to repress i t  by action on th# individual wherever such
3Ib ld .. pp. 378-79.
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naction. i s  p ossib le  without v io la tin g  neutral terr ito ry , and pr«~ 
eluding M s neutral s ta ts  from defending him against such re­
pression, while that s ta te  Is  not e&llsd on to jo in  in  the re­
pression. I t remains true that international l m  i s  the l m  o f  
s ta te s , hut there Is  m  s o lid  reason why sta te s  should not agree 
by such law that the resp on sib ility  for certa in  a cts  and their  
repressiom»siialX rest with th® Individual and the sta te  d irec tly  
concerned.
th is  relationsh ip  had been established by International law and
usage, the Second Hague Convention had treated the law o f n eu tra lity ,
in  some cases, as involving a d irect relationsh ip  between the b e llig e r -
6
enb sta tes  and neutral individuals.
However, as has been pointed out previously, I t  was generally held  
w ithin the framework o f international lav that a nation was in  m  way 
responsible for i t s  e it is e n s  engaging in  contraband trade, but that they 
did so at th e ir  own r isk .
Great B ritain  began the practice of assbendlng the contraband 
l i s t s  very early in  the War and the leg a l treatment of contraband under­
went some remarkable changes.
Contraband may be defined ass
fhe designation o f property, by whomever owned m  board a neutral 
v e s se l , or owned by a neutral on board an enemy v e sse l, found by 
a b e lligeren t on the high seas or within h is  own or h is enemy1 s 
te r r ito r ia l waters, on i t s  way to a s s is t  h is  enemy in  the conduct 
Of .h o s t il it ie s  against him.®
Contraband i s  divided into three c lasses: (1) Absolute Contraband,
those goods which are intended for us# in  war,.- by an enemy government or
Ib id .. p. 9^-
6m & ., p. 95. 
IMA.. p. 6.
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It® einiad force®. (2) Conditional Contraband, those good.® which are act 
n ecessarily  intended for war purposes ©ad can become absolute contraband 
only when proved that they are so intended. ( 3 ) lonr-Ccmt raband, the®# 
goods which are intended for as# la  war and thus are placed on th# free  
H i t .
It 1# in terestin g  to  note that th© f i r s t  o f f ic ia l  use o f the word,
with i t s  aeaaiag in  re la tion  to  the conduct of war, was in  the treaty o f  
, 10
Southaapton la  lm $ .  ' fhm e a r lie s t  document where th# word m tm X lf  c$~ 
pears i s  la  m  I ta l ia n  charter in
fh# B r itish  practice, with regard to contraband of war, had always 
been defined by reference to general princip les o f in ternational law, m  
interpreted by the decision© of B r itish  P rise Courts, r e la tiv e  to the
provisions o f  th© various proclamation# and Orders in Council issued m
12
the occasion of th# particu lar war. the A g e n c ie s  o f  the Croat War 
compelled th# English to implement and exercise practices without p rece­
dent in  accepted rules o f international law, M  stated e a r lie r , immedi­
a te ly  a fter  th© outbreak of h o s t i l i t ie s  ftreaS B ritain  began to extend 
and enlarge th© contraband l i s t s ,  ft*# f i r s t  l i s t  was id en tica l with that 
o f th® Declaration o f louden with the exception o f a ircraft which were 
transferred to  the absolute l i s t ,  fhe Declaration had designated th#
1 0 I t l d . . 5. u .  
u ib ia .
u n>i&., p. 14.
machine® m  condi t  loaal coatrata&d, Sometimes there was an intermediate
step and a r tic le s  were appended to th® absolute coutraband category 
d irectly  from the free  l is t*  
In every instance, u n til  1916, Ills Majesty* s Government made d is­
tin c tio n  between absolute and condition®! contraband. James Garner, 
author of works on international law and p o l i t ic a l  sc ien ce , said in  parti 
f t  w il l  be noted that in  a l l  cases in  these proclamations the 
d is tin c tio n  between absolute and conditional contraband v m  main­
tained, but so many a r t ic le s  w#r© put on the l i s t  o f absolute 
contraband when tested  by former principle® o f c la s s if ic a t io n , 
that the attempt to preserve the d istin ction  became absurd, and 
according!?* by a proclamation o f  April 19, 1916, the B r itish  
government adopted the mere lo g ica l course of formally abandoning 
the d iftin c tio n . A sin g le  l i f t  of items arranged alphabetically, 
without d is tin ctio n  as to whether ther ware absolute or condition­
al contraband wm accordingly issued.
th is  was a departure from the previous p o lic ie s  of Soglaad. As 
Earner pointed outs #fhe d is tin c tio n  between absolute and condition®! 
contraband i s  a® o ld  as G ro tiu s , and m  a p rin cip le  of international Xm  
I t  had never hem contested by the United State® or Great B ritain .
In 19X6* ^sgland form ally abandoned the d is tin c tio n , but In practice she 
had done so much ea r lier . 
Another B r itish  departure fro© established principle® of Inter­
national l m  wm  the extension o f the rule o f continuous voyage to the 
carriage o f  conditional oontridiandt th* Order in  Council o f October 29,
b saes Wllford Samar, SM OTfttteA iSSL S&,&& XJUAA J «
(London; Longmans, Green and Company, Xf20), I I ,  286.
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191^, perm itted  ap p lica tio n  of th e  r a le  to  cond itional contraband bound
fo r  n e u tra l p o r ts ,  and furtherm ore, i t  rev©reed the  e s tab lish ed  custom
which placed upon th e  cap to r, not upon th e  owner* th© 'burden o f  proving
16
a h o s t i le  d e s tin a tio n . The D eclaration  o f London sanctioned app lica­
t io n  o f  th© ru le  of continuous voyage to  cond itional contraband only i f  
the  enemy had no seap o rts . Both Germany and J u s tr ia ,  however, had sea­
p o r ts , thus th® ru le  of continuous voyage as regards cond itional co n tra ­
band could not have been le g a lly  app lied  to  n e u tra l cargoes had the  
D eclaration  o f London been observed. While i t  i s  t ru e  th a t th is  B r i t is h  
po licy  was a  m odification of the  D eclaration , m  she had observed, i t  
was genera lly  accepted by a l l  Maritime S ta tes when th e  War broke, th a t
th© ru le  governing continuous voyage should be held as provided by the
17
London Instrum ent.
Th© D octrine of Continuous Voyage had been developed, as a l e g i t i ­
mate p<art o f in te rn a tio n a l law, to  perm it b e llig e re n ts  to  e ffe c tiv e ly  
meet th e  problem created  by th® proxim ity of n e u tra l p o rts  to  enemy t e r r i ­
to ry  as regards th e  u ltim a te  d e s tin a tio n  o f contraband consigned to  neu­
t r a l  p o r ts . The u ltim a te  d e s tin a tio n , o f course, may w ell have been to  
th© enemy. Hespective to  the  D octrine of Continuous Voyage Oppenheim 
wrote:
I t  a lso  happens la  war th a t n e u tra l v esse ls  ca rry  to  n e u tra l 
p o r ts  .such a r t i c le s  as a re  contraband i f  bound fo r a  h o s t i le  
destina tion ,, th e  v esse l being cognisant or not o f the  fa c t  th a t
m a . . p. 296. 
17m a .. p. 299.
9^
arrangements have been made fo r the a r t ic le s  to he afterw ards 
hrought by land or sea  In to  th e  hands of the  enemy. 1®
Vessels could carry  contraband whether going to  a  n e u tra l or not i f  th e  
goods were u ltim a te ly  d estin ed  fo r the  enemy.
fhe  f i r s t  ap p lica tio n  o f th e  do c trin e  to  th© c a rriag e  of con tra ­
band appears to  have been by fren ch  Courts during the  Crimean War. I t  
involved the  v esse l jfeaaj Anna Bowina which was bound from l i s t e n  to  I s&h
burg. The cargo of s a l tp e tr e  was condemned on th®' ground th a t  i t  was
19u ltim a te ly  destined  fo r R ussia. The B r i t is h  had always a sse r te d  th® 
r ig h t  o f n e u tra ls  to  trad e  f re e ly  between n e u tra l p o rts  u n t i l  th e  Boer 
War when they con fisca ted  cargoes on the  ground o f  u ltim a te  enemy d e e t l-  
n a tio n .20
The B r i t is h  a p p lica tio n  o f the  D octrine o f Continuous Voyage, how­
ever, as implemented by th e  Order in  Council o f October 29, 191^, was a 
new and d is t in c t  departu re  from estab lish ed  p r in c ip le s  o f In te rn a tio n a l
law, which destroyed leg itim a te  w ith  Germany and severely handicapped
21le g itim a te  n e u tra l commerce. P o ssib le  trad® w ith  Germany through con­
tiguous coun tries  forced the  B r i t i s h  to re ly  upon broad in te rp re ta tio n s  
and a p p lica tio n s  o f th e  ru le s  regarding contraband.
^Oppa&he&n, &%$• , XX, 500*
B ern er , pp. £££. , IX. 29?.
20Ib id .
21M.» 0. frim ble , wV lo la tions of Maritime Daw by A llied  Powers 
During fhe  World War,1* jQtt dp.orlcaa Jou rna l &H In te rn a tio n a l Jgg , 2 h
(1930),
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fhe Baglisk maintained that the United States had protested a 
right which the had gggrelctftd in treating contraband darling the U lv ll 
War. S ir  O ceil % rii?g-Sloe isadd %n p a r t i
As- yon a re  aware th e  Supreme Court o f  th e  United S ta te s  in  
I S #  c#»®id#r#d ire# sa ls  a t  engrpis#  cemimb*cs$* a lth o n ^ . 
ta ilin g , from on# neutral, p o rt to  ano ther, i f  th e  goods con­
cerned war© destin ed  to  ho tran sp o rted  by land or se a  .from th e  
non tra d  p o rt o f landing in to  th e  «&emsy*s t e r r i to r y .  I t  t  k m  
decided th a t  th e  ch arac te r o f  th e  goods i s  determined by th e i r  
u ltim a te  destina tion*  and th is  d o c trin e  was a t  the  t i a e  an- 
fpleseddlm  by O ffal B r i ta in , though her own trad© was th e  
c h ie f  m?.f£®rer.
the fa i le d  States taring the 01*11 far  held rm m t®  to  he carrying 
contraband on proof that goods were eventually to he transshipped to the 
enemy even though the reseele  involved were ta ilin g  between one neutral 
port and another, fheee cases dealt with the Springbok and the gctar- 
h s ff , XI i s  Sag?o riant to point out that the cases a lso  were treated  
under breach o f blockade. TM  rulings established the ^Doctrine of Ooa- 
tlm uhs transportn ia  ^ p lic a t io n  of the Soetyine cf Continuous foyaga.
In reviewing the decisions* OppsnheiJs eelds
fkzs .another application o f  the doctrine o f continuous voyage 
cam® into existen ce, since v e sse ls  Whilst sa ilin g  between two 
neutral ports could only be considered to be carrying contra- 
band when the transport f i r s t  from one neutral port to another 
and afterwards t r m  the la t te r  to the enemy territory  had been 
regarded m  mm c en t!« « s i  voyage* -*
Corner, fg.. c i t . » I I ,  300. 
2%ppenhete, j$£# M i . , II* 501* 
i b id .
25$M 4., p. 502-
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*£hw® were, however, important d if f  ©ranees between soy ages refer­
red to by HI# Majesty* s Government during the Civil War and those of 
World War 1. She cargoes never became part of the common stock of the 
country daring the Civil War, but were immediately reloaded and re - 
forwarded to eneray te rr ito ry . Discussing the subject &arm®r wrotei
In the recent, war the neutral ports to which the destined 
cargoes were consigned were the ports not of small islands, but 
of countries with extensive populations among whom was a large 
demand for the p a rticu la r commodities in  question, a demand 
which was increased considerably by th# cutting off of the 
accustomed supply a t the outbreak of the war, trm  the neigh­
boring belligeren t S tates, fhey were not ports of c a ll or 
transshipment. In every case the cargoes, were intended to be 
unloaded, a f te r  which they would become mixed with the common 
stock ©f the country, a transaction which interrupted the  voy­
age; i f  a  subsequent shipment took place, i t  would be an entire­
ly  new voyage and not m continuation of the In i t ia l  voyage.
the Doctrine of Continuous Toy age held that absolute contraband 
going immediately to a &*»%?*! port but destined ultim ately, in accord­
ance with the evidence on board the vessel, to  a belligeren t, was subject
27to eelsmre before reaching the neutral po rt. As previously observed, 
the B ritish  treatment of conditional contraband with regard to the Doc­
tr in e  of CoatInuous Voyage was unprecedented in  in ternational 1 m . fhe 
B ritish  application of the doctrine to contraband, as interpreted by the 
Order in  Council of October 29, 1915» and which drew no distinction* in 
usage, between absolute and conditional contraband, could not be proper­
ly  ju s tif ie d  by reference to cases in  the C iv il War, because the analogies 
were not altogether correct.
26Sarner, ££. c i t . .  I I ,  301. 
frlm ijl# , op. c l t . . p . 81.
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Foodstuffs from th e  o u tse t o f the  Wear had been regarded as con­
d i tio n a l  contraband. M%m yebruary, 1915, tew eter, th e  most im portant
items o f  th is  c la s s  of goods were, in  e f fe c t ,  tre a te d  as ah so lu te  e o n tra - 
28hand* th e  B r i t is h  te d  t r e a te d  fo o d stu ffs  m  contraband only when des­
tin e d  fo r  th e  use o f the  m ili ta ry  fo rces of th e  e n e m y . I n  th e  pm% th e  
B r i t i s h  G-orernmeni had r e s i s te d  any attem pt by nations to  d ec lare  m food­
s tu f f  contraband. A lead ing  E nglish j u r i s t  te d  remarked:
foodstuffs with a h o s t ile  destination  can he considered con­
traband o f  war only i f  they art supplies for the- enemy* s forces.
I t  i s  not su f f ic ie n t  t t e t  they  a re  capable o f being so used; i t  
mast be s te m  th a t t h i s  m n  in  fa c t  th e i r  in te n tio n  a t  th e  time 
of the  s e is u re ,3$
7te  British, ted protested a sim ilar p osition  by Russia regarding
fo o d stu ffs  as contraband in  1904, when lo rd  Landsdowne s ta te d  t t e t  such
a  s tep  was. * in co n s is ten t w ith  the- law and p ra c tic e  o f n a tio n s .11^  fh is
view was a lso  held  by the  Souse of Commons during th e  considera tions of
the  d e c la ra tio n  o f London.
th e  United. S ta te s  Government d id  not p ro te s t  so ea rn es tly  against
the- extension of the  d o c trin e  o f contraband to  goods form erly regarded, as
Innocent, a t  unprecedented as they were, as be the  n e t t e d *  o f  enforcing
B r i t is h  p o lic ie s . Ispeci& lly  i r r i t a t i n g  was the  p ra c tic e  o f v i s i t  and
go
' Gamer* g$* S l i* » 28** *
29
IM d .. j>. 2^1.
31ib ia .
32ibia.. p. 292.
mm®k which was d iscussed  e a rlie r*  f t e  p o licy  o f  tak ing  v e sse ls  in to  
port for inspection was without precedent in  international law, fits 
B ritish  defense for such action-* of course, was that modem conditions 
o f  war had rendered search on the high mm- in e ffe c tiv e  thus making i t  
necessary to take the ship® into p er i.
the taking o f  v e sse ls  in  with only monger w ppicion m& pursued 
to  the fu l le s t  e x te n t .^  the practice was both exasperating and extreme­
ly  co stly  to American shippers* Iren discharging and port co sts  ted to  
he borne by the neutral parties*
Costly detention resu ltin g  from sometimes fraudulent m anifests was 
t r ie d  to  be averted by c e r tif ic a t io n  of the cargoes by B r itish  Consuls 
who ted  witnessed the loading o f the vessel®* the B r itish  Government, 
however, refused to  recognize the c e r t if ic a te s  as conclusive on the
ground that they afforded no assurances that there would act be augmen­
ta tion  o f the cargoes at sea. In several instances, cargoes so c e r t if ie d
ah
were seized  .and taken in to  p o rt fo r  fa r th e r  examination. According to 
B r i t is h  naval p riz e  re g u la tio n s , it-w as provided H te i  in  e x c i s i n g  the  
r ig h t  o f search  the  should be c a r t fu l  not to occasion the
n e u tra l ship any delay or d ev ia tio n  from her eoxrse th a t  can be avoided
and genera lly  to  cause as l i t t l e  annoyance -as p o s s i b l e . f h e  §nney-
anc®, however, was g re a t .
E a r n e r ,  £11*» II*  2 9 2 • 
^ I b i d .  ■ p . 295.
35i m - . PS* 292-93*
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ftm  Order in  Oomotl of March 11, 1915» established a blockade in  
everything but legal Mae. the measure prevented access to 0im aa ports 
of a l l  a r tic le s  whether contraband or not, thus effecting the resu lt of 
blockade although not legally  om  J& nomine, fhe measure* however, went 
mm further by applying the blockade to neutral ports as well as those 
of the
the defin ition  of a blockade, sta tes  Ogpsa&eta, is  wth© blockading 
by sen-of-war of the approach to the m m f  coast or a part of i t  fo r the 
purpose of preventing ingress and egress of vessels of a i l  nations.
A blockade m et also be universal to have legal existence. In other 
words, ships of a l l  nations must be stopped, i s  provided in the Declar­
ation of London a'blockade must be declared either by government declar­
ation o r by a naval commander acting under i t s  authority to so declare 
o m . ^  A blockade m et also be effective to  maintain legal statu®.
fhe Order in Ckmncil of March 11, violated three fundamental prin­
ciples of a blockade? (1) I t  was net jaadntaihed at close range, (2) Ves­
sels going to neutral ports were stopped, (3) Oerman ports on the Baltic
38
Sea were le f t  open to others. S ir S&imel Brans, eminent p rise  ju r i s t ,  
b a lle t i t  a blocked® for ap o litica l and jo u rn a lis tic  purpose®.*1^  I f  
viewed legally , i t  was no blockade a t , a l l ,  but i t  did, n on eth eless,.,
^Qppenheim, o i l . . I I ,  450-51*
37m i- ,  r -  ^5 6 .
•^Trimble, gp. c l t . . p. 93*
39m a .
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accomplish the same ends. In many way® I t  was more e ffe c t iv e  than a 
leg a l blockade for I t  encompassed both German ant neutral ports as pre­
v iously  mentioned.
The B ritish  innovation proposed that the cargoes were not to  be 
confiscated as in a  lega l blockade, but were to be disposed o f by Brl.se
Courts, provided they were not requisitioned by th e  government under c e r-
40ta in  enabling c o n d itio n s ." The Soglish  rea lised  that they could not 
le g a lly  prevent e l l  good© from reaching O em m f  so a blockade of .an un­
usual, but e ffe c t iv e , nature was adopted.
The B r itish  based th e ir  defense for such action, oiseng other things, 
upon r e ta lia t io n  for &emsn transgressions of international law. It was
also pointed out that the United States had, during the C ivil War, applied
41the Doctrine o f Continuous Voyage to blockade m  well an to contraband*
His Majesty*# Government f e l t  that the in ter fre la tio n  had to be applied to
the e x is t in g  s itu a tion  to sake the blockade e ffe c t iv e , by extending I t  to
n e u tra l port© and th is  procedure vm  defensib le within the established
p rin cip les o f in ternational law.' the important aspect o f th e  .Springbok
Case, according to the British., was that adaptation of old rules should
not be advanced un less they were i s  harmony with the general princip les
k2upon which established b elligeren t right® were based. ' ®his had been 
the s p ir it  o f the measure implemented by treat B ritain  for intercept lug
»• 93 .
^SrahsM, SiS.' SU.-1 P* 156. 
t e X tld. , pp. 156-57.
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commerce to Gkamsny* fhey had* however, cheated the penalty for breach
o f  blockade oo that confiscation  o f v esse ls  and goods was not perm itted .^
fhe B r itish  p osition  regarding the blockade was m t  enable. I t  was
c learly  without the framework o f established princip les of international
law. fha ea r lier  B r itish  view concerning the Ssrim ^ok. m  expressed by
Sir  Bdward Grey him self, had been that i t  was extremely doubtful i f  the
Doctrine of Ooniimxoas Voyage could be applicable to a vesse l carrying
non-contraband m aterial, and th is  was the only instance where condemnation
44
for breach o f blockade alone was J u s tif ie d .
She two important means by which enemy commerce could be in ter­
cepted were blockade and contraband, fhese two methods are d is tin c t a l­
though many times a sin g le  action involves both.
Im th is  resp ect, i t  i s  w ell to append several paragraphs to draw 
out th is  d is tin c tio n , lord  ho reburn, an English w i t  or on naval war con­
duct, wrote?
The rule o f international law which allows a b e lligeren t sta te  
to capture contraband i s  based upon the theory that when two 
sta tes  are at war no neutral# ace en titled  to in terfere . I f  a 
neutral sta te  lends help to e ith er  o f the combatants i t  e p o se s  
I t s e l f  to attack from the other. I f  individual clbisom© Ac so 
by furnishing s u l l i e s  by sea o f a contraband character, they in ­
cur the r isk  o f eeirure and confiscation . Many capture is  eon- 
fined to enemy property. Blockade applies to property o f  a l l  
kinds i f  found in the prohibited cone end d irectly  destined for 
the blockaded territory . But contraband i s  lim ited  So property 
of a particular kind which i s  destined to the b e llig eren t, sad 
i t  may be captured anywhere at sea except in  neutral waters,
. , . jte&e sta tes sometimes say that i t  cannot be captured ma­
le s*  i t s  destination  i s  to  the b elligeren t terr itory  and for
43
A & -  P-
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tii© b elligerent government. The extras© view on the other side  
i s  that, 3io matter what i t s  port o f destination  may ho, i t  cos 
ho qapturod i f  i t  i s  Intended u ltim ately  to  reach the b e llig e r ­
ent terr itory . . . , the law o f contraband m y bo need so as a l­
most to extinguish neutral trade-, and to produce nearly the same 
e ffe c t m  a blockade without the r isk  and effect, o f  esployiag a 
su ffic ien t naval f o r c e .^
These passages b r ie fly  present Lord lo r  ©bum1 s concept o f the prin­
c ip le s  of contraband as nay he e ffe c tiv e  in the interception of enemy 
commerce, However, prior to the War, & distingnlehed 0 -erman scholar, 
hie&eyer said:
fhe acceptance of the right of contraband o f war mean as Tom 
are unrestricted  in  the d e fin itio n  o f  war contraband. Conse­
quently, through a proper handling of the meaning of war contra­
band yen. m y evade the demands imposed upon blockade. By over­
stretching the right o f contraband you may achieve approximately 
the r e m its  o f an e ffe c t iv e  blockade that would otherwise he 
either impossible for you or e lse  highly inconvenient. And by 
exercising m  smch as possib le  the right o f contraband you say 
even empress, under certain  conditions, the imperfepi, because 
lo c a lly  restr ic ted  e ffec t o f an e ff ic ie n t  blockade . 4*"0
liem®y®r, s remarks point out that since the- ultim ate e ffe c t  o f con­
traband and blockade Is the same, the operation o f both become somewhat 
id en tica l. I s  regards the d istin ctio n  between contraband and blockade 
H all, author of a  work on the laws of naval warfare, suggested;
the l ia b i l i t y  of a neutral merchant ship to be captured by a 
b e llig e re n t arise®, e ith e r  because such a vesse l Is  attem pting to  
break a blockade, or because she is  g u ilty  o f carrying co n tra ­
band goods or is  h erself contraband—i . e . ,  a v e sse l intended t# 
be converted to a warlike use. the two causes of l ia b i l i t y  are 
to be carefu lly  distinguished, there can only be a breech o f  
blockade when on© had been established, but i t  i s  i l l e g a l  be 
carry contraband from the moment war has been declared. Sailing  
with any cargo or m m  to a blockaded place i s  i l l e g a l ,  but the
h b l j . . cp. 86-87-
^ I M d . . p . 87.
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l ia b i l i ty  carriage of contraband depends en tire ly  m  the 
noxious nature of the cargo; for % ha abject of blockade is  to 
cat off a l l  in te rco u rse  with. a sped  fie  p lace , w hile the par- 
pose of the la t te r  is  to out o ff from the enemy everywhere a r t­
ic le s  of d irect use  to  Mm in  prosecuting the war. % ain im 
blockade the ultim ate destination of the ship is  the t e s t ,  but 
in the question  of contraband I t  is  that o f the earge* f in a lly  
the penalty fo r breach of blockade f a l l s ,  as we have seem* on 
both ship and cargo, but for carrying contraband i t  f a l ls  p r i­
marily oa the contraband goods* and except for loss of time and
fre igh t, only exceptionally on the vessel. Since, then l i a b i l i ­
ty depends on the mature of the cargo , i t  is  necessary to con­
sider, what is  to be regarded tz  contraband and what as inno­
cen t.
Great B ritain  had unquestionably violated the d is tin c t 
principle® of blockade m&t B ritish  apologies notwithstanding, her policy 
Could not be Ju s tified  within the established principles of international .lav/. 
A belligeren t, however, does not always measure the success of a war tac­
t ic  by i t s  complete compliance with the accepted ru les among nations.
A& regards contraband i t  is  in teresting  to note the success of i t s
treatment, by the B ritish , under the Doctrine of Goatimiou© transport.
Ilnety-mime per cent of contraband, whether absolute or conditional was
captured m  being in ^continuums transportu—that is  while in tran s it to
a neutral port on the supposition that i t  was going to be transshipped
ifB
overland to Germany*
Tm ia strm en t for .handling cases la  li t ig a tio n  involving in ter­
ference with neutral camaeree was the Prise Court, the basis for i t s  
imstruction as a court was the Orders in Council. Decisions of the
47IM d. . pp. 87-38.
h&
Kenworthy and Young, ££,. ci,t.«, p . 127*
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B ritish W rim  Courts, im tfe* most im portant casts, provide th e  g re a te s t
49imaovai lem  im prise law.
Qgpsohelm m aintained th a t  t r i a l s  o f captured v e sse ls  by P rise  
Courts were municipal m atte rs , f t e  law adm inistered by th e  P r is e  Courts 
was mot i*i-crwti©»*3L law. the court#  in  r e a l i ty  applied  th e  law o f
<n
th e i r  own country (Municipal law ). He po in ted  out th a t only ..atj t^efs,
were subject to international law, and not their court®, o ff ic ia ls , or
e t t t s e a s  .as such* th e  law app lied  by I& tiana l P r is e  Court® was mot and
could not be International law fee to the difference# between municipal
51law and international law sad the previously mentioned fa ct. for  ex­
ample, i f  the Declaration o f Deafen ted  been r a tif ie d  that would certa in ­
ly  have h em  international law- binding upon the sta te# , but only upon the  
sta te# , and they would have had to incorporate that law into th e ir  munici­
p a l law, so that their  P rise  Courts would have been obligated to adminis­
ter m oh % m  regarding p r ise  ease# im conformity w ith'the Declaration**^ 
However, Opp-enteim suggested?
A state which is a p a rty  to the Declaration and would never­
theless order its Prise Court# to apply a law which is  in oppo­
sition to the Declaration of louden» would commit an internation­
al delinquency, tu t i ts  Prise Courts would be ©bilged t© apply
mioh la w .53
^%rlmhl®, £&« o il. * p. JB. 
^Oppenhelm, gg. .%!&*, IX, 553*
?• 554. 
??• 554-55-
53ibia.
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waiters, however, were of the opinion that Prize Courts were 
lutematioiml court® and the law administered was international law.
Lord Stowell» an laglish prise Judge, repeat ©dip held this view, as did
Kh
a great majority of international writers oft the subject.
I, Borneo!* Pyke, In Ms treatise on the law of contraband, held the 
opinion that should a state pass a statute contrary to the general eas­
iest* of civilized nations, the Judge presiding would he bound to follow 
55
it, in principle theft* the Prize -Court was not International hut
national im character, fh© sources of law might be the custom followed 
amn$ nations, but the authorization to follow such law em e from immicl-
56
pal legislation.
the natural question arose as to whether a Prize Court would he 
hound hr mmi®ip&£ acts or rule# if they were contrary to the established 
principles of international law, fhe Judicial Committee o f the Privy 
Council did im fact act upon mmh a ruling im a decision handed down im. 
the gafteya Case, 1916. the decision, describing the relation of Order* 
in Council to inter mat'tonal law, read in part?
It cannot, o f course, he disputed that a Prize Oourt, like 
any other court, is hound by the legislative enactments of it®
&m sovereign state, , . . the fact, however, that the Prize- 
Courts im this count.ry would be bound by acts of the Iberia! 
Legislature afford m  ground for arguing, that they are bound by 
the executive order'of the King in Council. , . . If the Court 
is to decide Judicially im accordance with what it conceives to 
be the law of nations it cannot, even im doubtful case®, take 
its direction fro® the Crown, which is a party to the proceedings.
ibid,, p. 55%.
^Pyke, ©£. c i t ., p. 216. 
^ i b i d .
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I t  m et i t s e l f  determine wh&t the law i s ,  according to the best 
o f  i t s  ab ility*  and i t s  view, with whatever h esita tion  i t  he 
arrived a t, m et prevail over any executive order. Only in  th is  
way e m  i t  f u l f i l l  i t s  function as a Prise Court and ju s t ify  the 
confidence which other n e t ions have hitherto pieced in  i t s  de­
eds ions*
I t  e m t  fee assumed, m i l l  there fee a decision  of the f r i s e  
Court to that e ffect t that any executive order i s  contrary to  
law, and a l l  such orders, i f  aCfuieseed in  and not declared to 
fee i l l e g a l ,  w i l l ,  in course o f time, fee th « 3  elves evidence fey 
which International few and usage may fee established*5?
fhe decision  declared that a Prize Court, which administered in­
ternational law, was not fecund fey a prerogative Order in  Council unless  
i t  d irected m itigation  of the Grown1 s right in  favor o f the c la im an t.^  
fb© claims o f le g is la t iv e  r igh ts for  the lin g  in Council was an errone­
ous dictum for courts ruling upon international law* She Jud icia l Com­
m ittee o f the Privy Council did hold, however, that a Prise Court would 
fee fecund fey m le g is la t iv e  enactment o f i t s  own s ta te , but th is  did not-pro­
vide greund for arguing that same would fee true for executive orders fey 
the l in g  in Council.
fhe B r itish  proclamation declaring the Serih Sea a war m m  wm
another measure without leg a l J u stif ic a tio n , the A llie s  assumed control
o f a portion of the high m m  which v io la ted  established princip les o f
59international law, f id s  was accomplished fey placing mines in the area 
which n ecessita ted  neutral ships stopping for B r itish  in  order to ne­
go tia te  the mine f ie ld s ,  thus allowing visit..and  search la  port, th is
57Graham* a l t , . pp. 9 9 - 1 0 1 .
58Morrtsey, p l.t, * p . 133. 
liable, p i t . , p. 83.
was without precedent, hut drew m  formal protest from the Suited States,
B r itish  contributions to Prise Court methods and procedures are
also wortl^r o f note. It had been generally held before World War I ,  m
regards conditional contraband, that ship*# papers proved destination  o f  
60
goods. the old way of determining destination  was that such evidence
61
was to come from on hoard the v e sse l, fhe B r itish , however, held ad-
missable to P rise Courts a l l  types o f evidence and the methods used to
ascertain  ultim ate enemy destination  r a i le d  upon mere presumption dram
trm . ex istin g  circumstances surrounding the transaction. Often goods were
confiscated i f  the claimant could not p cstive ly  prove that the goods were
not u ltim ately  to  reach the enemy. ffcle was desp ite the fact that in
many cases the neutral government e had embargoed such goods prior to
confiscation . I t  was nearly i ip e s s ih is .  In most In stances, for the
claimant to prove or to supply p o s itiv e  evidence that the goods would not 
63
reach the enemy.' fo  establish that goods were consigned to  a neutral
country or port was not enough, fhe claimant had also to prove that they
were not intended by one moans or another to  reach the. enemy territory
63a fter  arriving at a neutral p o r t ." th is  requirement necessitated  posi­
t iv e  proof#
yu$$S*» P- 81
&n j A - . p- 85.
62.
^ C . John Colombos, ,4 g ree t la c  of tiie  Lay o f P riz e  (London: Sweet
and Maxwell, 1926), p. 185*
108
I f  B r i t i s h  P riz e  Court proceeding© were in  mmg way© a d is t in c t  
d ep artu re  from ©14 p r in c ip le s , they were net ephemeral. ColOmbos, 
B r i t i s h  p r iz e  lew a u th o rity , d iscuss log th e  ©abject o f  evidence, wrote 
in  p a rts
A P r is e  Court 1© no t r e s t  re in ed  w ith  regard to  evidence by 
any confining ru le s  such as a re  ap p licab le  to  question© o f  
ism ie ip e l Xm* and i s  not g o w n e d  o r lim ite d  by th e  ©eat 
s t r i c t  te c h n ic e ll ti t© . tv idenee i s  the.© accepted l a  th e  Prig*
Court © which would have been declared  Inadmi©sable in  o th er 
n a tio n a l t r ib u n a ls . Moreover, ra d ic a l changes have been 
©f f  ee t  e& Ju rlag  th e  Croat f a r  in  the- p ra c tic e  h ith e r to  p re ­
v a il in g .
She Ju ris t, fu r th e r  reasoned th a t a  P r ise  Court must be “given th e  
r ig h t  to  a sc e r ta in  th e  t r u th  by proper in v e s tig a tio n  and by the  in tro ­
duction  o f  a l l  hinds o f  evidence ever end above ship* s papers, provided
65
th a t  such evidence be t r u e  end m aterial.®  C erta in ly  during th e  War th e  
B r i t i s h  had e n te rta in ed  .a ll kinds o f  evidence in  p r is e  proceedings.
His Majesty'1© Government had c le a r ly  in i t i a t e d  numerous p o lic ie s  
a t variance  w ith  th e  e s tab lish ed  principle©  o f in te rn a tio n a l law. fh e  
treatm ent of contraband, blockade* and s h if t in g  th e  burden o f proving 
the  innocence o f cargoes upon th e  claim ant were but a  few o f an almost 
endless l i s t  o f  unprecedented in te rfe re n c e  w ith  n e u tra l tra d e , fh® 
question  o f undue in te rfe re n ce  w ith  n e u tra l commerce g en e ra lly , in ­
cluding search , d e tea t ion , C ondonation , c o n fisca tio n , treatm ent o f 
contraband, blockade, m i  procedures in  the  Brize Courts, was a very 
complex problem which c rea ted  new innovations in  in te rn a tio n a l law.
p . 3X3.
65IMd. ■ p. 31?.
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Oteae, 1^16), p. 1297.
67m a . . p . 1673.
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The 'B ritish  contention that modern conditions of war n ecessitated  
a l t e r s  loss o f old princip les was not without reasonable foundation*
She War did bring: great changes in the conduct o f war, which nnquestion- 
ably demanded new appreciation o f new problems with regard to inter­
national law. For example It would have probably been impossible to 
draw up a, l i s t  of contraband which would have held good for a l l  time# 
and in  a l l  circumstance®. As H. Reason Fyke stated: w2he l i s t  o f con­
traband a r tic le s  must be arrived at by the application of general princi­
p les to particular circumstances of sp ec ific  wars and.must -have e la s t ic ity
*^8
for conditions, o f modern warfare greatly  change. *
ifaverthclecft, the unique B r itish  interpretations and practica l 
measures were., in many instances, contrary to ex istin g  international 
code® o f  guidance, The p o lic ie s  were, however, e ffe c tiv e  In achieving 
the stoppage o f Q m uw  trade, end th is  was, o f course, the determining 
factor in  achieving the economic starvation o f the Central Powers* i s  
Trimble wrote:
These interpretations o f the law made by the Orders in  Coun­
c i l  and the court decisions,' destroyed, as a p ractica l matter, 
the d is tin c tio n  between the two c la sses of contraband goods, and 
a l l  but stopped the trade of the United States with the neutral 
countries adjacent to  Germany, a# well as with Germany* Having 
made these changes, a l l  that was now necessary to increase the  
©eonojsic pressure on the Centra! Powers was to enlarge the con­
traband lis t .® *
The B r itish , indeed, in te n sified  th eir  economic pressures on Oer- 
jaeay despite- opinions voiced -shout international law. A Command Paper
^ p yke, c i t . , pp. 178-79*
■69Colombos, ggf P it . . p. 181.
■dated April 13, 1918, o ff ic ia lly  mppreeotd a l l  d is tin c tio n  between abso-
70lu te  and e o n d itio m l eoatnabmd* The D eclara tion  of Aondoa w ith i t#  
frequen t m& fundamental m odifications was o f f ic ia l ly  abandoned by &r©al 
B r ita in  In  Ju ly , 1916» but fo r  a l l  p r a c t ic a l  purposes i t  had been d is ­
carded long before*
^ T rim b le , jgg, p i t . « P* 79*
t m m »  ?
9HX KIM
In fewember, 1914, B r i t i s h  c ru is e rs  captured four v e sse ls , th e
M&* th e  s & S  la M L  the  j t o m d m M i  M m m m >  « d  th e  on
the ground th a t  th e i r  cargoes were condi t  len a l contraband u ltim a te ly  
d estin ed  fo r  th e  government o r  armed fo rces o f  Germany, th e  sh ip s, w ith  
the  exception o f th e  Kim, had sa ile d  in  Getober—th e  l a t t e r  had s ta r te d  
her voyage on lovember 11.^ th e  Kim, a lso  c a rr ie d  rubber which was de­
c la red  abso lu te  eontxab®hd by th e  Order in  Council o f October 29, 1914. 
fhe Kim, a t th e  tim e o f  cap tu re , was under time c h a rte r  to  th e
Gens Steamship CeapaxgY an American corpo ra tion  w ith  a German president*
2She corporat ion* s general agent fo r larope was a lso  German. Bound from 
lew Xork to  Copenhagen, th e  v e sse l c a rr ie d  a  cargo of la rd , meat products* 
©11 stocks, wheat and o th er fo o d s tu ffs , in  ad d itio n  to  the p a rc e l o f  rub- 
b e r .3
A fter & long delay , th e  four cases were brought before  a  B r i t i s h
B rice Court in  Ju ly , 1915» p resided  over by S ir  Sam el Ivans, fo r  pur­
poses o f ad ju d ica tio n  the  cases were d ea lt w ith  sim ultaneously.
fh® Kim Case was decided in  accordance w ith  the  ro le s  and repb-
la t io n s  as provided in  th e  Order in  Council o f  October 29, 1914, since
^haw R eports, Probate D ivision 216-X? (1915).
2Ib id .
3iu a .
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hm  s a i l in g  dale had hem  ft»ir«Bb«r XI, or a fter  the p r e e le c t io n  of that 
b
Order* ' fhe other three Teasels were treated in accordance with the  
general rule# o f  International I m  m  they had sa iled  prior to October 29, 
.and, consequently were not subject to the Order. In addition, the October 
Order had. repealed that o f  August 20., so that Order was held to be w ith­
out o f f  set*
the main point# o f consideration were whether the Doctrine of Con- 
tiimou® Toy age applied; that i® whether the .goods could be eo Manned 
irraspectIt © of neutral destination  o f the v e sse ls  transportation th m  i f  
cirm sstan ces indicated that they had been consigned to Copenhagen, with 
the intention on the part o f the shippers o f ultim ate destination  to 
Oermamy* either by transshipment upon sea® or by internal eom m nication 
over land* I f  th a t be so i t  had to be determined whether the eircmra- 
glances before the Court warranted inference o f  such intention .
The American meat packing companies Involved contended, with re­
gard to foodstu ffs, th a t  since the goods were conditional contraband, i t  
must be shorn that they were intended for the government or armed forces
o f Osmany. It wist also be shown that th is  intent existed  fro® the
£
f i r s t ,  and the s m i  of proving the intent re s te d  with the Grown* they 
farther argued th a t the Doctrine of Oo.ntinuoi.is Voyage could not be ap­
p lied  because IM# doctrine was applicable only when the destination  m s
L
113 Ltai S ices Saaai%.8. 1071 (SeptesAsr, 1915-yebraary, 1916), 
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*1
1
E a r n e r , o i l . ,  I I ,  30b-.
*H. Beason Dyke, **fh® K±m Gass.** ffjie hm  Quarterly Review, m t l
(19X63, 50. Hereafter o iled  as Bffle, Ijfe CaseT*
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th a t  to  which the  o r ig in a l consignor l a t h e d  th e  goods to  ho se a t, and
7i s  th i s  case the  te s t  illa tio n  was a  n e u tra l port* ®o allow the Crows1# 
p o s itio n , in s is te d  the  claimants* th a t  fo o d stu ffs  going to  could
be tre a te d  as i f  they were intended fo r the  use  o f the  government or 
armed force# d#e*u#e th e  e n tir e  Ceraan n a tio n  was under a w ,  would be to  
.render th e  e s tab lish ed  d is t in c t io n  between abso lu te  and conditional, con­
traband  in o p era tiv e , th e  Crown1 a claim  th a t  th e  p ra c tic e  o f the  Cerman 
Government in  making re q u is it io n s  upon merchants fo r  food a p p l i e s  mad#
p o ss ib le  the  tak ing  o f #ay goods going to  &er©eny fo r th e  u se  o f the  m ill-
$t&ry, and thereby t r e a tin g  them a# abso lu te  contraband could not be held . 
She f a c t ,  i f  i t  m s  a  f a c t ,  th a t the good® were destined  to  enemy t e r r i ­
to ry  and so might u ltim a te ly  f in d  th e i r  way to  th e  enemy government or 
ansed fo rces d id  not render th e  goods con fiscab le ,
th e  claim ants argued, furtherm ore, th a t the  t e s t  ©f a  continuous 
voyage, m  S ir  Mward drey had in s tru c te d  h is  delegates p r io r  to  th e  
London la v a l Conference, was '^whether th e  whole tra n sa c tio n  was made in  
pursuance of a  s in g le  m ercan tile  tra n sa c tio n , preconceived by the consign- 
e r fro® the  o u ts e t ,1* I t  w§# po in ted  out thg t the  D octrine o f Continuous 
Voyage had never been applied  to  & case where the  commodities upon 
a r r iv a l  a t a  n e u tra l p o rt had been so ld  th e re , and i t  could not be app lied  
where the  evidence did  nothing more than  show th a t  they were sent to t hm
7m a ., p. 305.
o
Ibid.
9iB ld .
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mmMwol port la  hope of flading a mariset for delivery elsewbere**®
$h© ^aestloft was also raised as to whether bh© Order in Council
was binding tipcm the Court, fits claimants did not fo a l that It was cosh
potent for the Crown to a lt  or ex ist inc ru les o f international law as
affectod  wm tra l righ ts by Orders In Council, and the October Order had
Uso altered  these law®, and therefore was not binding upon the Court*
the American shipper® maintained that the goods had remained th e ir
12property and possessed ownership at the time o f  th e i r  sa l  sure. " fhe  
other claim ants, person® or firs® in  Seamark, contended that they had 
become purchasers o f the foodstuff®*
■One claim was based on the ground that the goods wore the property 
of the firms as neutral®, shipped on neutral vessel® , and consigned to a 
neutral port. She goods were not intended for sa le  to  or w  by or m  
behalf o f any enemy government or i t s  arsed forces, in  a f f id a v it  was 
f i le d  on behalf o f  Armour and Company sta tin g  that Hhb whole o f  the 
said goods were chipped to the order o f th e ir  a^eab in  Copenhagen for  
sa le  im the agent* s own d is tr ic t  in .the ordinary course of business . 11 
fhe various claimants in s is ted  that there was no p o s itiv e  evidence 
showing- that the good® In question were intended for the use o f the 
government or armed forces o f the enemy,
10m&.
i i
~ m a.
12Lav S m a r t , . Probata D ivision 219 <1915).
13X1>ia. , pp. 219-20.
the Crown claimed that the go o&s were intended to be transmitted
from Copenhagen for the use o f the en&ay government or It a arnod forces.
therefore, the Doctrine o f Oontimious Voyage applied to make the whole
venture an i l le g a l  trading from the beginning. file  At % oraey-Ceneral
pointed out, on behalf o f the State, that since the outbreak of the %bt
ChersKaiy had been using' Copenhagen as & depot for provisioning her troops.
Previous trade had. been diverted to Copenhagen, a neutral port used by
14
neutral shipper® in  America employing neutral bottoms.
l it ig a t io n  began on Jtaly 1 2 , 1 9 1 5 , and the judgment with regard 
to the cargoes was delivered by Sir Sm m le Ivans on September 16 of that 
year, She question before the Court pertained to eo u flsca b ility  o f the  
cargoes only.
She opinion was quite lengthy and system atica lly  disposed of .each 
particu lar argameat. Sir Bm ael AVans said  that the vessel® were cap­
tured on the high seas, and th e ir  cargoes were seised  on the ground that 
they were conditional contraband, alleged to be confiscable in the c ir ­
cumstances with the exception o f a small amount of rubber on board the
15Kim to be treated  as absolute contraband.
He pointed out that Denmark was a small country of le s s  than
three m illion  population, and was an exporting not an importing country
16
with regard to foodstuffs. I t s  geographical situ ation  gave great
15
11?
MGM* to the Uermaa c i t i e s  o f aariborg, ilto n a , lu&edk, I tot t in , and
B erlin , Brass pres exited figures showing the annual quantity o f lard ,
from a l l  sources, consigned to  or i©ported into Uerui&rk during the thro#
year period 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 3 . which vss l»^ 5 9 »0 v 0  pounds* The quantity of lard
1 ?on. the v e sse ls  i z  question alone was 19,252*000 founds* The Orswa had
given in  evidence that the United States had sn o r te d  to Scandinavia
during October end lovember* l? ld , 50,6^7,8^9 pounds o f lerd  as coiapared
with 8 3 & , 8 5 6  pounds for the sane souths in 1 9 1 3 —an increase of
^ 9 .7 9 2 >9 3 3  pounds ox nearly s ix ty  tInes the inports for the corresponding 
18
months o f 1913*
The large quantity o f lard aborted  to Uermsny before the War,
m m  .68,88^,975 pounds during the period Jagust to Beeember, 1913, had
fa lle n  to 2 3 , 8 0 0  pounds for the same period in  191^. Sim ilar exports
to Scandinavian countries, bower or, inftye&wad from 2 , 1 2 3 * 5 7 9  pounds to
no
5 9 *6 9 h, W? pounds., fhes# fa c ts  led  Brans to the conclusion that most
o f  the lard constgiaaent* were actually  Intended for ultim ate Owmm  des­
tination* These v?ere general observation# hut were in  no way conclusive
upon questions pertaining, to the c o a fisca b ility  of goods se ised  r e la t iv e
2 0to consecutive voyage, h o s t ile  qu ality , ant h o s t ile  destination .
th e  enormous increase in  the t r a f f ic  o f foods tu ffs  from the United 
States to Scandinavian countries, however, created a strong presumption
17Ibl&. . p . 223.
18 
IMi*
19IM$.
2 0 XM.&. > p. 22b.
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o f  u ltim a te  enemy d e s tin a tio n . In view o f the  s t a t i s t i c s  quoted* i t  
could hardly  be assumed th a t th e  f in a l  tra n sa c tio n  re s ted  in  Denmark.
The evidence revealed , or seemed to reveal* th a t the  goods in  
question  were shipped to  Copenhagen, In p a r t  to  named consignees, however, 
in  the  g re a te r  number, to  agents o f the  packers or to  th e i r  o rder. These 
agents were in  r e a l i ty  not n e u tra l ‘buyers* but persons employed by th e  
l i t i g a n t  companies in  Germany and who had es tab lish ed  residency in  Copen­
hagen fo r th e  purpose of in su ring  the  immediate tra n sp o rta tio n  o f food-
21s tu f f s  to Germany.
Bvsne re fe rre d  to  a  cable sent by an agent o f one of th e  American
firm s dated lenuary  2^, 1915* i t  s ta te d : **Bon*b ship  any la rd  Copenhagen,
22e rp e rt p ro h ib ited .*  He f e l t  th e  telegram  was both  m ateria l and import­
ant even i f  i t  was a f te r  th e  da te  o f the  vesse l*s cap tu re. I t  t e s t i f i e d  
to  th e  fac t th a t Denmark d id  not req u ire  la rd , and th e  previous importa­
tio n s  o f  th e  product in to  Denmark was only an in term ediate  s tep  fo r  tra n s ­
shipment to  Germany.
During the  course o f th e  t r ia l*  S ir  Samuel 3Hra@ui had inqu ired  o f a  
counsel fo r on© of th e  packing firm s i f ,  in  respect to  fo o d stu ffs  con­
signed to  t h e i r  own o rder, or to  th a t o f th e i r  agent a t  Copenhagen and 
not to  an in&pendent consignee, they were wintended fo r  a Danish market 
or fo r  the  German. “ The counselor answered: *Ky submission i s  th a t th e re
i s  no evidence as to  which they were intended fo r  in  regard  to  any speci­
f i c  consignment* but th a t i t  was e j e c t e d  th e  the  g rea t bulk  would f in d
21Lw  Ba-oorte, P robate D ivision 231-36 (1915). 
^ I b l d . . p . 236.
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i t s  way to Oermto ultim ately i s  obvious,1* Brass replieds MIn o t t o  
words, those goods would not have been seat to Benm&rk i f  the Germans 
were not c lose  by?* tim  ^Defense: wflmt i s  obvious . 11
Brass called  atten tion  to the fact that the  claimants did not 
give the Court say information regarding the arrangements made for  
se llin g  the greater portion o f the- cargoes to  Germany - o f any consignees 
o r  intended consignees. All of th is  information was w ithin the power o f 
the companies to  g ive, ffee counsel for Morris and Gompaity, one o f the 
American packing firm s, had offered to prodace evidence rereading th e  
amount o f lard and other foodstuffs the eompsmy had supplied to  Germany
Z§during the three years prior to the War, th is ,  however, was never done.
Armour and Oempauy argued that th eir  agents lad  s tr ic t  instruc­
tions to  confine their  sa le s  to ftenmarte, and o t t o  ica n d in a v i*  countries, 
fhe Copenhagen o ff ic e , however, was small and the company"* s principal 
Soropean o ff ic e  before the War had been im Frankfurt. fhe  company had 
■offered no in.form.ation as to what became o f th e ir  Franhfitri a fter  the 
War commenced, furthermore, no evidence wm  given concerning transac­
tion s made at the Copenhagen o ff ic e , Record* revealed that Armour aloa# 
had shipped twenty times as much lard to Copenhagen as had been shipped 
to a l l  of Scandinavia by American companies fo r  th e  corresponding period  
im 1913* I t  was a lso  stom  th a t the company had shipped from October to  
Bee amber, X91^» pork products in  amounts ®%ulval«t to  th e ir  s a t i r e  e ip o rt
P- 23? .
2h
Ib id .
25
' Ib id . , p., 238.
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26to  Copenhagen fo r th e  previous e igh t ventre. 5h i t  was n e ith e r  con­
te s te d  nor denied by the company*
Ay&our and Company was a lso  extended th e  opportunity  to  produce 
f ig u res  r e la t in g  to  such products shipped to  Germany In  the  th re e  year
2 7
period  before  th e  War* !e  such statem ent was produced.
She company contended th a t th e  goods in  question were th e i r  proper­
ty  as n e u tra ls  shipped os n eu tra l v e sse ls , and consigned to a n eu tra l p o r t .  
Also, th e  goods were so t intended fo r  sal© to  or use by or os b e h a lf  of
on
any enemy government, or i t s  aw ed  fo rces . fh is  p o s itio n  was supported 
by sworn a f f id a v i ts .
Brans m aintained th a t  th e  defense had. f a i le d  to  give any explana­
t io n  as to th e  shipment, o r the  sa le  o f the  good© the  company claimed.
Be po in ted  o u t, furtherm ore, th a t p a rt o f the  shipment Contained t in s  of 
meat which had g rea t ad& pisb liity  fo r  use by enemy troops in  th e  f ie ld .
I t  i s  in te re s tin g  to  note th a t one counselor fo r Armour and Com­
pany d id  not r e s t  h is  defense upon th e  a f f id a v its .  He said? *My case i s  
not th a t  they were a l l  to  be consumed in  Denmark or Horway; my case i s  
th a t  they were not consigned to  the  (formal fo rces, and i t  was almost c e r-
29
t a l a  th e re  was no continuous voyage.* fh e  S o lio ito r-C enera l queried:
MI  th in k  I heard my learned  frien d  say a  moment ago th a t h is  case was not
26Ib id . , p. 2^0.
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i m *
^ Lm  E eoo rts . Probate D ivision 2^ -3 (1915)•
th a t these  goods were destined  fo r  Danish eoaeumption hut fo r  0®rma»
30
c iv i l ia n  population . * '' $h® defense rep lied : #Ho, 1 sa id  otxr case was
not th a t  the  goods were intended fo r consumption in  Denmark, hut th a t
■ 11the  persons to who® they were consigned so ld  them to  Germany.w
la  the  opinion of Brans, however, i t  remain*! fac t th a t le s s  than 
o n e -f if th  of the goods had ’been sold to  d e f in i te  consignees and so re  than 
f o u r - f i f th s  had not 'been so ld , and laroour and Company was claim ing the 
products on th e  ground th a t  they remained th e i r  p roperty . He could not 
allow  th is  l in e  to he c o rre c t.
The claimant fs “business was purported to he horn f l ip  neutral 
trade between neutral buyers in neutral ports. With few exceptions there 
were no invoices, incaranca p o lic ie s , drafts, or other proofs o f sa le  or 
payment presented concerning the transaction*. On th is  point Sir Sam el 
3vaas said:
f in a l ly ,  I note th a t th e  claim ants d id  not produce any l e t t e r ,  
t «&*#*«*» c o n tra c t, o r any o th er document passim : between the® 
and th e i r  agents in  Copenhagen touching on any p a rt of th e  enor­
mous fu n n t i t ie s  o f goods shipped5 and not one s in g le  booh o f  
account, or commercial document o f any Irind kept by th e i r  agents 
in  Copenhagen, dealing  w ith  th e  goods claim ed, was d is c lo s e d .^
■Sir Samuel 8r«o* fu io H y  disposed o f th e  guest ion o f th e  th i r ty -
n ine cases o f rubber on board the  If® , tre a te d  as abso lu te  contraband*
th e  rubber was consigned to  on® Friisch* th e  Gmrnm Tie ©-Consul a t  SloCk-
11hoi®*, th e  o f f ic ia l  was a lso  a forwarding agent. th e  sh ipper m »
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W. f .  Baird who claimed ownership o f bb© god&is. !<> commercial document# 
were adm itted Into  Court to subo t  an t I a t e h is  claim  nor was th e re  any 
apparent re se rv a tio n  by th e  shipper of the  r ig h t  to dispose o f the  goods 
on sa le  to  f r i t  soli or to on interm ediary person a m #  frah ltfarier*  I r a n i  
was not s a t is f ie d  th a t  B aird had susta ined  h i t  claim  th a t he was the  
owner o f the goods or th a t  any property  remained to  him a f te r  the  ship­
ment o f the  good s* ^  In conclusion o f the  claim , TBrss&e sa id  In  parts
Taking the whole circumstances into consideration, 1 m  Ju sti­
f ie d  i s  drawing the inference that the rubber was #m i t s  way Is  
enemy terr ito ry  through f r i t s c h ,  the # ® r w  Consul; even I f  the  
claim ant had mads out h is  claim  to  be th e  owner, X*fiad th a t  
the rubber was confiscable as ah solute contraband. ™
After disposing  of the ind iv idual claim s, Ursm  turned hi® atten­
tion  to the summation of the case in general opinion* Sc suggested that 
the general character o f the  cargoes involved was I hut th e  foodstuffs  
wore su ita b le  for use by enemy troops and com® sp e c if ic  item® of a  type 
not usually  supplied  to the c iv il ia n  population, fh® favorable location  
of  Oapenhagen for German tra n sp o rta tio n  o f goods was obvious*
In Bran* s opinion I f  International leer was to be adequate i t  mi s i  
bs in leeeping or •have regard* to a l l  the circumstances of th e  t i s # * ^
*we princip les of international lew were involved in  th is  case* ( ! )  **coa- 
t  inuous voyage* or •continuous transport at ion ,*  (2) ultim ate destination  
o f conditional contraband and afeselute contraband respectively*
Ibid* * p. 268.
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'M&m f i r s t  discussed the Doctrine o f  Continuous Voyage, l e  re ­
viewed s i  length I ts  h istory and development. ®li# B r itish , ftraaf main­
ta in ed , were not the f i r s t  to  apply I ho d o c trin e  to  the carriage o f con­
traband . the U nited States had so applied and extended i t  during the  
O in i  fa r , and has received the approval o f I,he B r itish  Government, i f  
act B r itish  Jurists.*^  lord Salisbury had defended i t  at the time o f the 
Boer War- in  counsel ion with the Belogos Say Cases.
f he Boctrln® of Continuous Voyage was conceded in  ©rpllcib langu­
age by the Declaration of Doadon sta tin g  that #l t  i s  Immaterial whether 
the carriage o f the goods i s  direct* or e n ta ils  transshipment, or a sub-
*a|>
sequent transport by land . 11 In the case o f conditional contraband.
however, i t  was held that the doctrine was inoperative in th is  connection
39
except where the  enemy country had no seaboard. fo  Brens th is  ex­
clusion was I l lo g ic a l ,  In regard to th is  point he said in parti
I f  i t  is  a right I.hat a b elligerent should b© permitted to 
capture absolute contraband proceeding by various voyage or 
transport with m  u ltim ate destination for the enemy te r r i­
tory, why should he not be allowed to capture good®, which 
though not absolutely e<nsire%nd, became eomty&bend by reason 
of further destination  to the enemy Government or i t s  armed 
forces! Mil with the f a c i l i t i e s  o f transportation by sea and 
by land which'now e x is t  the right of a b e lligeren t to  capture 
conditional contraband would be of a very shadowy value I f  & 
mere consignment to  a neutral port were su ffic ien t to protect 
the goods. I t  appears also to be obvious that in  these days of 
easy tra n sit , I f  the doctrine o f continuous voyage or contin­
uous transportation Is to hold at a l l ,  i t  must cover not only 
voyage fro® port to port, at sea , but d e c  transport by land
37.Ib id .
3*Ib id . , p . 2?3.
39Ib id .
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u n ti l  the rea l, as distinguished from the merely obstsnslbl# 
d e s tin a tio n  o f th e  goods i s  reached .40
Ivans pointed out by analogy that the p o lic ie s  pursued by the 
B ritish  m m  merely outgrowths o f those adopted by the United States uhm  
she was a  b e ll ig e re n t ,  th e  p r is e  J u r i s t  sal&s
1 have no h e s ita tio n  in  pronouncing th a t ,  in  my r i m ,  th e  doc­
t r in e  o f continuous ovyage* o r tra n sp o rta tio n , both  in  re la t io n  
to  c a rriag e  by sea  and to  c a rr ia g e  over land, bad become p e r t  o f 
th e  law o f na tions a t  the. cemeneassent o f  the  p resen t war, in  
accordance w ith  the principle®  of recognised le g a l d ec is io n s, 
end w ith the  views of the  g rea t body of modem j u r i s t s ,  gad a lso  
w ith  the p ra c tic e  of n a tions l a  recen t maritim e w arfare,
th e  r e s u l t  was th a t  the  Court was both  e n t i t le d  and bound to  tak e  
a  more extended view a® to  th e  primary consignments of th e  goods and as­
c e r ta in  th e i r  re a l  and u ltim a te  d e s tin a tio n  ra th e r  than  the  obstensib le  
one. fke  t e s t  o f r e a l  d e s tin a tio n  wee simply whether th e  cargoes were
consigned to  a  n e u tra l p o rt f o r  the  purpose o f  being incorporated  in to
42th e  common stock  o f th e  n a tio n . Jtocttor Important way of d is t in ­
gu ish ing  the  re a l  d e s tin a tio n  from the  obste&eibl* one, Ivans suggested, 
was by the consSgnsient * te  order or a ss ig n s0 without naming a  sp e c if ic  
consignee.
A® regarded the  Kim, her cargoes were being t r i e d  in  accordance 
w ith  the  p rov isions as provided in  th e  Order l a  Council o f October 29, 
1914, which d e a lt s p e c if ic a lly  w ith  Ho o rder” consignments, and i t  
appeared th a t they should have been d e a lt w ith  under th a t Order, ra th e r
**®hw P robate D ivision 273-74 (1915) •
%1a i a . . p . 275 .
hzm  k-l- l a s s E i a .  v- w .
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than  th e  more «*te&siv® d oc trine  which had become the la*r o f the  nation* 
p r io r  to  the  War* since  th e  vessel© s a i l in g  da te  had been subsequent to  
th a t O rder. Bat s in ce  th e  cargoes were consigned Ho o rd e rH th e  r e s u l t ,  
in  e i th e r  ease , would hare been the
Ivans adm itted, however, th a t n on -spec ific  consignees was not 
conclusive p ro o f o f  in te n tio n  fo r u ltim ate  enemy d e s tin a tio n , but i t  
made such shipper© suspect, end I t  remained w ith  th e  shipper to prove th e
lliir
ligltim & ey o f In te n t. ' Pursuing the  p o in t fu r th e r , he ©aids ^Whenever 
d e s tin a tio n  Comes in  question , c e r ta in ty  as to  I t  i s  seldom p o ss ib le , in  
such eases as th ese , * h ighly  probable d e s tin a tio n 1 i s  enough in  the  ab­
sence o f  s a t is fa c to ry  evidence fo r  the  sh ippers.
th e  j u r i s t  was in  no way h e s ita n t in  s ta t in g  th a t the cargoes in  
question  were not d e s tin ed  fo r consumption o r us© l a  Danmark or th a t they 
were to be incorporated  Into the  general stock  o f th e  country by sa le  or 
otherw ise. Copenhagen was not the  r e a l  d e s tin a tio n  o f the goods, b u t, 
a t  th e  time o f  cap tu re , they were u ltim a te ly  intended fo r  Germany.
Ivans next addressed him self to  the  question  of the  v a l id i ty  of
th e  Order in  Council of October 29, 191&. He sa id  th a t th e  proclam ation
!f6was in  no way a  v io la t io n  of in te rn a tio n a l law. 3?he Order in  Council 
had proceeded from the very b asis  o f e x is tin g  in te rn a tio n a l law. .Ivans
h y k e ,  "Shs j g a  Case," p . 5>*.
haw Eepoyts, Probate D ivision 27? (1915)*
^ 1 1 3  b g .  i s s a U a .  p- w n .
Less H eaorts. Probate D ivision 279 (19155-
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po in ted  out th a t  a t the  tim e of th e  London la v a l Conference which pro­
duced th e  D eclaration  of London a l l  o f the  A llied  Powers m& th e  H alted 
S ta te s  ware l a  favor of continuing  to  apply th e  D octrine o f Coatimious 
Voyage or tra n sp o rt to  co nd itiona l contraband.**^
In  regard  to  th e  m odifica tions o f th e  D eclara tion  o f London 
e ffe c te d  by th e  Order in  Council r e la t in g  to  presumption and s i i s  o f proof 
when goods were continued Hto  o rd e r ,H Dsrans held those to  he m atters .af­
fe c tin g  th e  ru le s  and methods o f evidence and proof in  th e  P r is e  Court, 
mad were not in  v io la tio n  o f th e  accepted p r in c ip le s  o f in te rn a tio n a l 
law. D iscussing th is  po in t he sa id :
Th® e f fe c t  o f the  Order in  Council i s  th a t ,  In  a d d itio n  to  
th e  presumption la id  down in  a r t i c l e  3b o f  th e  D eclara tion  o f 
Loudon, a  presumption o f enemy d e s tin a tio n  as defined by a r t i ­
c le  33 sh a ll  he presumed to  e x is t i f  th e  goods a re  consigned to  
o r fo r  m  agent o f th e  enemy S ta te , or to  a  person in  th e  ene­
my te r r i to r y ,  o r  i f  they a re  consigned Ho order'* o r i f  th e  
sh ip H  papers do not show who the  consignee is* hut l a  th e  l a t ­
t e r  cases the  om erj^jssy, i f  they are  ab le , prove th a t th e  d e s ti­
na tio n  i s  in n o c e n t.^
All goods claim ed by th e  shippers on the  gifa were consigned to
th e i r  own o rd er, or to  th e i r  agent®, and not to  any independent con-
50slgnee* 1’he claim ants f a i le d  to  prove th a t th e i r  d e s tin a tio n  was inno­
cent to  the  s a t is f a c t io n  of th e  Court.
I t  had been contended by the  claim ants th a t  l i a b i l i t y  to  cap ture  
under th e  Order in  Council d id  not n&m l i a b i l i t y  to co n fisca tio n  or
»w .
iiS'
n i &. . pp. 279-80.
ItlA .. p . 280. 
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eomdensatiem. In  re fu ta tio n  o f th is*  S ir  i« m l#  Mm® s ta te d  th a t ho
was o f the opinion th a t  th e  goods claimed by a l l  sh ippers on board th e
gjLf wore con fiscab le  as law ful p r i s t  a® provided in  th e  p rov isions o f
m
th e  October Order in  Council.
Brans next considered the question of whether th e  goods going to  
Germany were intended fo r use by i t s  government or armed fo rce s , f i r s t  
i t  was argued th a t  th e  goods in  (guest ion were adopted fo r  mush use* some 
had g rea t a d a p ta b ility  fo r  immediate w arlike purposes* I s  then re fe r re d  
to  d re rH  note  o f February 10, 1915# which s ta te d  th a t when th e  d is tin c ­
t io n  between th e  c iv i l  population  and the  armed fo rces d isappears the
reason fo r  drawing d is t in c t io n  between fo o d stu ffs  intended fo r  th e  c iv i l
32popu lation  and the  aimed fo rces a lso  d isappears,
$fc* j u r i s t  fu r th e r  reasoned th a t when so large- m popu lation  o f a  
s t a te  was in  th e  m ili ta ry  fo rces and th e re  wm me c le a r  evidence d is ­
tin g u ish in g  p r iv a te  accounts from those o f th e  government, th e  burden o f 
p roo f should re s t  w ith  th e  c la im an ts, l e  was convinced th a t whatever the
th e  m ili ta ry  would rece ive  th e  la rg e s t  p o rtio n  of any feed- 
53s tu f f s  going to  Germany.
In  regard to  th e  problem o f proof o f in te n tio n  r e t t in g  w ith  th e  
sh ippers, Srft&e f e l t  I t  was necessary fo r such proof to  be subm itted by 
th e  c la im an ts. I t  had been argued by th e  defendant* th a t the  Grown wm
51m a .
52IM & .. p . 261.
53I b id . . p . 282.
obliged to  show and prove o r ig in a l in te n t on th e  p a rt o f the  shippers to  
supply the  enemy government or armed fo rces , Shis was, in  many oases, 
im possible fo r the  cap to rs to  do owing to  the  merchant*® modem methods 
o f  covering up suspicious d e a ls . I© sa id  th a t I f  the  cap to rs had to  
prov# mmb m  & rrm g m m t ( to  supply the  enemy), ab so lu te ly  sad affirm a­
t iv e ly ,  to ju s t i f y  cap tu re  m& condm m tion  th e  b e ll ig e re n t* s r ig h t ©
to stop a r t i c le s  o f contraband from reaching  a  h o s t i le  d e s tin a tio n  would 
54become nugatory .' In  d ism issing th e  claimants* con ten tion , he- sa id  in
part?
I t  i s  not a  crime to  d ispa tch  contraband to  b e ll ig e re n ts .  I t  
can be < p iie  le g itim a te ly  sen t sub ject to  th e  r i s k  o f cap tu re i
but th e  argument proceeded m  i f  i t  were © ssential fo r  th e  cap­
to r s  to  prove th e  In tu it io n  as s t r i c t l y  a©- would be necessary  in  
a  crim inal t r ia l . ;  and as i f  a l l  shipper® needed to  do was to  be 
©11 ©at, to  o f fe r  m  e ^ la s a t lo n ,  and to  adopt the a t t i tu d e  
towards the  Crown, * Prove our h o s t i le  in te n tio n  i f  you can*. ^
Bvan®, however* went even fa r th e r  and m aintained th a t i t  was not
necessary  fo r th© captors to  prove in te n tio n  a t th e  beginning o f the
voyage. He reasoned th a t i f  there  was an in te n tio n  formed e ith e r  a t  th e
tim e of the orig inal- shipment, or afterw ards, to  send th e  good® to  an
u ltim a te  enemy destination,* th e  co n tin u ity  o f the  voyage would not be
broken, re la t in g  to  th e  cargo , by assy tra n sa c tio n  a t  the  in term ediate  
56
p o r t .
fh© incumbency which re s te d  upon the  cap to r was to  f i r s t  prove 
fa c te  from which a  reasonable in ference  of h o s t i le  d e s tin a tio n  could be
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drawn, sub ject to re b u tta l  by th e  c laim ants. Brans f e l t  th a t In ten tio n
on th e  p a rt o f the  shipper could be e s tab lish ed  by Minference  fro® sur­
rounding circum stances r e la t in g  to  the  shipment o f and dealings w ith th e  
57goods.H fhe j u r i s t  argued in  p a r t i
Cargoes are  inanim ate things* and they mmt  b© seat m  th e ir
ww  by persons* I f  th a t  i s  a l l  th a t was meant by counsel fo r
the  claim ant s when they argued th a t  in t  ent ion m e t  be proved, 
th e i r  con tention  may be conceded* But i t  need not ha an * in ten­
tion* proved s t r i c t l y  to  have ex is ted  a t  th e  beginning of the 
voyage, o r as an o b lig a tio n  under a  d e f in i te  Commercial b a rg a in ,^
fhe  onus ©f proof o f In ten t had re s te d  w ith  the  claim ants and they
had not s a t is f a c to r i ly  proved th e  tra n sa c tio n  innocent. fhe  reasons fo r
in fe r r in g  u ltim a te  h o s t i le  d e s tin a tio n  werei (X) Some goods were adopted
fo r m ili ta ry  use and o thers fo r  the  manufacture of war m unitions,
(2 ) I t  was in fe rre d  under the  Boetrin® o f Continuous Voyage th a t the
.goods were u ltim a te ly  destined  fo r  some contiguous p o rt such as Hamburg,
lAibecIt* or S te t t in .  (3) Because of th e  cond itions in  Germany which
rendered i t  im possible to  assume th a t the  fo o d stu ffs  would no t, in  some
proportion* be used m  supp lies fo r th e  armed fo rce s . (4) Because th#
claim ants f a i le d  to  produce evidence to  re fu te  th e  presumption of the
5®w arlike  d e s tin a tio n  in fe rre d  by a l l  circum stances. ^
In  conclusion of th e  Case S ir  Samuel Brans s ta ted !
fo r  th e  many reasons which I have given in  th e  course o f th is  
judgment and which do not req u ire  recap i tu l  a t io n , o r even sum­
mary, I have come to the c le a r  conclusion from the  fa c ts  proved
^ m a . . p. m •.
^ i b i a .
■^IPyko, "She Kim Casa,* pp. 67- 68.
mand th© reasonable @mdt indeed, ir r© s is ta b le  in ferences from 
them, th a t  the  cargoes claim ed by th e  shippers were mot cm 
th e i r  way to  Benmarlc to- be ii^ o tp o ra ted  in to  the  common stock  
o f  th a t country by consumption, o r bona f l^ e  sa le , o r  o therw ise; 
b u t , on th e  con tra ry , th a t they were' on th e i r  way not only to  
German t e r r i to r y ,  but a lso  to  th e  German Government and th e i r  
armed fo rces fo r  naval and m ili ta ry  u se  as th e i r  r e a l  u ltim a te  
destina tion*
§0 hold con tra ry  would be to  allow one1 * eyes to be f i l l e d  by 
th e  fe e t o f th e o rie s  and te c -h n ic a litie s , and to  be b linded to  
th e  r e a l i t i e s  o f the  case ,
Helds
th a t  as th e  d oc trine  o f continuous voyage and tra n sp o rta tio n , 
bo th  as regards c a rriag e  by sea and land, was a  p a r t  o f in te r ­
n a tio n a l law a t th e  time of th e  commencement o f th e  war in  
August, 1914, ©nd was ap p licab le  to  cond itional as w ell as abso­
lu te  contraband, a l l  goods which were intended f o r  us© o f  the  
German Go V erm ont, although nominally having Copenhagen as th e i r  
p o rt o f destla& H oa, m e t  be condemned as law ful p r is e ,
Shortly  a f te r  d isp o s itio n  of the  Case, th e  sh ippers f i l e d  a  pro­
t e s t  w ith  th e  United S ta te s  Bepartmemt of. S ta te  against th e  dec ision  of 
th e  P r is e  -Court and respected  diplom atic in te rv en tio n  In  th e i r  b eh a lf  In  
an effort- to  ob ta in  rep a ra tio n s  fo r  th e  lo sse s  which had m stained* ^  
fhey a lleged  th a t the  judgment was unsupported by fa c ts  and was based 
upon in ferences and presumption®* fh® B r i t is h  Government agreed to  com­
pensate  the  sh ippers fo r lo sse s  incurred , and, a f t e r  some delay., th e  
value o f the  good® was p a id  to  rep re se n ta tiv e s  o f th e  companies. Upon 
payment* the  shippers expressed th e i r  ap p rec ia tion  o f the  f a i r  treatm ent
H eports, P robate D ivision  286 (1915).
6 lU 3 & .I, g f f i g l t ,  p . 1064.
62■ term er, gg* I I  > 303-08*
mextended thssu®
Ira reviewing Ivan1© decision  la  the  l i & Oe.ee, th e  Law JournalpPWRPJW* *pN*VM*Mat «n»MMMipaHMM^fiijpePw^'
s ta te d  in  p a rts
But M i considered Judgment in  th e  Kfo and th ree  other Scandi­
navian ships embodies the sosst remarkable development which he 
has yet given the Law of la ilo a s , She e ffe c t  o f  the Judgment is  
to condemn m. contraband enormous cargoes o f provisions which 
were captured on th e ir  way from imerican t© Scandinavian ports 
consigned to apparently neutral consignees, and the grounds o f 
the  decision  i s  that the cargoes were destined by the consigner© 
to find their  way to Germany and to be used there for the pro­
v ision ing o f th e  naval and m ilitary forces, fhere was l i t t l e  
direct evidence to connect the goods with the enemy Severupteni, 
but on the other hand* a large number o f circumstances contrived  
to male® that h o s t ile  destination very probable, and the P resi­
dent, ruling that one© a lin e  of suspicion was e stab lish ed  the 
burden of proof o f  innocent trade was on the neutral merchant, 
held th a t ,  the onus not being discharged, the penalty for con­
traband attached* * . * In the present case that highly probable 
destination  could be inferred from the nature o f th e  consignment, 
.which was many times as large in  bulk as the ordinary annual im­
portation of such commodities into Scandinavia, from the proved 
existence o f m  extensive trade between the Scandinavian ports 
and the c h ie f Oermn bases of supply, from th e  connection o f the  
consignees with enemy firm© which were supplying the force©, and 
la s t ly ,  from the fa ilu re  of the claimants to  produce documents 
which might esta b lish  cither- a genuine neutral market o f an in ­
tention  to us© cargoes for the c iv i l  population o f the enemy 
terr itory . What is  novel in  the decision  i s ,  f ir s t  the in fer­
ence of enemy destination  for conditional contraband from the 
cumulative effeofe of a number of elements of suspicion, and 
secondly, the  inference o f ©mpioyaent for the Sever ran cut pur­
pose© from gemgg&l reasoning without any actual proof from the 
ship1© papers.
On© f in a l  po in t should be mentioned in  th e  ad jud ica tion  of th e  
Case, end th a t is  th e  'in fec tious natu re  of contraband as viewed by the  
B r i t i s h ,  S ir  Samuel Ivans po in ted  out:
63m a .
6h
50 4ax. is s sa A  ^ 50-60 (1915).
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Contraband a r tic le s  are said to be of an infectious nature-, 
and they contaminate the whole cargo belonging to  the same 
owners, The innocence of any p articu la r a r tic le  i s  not usually
admitted to exempt i t  fromth® general c o n f i s c a t i o n .  5
l i t  hough the %®e was not f in a lly  decided u n til  September, 1915# 
the- B ritish  had developed the policy of determining reasonable isporte 
for- Scandinavian countries from an Index of previous dosing the pre­
ceding months.
Sir iinanel Irani* with llm Case, began trea ting  a l l  Oermaa ports
m  bases of m ilitary supplies, thus making goods which were conditional
contraband confiscable when going to Q-mmm ports, especially the ports
66of Hamburg, Labeck and Stettin* Iren more remarkable, however, was the 
condemnation of conditional contraband consigned to neutral consignees 
la  neutral ports, the importance of th is  practice 1® obvious.
In October, 1915# rationing committees were created in London to 
determine lirport quotas for Holland and the Scandinavian countries. ^ 
th is  was a very important addition to the program for the economic 
strangulation of Germany, which wares ( l )  the extension of the princi­
p le  of contraband. (2) The tmiqme blockade established by the Reprisal
, , 63Order in  Council. (35 the  rationing system.
The B ritish , however, realised  that they could not completely rely  
upon individual ruling* in prize law to effect m  e ffic ien t quota system.
^ L m  Reports. Probate Division 286 {1915}*
66Trimble-, gj&» * P*' ^5*
6?
Seymour, Mmiomj, Blnlpsuicy. p. #3*
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I b i d . , p. -4h.
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I t  was a l l  th e  mors apparent to B r i t is h  o f f ic ia l s  th a t %hey m ist cozt- 
timxe to  n eg o tia te  trad© agreements w ith  Scandinavian n e u tra ls  guaran­
tee in g  hot h dostestto consumption o f imports and acceptab le  r e s t  m in ts
69upon th e  ajacmat o f goods perm itted  by the  l i l i e s  to  reach  them.
In  l a t e  1915* B r i t is h  attem pts a t  n eg o tia tio n s  f o r  general 
ra tio n in g  agreements w ith th e  Governments o f Sweden end lorw&y fa i le d , 
f h is  f a i lu r e  to  achieve general .agreement® notwithstanding* n eg o tia tio n s  
w ith ind iv idua l firm s and trad e  a sso c ia tio n s  fo r  trad e  agreements con­
tinued . The B r i t i s h  had Been q u ite  successfu l in  reaching commercial 
C ontrols w ith th e  Bene® and Butch.
{inn i r  .  . _
^ I M d . . jxp. 116 - 1 2 2 .
Her le a  C. Siaey. SM  A111.A Blockade s i  Oermaiar 1914-1917
c o m n s io i
fh© inglo-iia©rican controversy daring World War X oyer neutral 
righ ts in  general ant that concerning blockade ant contraband in  particu­
lar  presents an in terestin g  i f  complex study* fh© B r itish  wars responsi­
b le  for ©any remarkable Interpretations and extensions o f previously  
accepted p rin cip les o f international las*. Innovations in  the %mt o f  
Hat ions occasioned by the c o n flic t  resu lted , for the most part, from a 
ser ie s  o f Orders in  Council and rulings handed In B r itish  P rise  Court
decisions* There can be l i t t l e  doubt that many B r itish  p ractices were f
1i l l e g a l  and completely without precedent in  International law.
Specific  B ritish  treatment accorded ia^crtant ru les and doctrines 
a ffec tin g  neutral righ ts in  time o f  war has %®m discussed in  the main 
body- o f the th e s is . The g$* Gas# was also reviewed in  addition to  lega l  
considerations o f B r itish  p o lic ie s  r e la tiv e  to  blockade and contraband. 
Thm important remaining conclusion requires an evaluation o f the contro­
versy between the United States and Great B ritain  concerning neutral 
commercial r igh ts.
fhe B r itish  war p o licy  which so complicated her re la tion s with 
th e  i n i  ted S tates was governed by n ecessity . International law was 
e i th e r  altered or circumvented whenever in  direct opposition to  b e llig er ­
ent in te r e sts , th e  shaping o f International law in  time of war to f i t  
national in terests i s  not am uml<pe procedure, indeed* history abounds 
with such examples. Great B ritain , in  r e a lity , had m  p ractica l
1C f., pp. 92, 9b, 95-97, 100-101, 107.
a lte rn a t iv e  but to  pursue bhe course o f a c tio n  she d id  pursue.
B r i t is h  p o l ic ie s  during the  Great Mar, however, by th e ir  very 
na tu re  c a r r ie d  an a tten d an t d i f f ic u l ty .  M otivated by a  b e l ie f  th a t u l t i ­
mate v ic to ry  in  th e  Mar- might possib ly  Mage upon the  economic s ta rv a tio n  
o f  th e  C entra l Bower®, th e  B r i t is h  a c tiv a te d  measures which struck  a t  a  
t r a d i t io n a l ly  tender spot in  American a f f a i r s —th a t o f n eu tra l commerce 
and commercial r ig h ts , throughout the  h is to ry  o f the  United S ta te s , any 
in h ib i t  ion o f or In te rfe ren ce  w ith  American commercial r ig h ts  and 
In te re s ts  had been met w ith  esp ec ia l d is p le a s u re . '
fh e  s i tu a t io n  re s u l tin g  from B r i t is h  in te rfe re n c e  w ith  n eu tra l 
commerce might have precipitated th e  complete rup tu re  of peacefu l Anglo- 
American re la t io n s ,  fhe fa c t th a t no such rup tu re  occurred may be 
a t t r ib u te d  to  severa l factors*  ( l )  Germany1 s u n re s tr ic te d  use  o f th e  
submarine; (Z) Popular sentim ent in  the  United S ta te s  for the  A llied  
cause; (3) She in te n t o f the  United S ta tes  and Great B r ita in  to  prolong 
th e i r  con troversies by means o f tech n ica l diplom atic no tes.
I t  1® d i f f i c u l t  to a r r iv e  a t  m  exact assessment o f .the.ro le ' each 
fo rce  played in  the p rese rv a tio n  of Anglo-American frien d sh ip . Ob­
v iously  Germany1s p o lic ie s  were misguided fro® th e  standpoint o f her 
re la tio n s  w ith  the  United S ta te s . What would have happened i f  Germany 
had d iscontinued  the  in d iscrim in a te  u se  of the  submarine? Ho one can 
answer th a t question  w ith complete c e r ta in ty , fhe  fa c t i s  th a t she d id  
continue to  employ i t  and th is  p a r t ic u la r  measure became, perhaps, the  
most important fa c to r  id  the  d e s tru c tio n  of a  sound German-A®erleen re ­
la tio n sh ip . Indeed, German conduct as a whole so enraged the  American
13&
p ub lic  th a t anything but a peacefu l a sso c ia tio n  between the- United S tate# 
and Great B r ita in  was hard ly  p o ss ib le  even In  l ig h t  o f  th e  g re a t contro­
versy  over n e u tra l r ig h ts .
Public opinion in  th e  U nited S ta te s  was la rg e ly  pro-A lly  frm  th e  
beginning o f th e  War end as mmh was an import«s& fa c to r  co n trib u tin g  to  
th e  B r i t i s h  d iplom atic v ic to ry , th e  sympathy fo r  th e  A llied  cause was not 
only m anifest l a  th e  p ress  and among la rg e  segments o f  th e  general pub­
l i c ,  b u t wm a lso  apparent in  govermaental circle®  a t  a l l  le v e ls . Io  one 
could e n te r ta in  fo r  a  moment a  b e l ie f  th a t Wilson could have embraced any 
form o f ka iserism . t h i s  was a lso  % m e  o f House* Bryan and hanging. As 
th e  War progressed th a t  se c tio n  of the  p ub lic  which might have been p ro - 
(*&rmm was adm inistered a  le th a l  Mow by ■Germany1 s devastating- submarine 
w arfare , th e  German genius f o r  doing exac tly  th e  wrong th in g  a t exac tly  
th e  wrong tim e was- an extremely important s ta b il iz in g  fo rce  in  th e  p res­
e rv a tio n  # f  Anglo-Aiaeriean- good w il l .
fh e  B ritish *  m  th e  o th e r  hand,- extended th e  contraband l i s t s  w ith ­
out regard  to  precedents in  in te rn a tio n a l  law. th e  A llie s  a lso  estab­
lis h e d  m. i l l e g a l  blockade and enforced i t ,  th e  B r i t i s h  Government sought 
end obtained American acquieseno© to  a  immber o f questionab-le p ra c tic e s .
In  view of a l l  o f th e  voluminous rep re sen ta tio n s  p resen ted  a t  the  Foreign 
■Office* however* th e  United S ta te s  d id  not win a  malhr concession from 
th e  B r i t is h  w ith  regard  to  n e u tra l r ig h ts  e ith e r  during the  Mar o r a f t e r  
i t s  conclusion.
fh e  United S ta te s  unquestionably held g re a t economic power ever 
th e  A llie s , th e  ex ten t o f  which her lead ers  f a i le d  to  re a l  is© o r , i f
13?
they did r ea lise  i t ,  elected  not to apply such pressures, America was 
essen tia l to the A llie s  as a base of supply, and any r isk  taken "by these  
Powers which night hare irreparably damaged a peaceful relationship with 
the United States was a calculated  one.
th e  absence of forcefu l economic pressures by o f f ic ia ls  in Wash­
ington nay be explained in part by the fact that such action would have 
seriously  curta iled  a highly lu crative  trad© with Great B ritain  in par­
ticu la r  and the A llie s  in  general. Corn ere i&l In terests in  the United 
States were not prepared to  admit to such pressures at the expense o f ' 
corporate p r o fits , Trade with the Entente Powers was far better than no 
trade at a ll*
The notes between the State Department and the foreign O ffice
concerning contraband and blockade were prodigious In number. What is
equally important i s  that they were also long and exhaustive. The 
length and d e ta il o f the messages were not by accident but by design. 
Short notes create short tempers and short tempers are dangerous.
The problem for the United States was to  prepare diplomatic repre­
sentations in  such a manner as to respond to public protests o f  B r itish  
actions, when they arose, and, at the same time, to  d elib erately  prolong 
the leg a l disputes. Lansing, in  hie U&r Mmpl r v . reca lled  h is in tention  
w riting in part:
I did a l l  that I could to prolong the disputes by preparing, 
or having prepared, long and detailed  rep lies* and introducing 
technical and controversial matters in  the hope that before the 
extended interchange o f  arguments came to an end something would 
happen to change the currant of American public opinion or to  
make the American people perceive that German absolutism was a 
menace to th e ir  l ib e r t ie s  and to democratic in s titu tio n s
everywhere, fortunately th is  hope and effort were not in  
vain . 2
The Halted States daring the f i r s t  year and a h a lf o f the War re­
frained fro® the formulation o f  a w ell-defined, in c lu sive  p o licy  re­
garding the controversies w ith Great B rita in  over neutral r ig h ts . Bryan* 
Lansing, and the others* a l l  adopted the practice  o f making representa­
tion s concerning individual cases, fhe course followed by the United 
S tates, however, doe# take shape and meaning when viewed in  proper per­
sp ective. I t  was the planned and deliberate purpose o f the Wilson Admin­
is tr a tio n  to extend the controversies as long as p ossib le  through a lab­
yrinth o f technical and d eta iled  ju r id ica l review.^ The United States 
r e lie d  upon le g a l arguments w ithin the framework o f  accepted Inter­
national law in  i t s  attempts to resolve every commercial dispute w ith  
Great Britain* fh is  p o licy  when examined re la tiv e  to i t s  end becomes at 
once w ell-defined , or, at le a s t  in  part w ell-defined.
The United. States p o licy  to  maintain a peaceful Anglo-American 
relation sh ip  by prolonged, verbose representations was o f singular im­
portance and can hardly be over-emphasised. Whatever the other forces 
operative at the time the program proved successfu l. The generally pro- 
Ally sympathy o f  the American public and inane German blunders compli­
mented i t ,  or perhaps permitted i t .  Highly irrita ting . B r itish  practice#  
were always m itigated by these factors.
^Lansing, as* £&&•* 112*
3n>ia.. p. 128.
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Thm o f f ic ia ls  responsible for form ulating United States p o licy  by 
the c lo se  o f  1 9 1 5 . became convinced that i f  k m ?ica entered the War i t  
would have to against Germany. Hm y  considered German frien d sh ip  a 
thing o f  the past.
the future p o s s ib il ity  of the United States m ilita r ily  opposed to  
the Central Powers point# tip another reason for Lansing1® fa ilu re  to  
present h is case too strongly to Great B rita in . So feared the United 
States would he forced to pursue the s w  p o lic ie s  the B r itish  pursued 
with regard to neutral r igh ts in  which event M erieu would he placed be­
fore the world as hyproerliic&l at worst or inconsistent at b est. Bela- 
i iv e  to  Lansing1 s desire  to continue the controversies la  l ig h t  o f m y  
future actions the United States'n ight he forced to tafce, the Secret say 
o f  State stated  In part:
Ivery thing was submerged la  verbosity, i t  insured cent issu­
ance o f the controversies and l e f t  the question© m eet tied., 
which was necessary in  order to leave th is  country free to act 
end m m  act i l l e g a l ly  whm  i t  entered the war.
th is  th e s is  conclude® with the beginning to the year 1 9 1 6 . The 
controversy with Great B rita in  concerning neat m i rights coat limed and, 
in  some Instances, worsened during the remaining period o f Jiserieaa 
neu tra lity . Whatever c r ise s  occurred, however,, they a lso  passed and th e  
United States eventually entered the War against Germany and her a l l i e s • 
She p o licy  adopted by the United States in  forming lengthy, techn ica l, 
le g a l notes had been set during the f ir s t  year and a h a lf o f World War I ,
4
Ib id . . p . 128f
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and th a t  p o licy  extended th e  diplom atic sa&h&ngsft w ith  Groat B r ita in  
u n t i l  to r ie m 1# armed in te rv e n tio n  in  concert w ith  th e  i l l i e s .
Wm ing lo -im erieen  controversy  over n e u tra l r ig h t#  end e sp ec ia lly  
th a t of contraband and blockade did net win a  s in g le  major concession 
fo r  th e  United S ta te s . I t  i s  p o ss ib le , and perhaps even probable , th a t  
Lansing- never fo l ly  b e l i e v e d  t h a t  le g a l  rep re sen ta tio n s  would accomplish 
sp e c if ic  re f trea m m t o f B r i t i s h  p o l ic ie s , th e  rep re se n ta tio n s  were, 
however» m c e e ts fu l fo r  by them and under such design  they in su red  a  
continuance o f peacefu l M gko-M m icm  r e la tio n s  as was th e  u ltim a te  
in te n t .
I t  may w ell be sa id  th a t  th e  period  encompassing th e  f i r s t  World 
War i s  f r e t t e d  w ith  as many H f*  problems as any fo u r year span in  h is­
to ry . " if*  ^mesilems* however, have no p lace  in  th e  w ritin g  o f h istory*  
they  serve* i f  they a re  o f se rv ice  a t  e ll*  as cons c rea tio n  p ieces so le ly  
fo r  academic specu la tion . I t  i s  a  f r u i t l e s s  p u rsu it to  su b s titu te , a  s e t  
o f a b s tra c t a c tio n s fo r  those which in  r e a l i ty  occurred, th e  h is to r ia n 1'® 
ta s k  i s  to  record  events as they happened and to  p lace  th m  in  th e i r  
proper p e rsp ec tiv e  through lo g ic a l  in te rp re ta t io n .
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fhe  follow ing a r t i c le s  may, w ithout n o tice , be t r e a te d  as con­
traband of war, under th e  name of abso lu te  contraband!
{1} Arms of a l l  h inds, including  .arms fo r sporting  purposes, 
m d  th e i r  d i s t in c t  I t s  component parts*
(2) f ro ^ c o tl le e , charges., and c a r tr id g e s  o f a l l  k inds, and 
th e i r  d i s t in c t  lire component parts*
(3) Powder m d  explosives sp ec ia lly  prepared for %m in  war*
(k) Qm-mountliigs, lim ber hoses, lim ber, m ilita ry  wagons,
f i e ld  fo rges , and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component parts*
(5) Clothing m d equipment o f a  d is t in c t iv e ly  m ilita ry  
character*
(6) i l l  kinds o f harness o f a  d is t in c t iv e ly  m ili ta ry  charac­
ter*
(7) Saddle, d raught, and pack animals su ita b le  fo r  use  in  
war.
(8) A rtic le s  o f camp equipment, and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  com­
ponent p a r ts .
(9) Armor Plates*
(10) W ar-ships, includ ing  boa ts , .and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  compon­
ent p a r ts  o f such a  na tu re  th a t they can only be used on a. vesse l 
o f war.
(11) Implements and apparatus d e s i r e d  exclusively  fo r th e  man­
u fac tu re  o f p ia i t io n s  of war, fo r  the  m&smf&ciure or re p a ir  o f 
arms, o r war m ateria l fo r use on land or sea*
ABflCha 23
A rtic le s  exclusively  used fo r  war may be added to th# l i s t  o f 
abso lu te  contraband by a  d e c la ra tio n , which must be n o tif ie d .
Such n o t if ic a t io n  must be addressed to  th e  Governments of 
o ther Powers, or to  th e i r  rep re se n ta tiv e s  accred ited  to  the  
Power making the  d e c la ra tio n . A n o tif ic a t io n  made a f te r  th e  out­
break of h o s t i l i t i e s  i s  addressed only to  n eu tra l Powers*
i B f m i  2k
fhe  follow ing a rtic le® , su scep tib le  of use in  war as w ell as 
fo r purposes o f peace, say , without n o tic e , be t r e a te d  as
^Brown, op. c i t . . pp. 117 —22. (All A rtic le s  taken from th is  work).
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contraband of war, under th e  name of cond itional contraband;
(1) foo&stuff®.
(2 ) Forage and g ra in , su ita b le  fo r feeding animal®.
(3) C lothing, fa b ric s  fo r  c lo th in g , and boat# and shoes, s a l t -  
ab le  fo r as#  in  war,
(4) Geld and S ilv e r  in  coin  or b u llio n ; paper money,
(5) V ehicles o f a l l  kinds a v a ila b le  fo r  u se  in  war, and th e i r  
component p a r ts ,
(6 ) T easels , c r a f t ,  and. boats o f a l l  kinds; f lo a tin g  docks, 
and th e i r  component p a r t s ,
(7) Bailway m ate ria l, bo th  fixed  and ro l l in g  s tock , and mater­
i a l  fo r te leg rap h s, w ire le ss  te leg raphs, and telephones,
(8 ) Balloons and f ly in g  machines and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  compon­
ent p a r ts ,  to g e th er w ith  accesso ries and a r t i c le s  recogn isab le  as 
intended fo r  u se  In  connection w ith balloons and fly in g  machines*
(9) fu e l ;  lu b r ic a n ts .
(10 ) Powder .and explosives not sp e c ia lly  prepared fo r  u se  in  
war.
(113 Barbed w ire and implements fo r f ix in g  and c u ttin g  th e  
same*
(%2) Horseshoes and shoeing m a te ria ls ,
(13) Harness and saddlery .
(14) H e ld  g la sse s , te le sco p es , chronometers, and a l l  kinds of 
n a u tic a l instrum ents.
mnou 25
A rtic le s  eaaeeptlfele o f use in  war a# w ell as fo r  purposes of 
peace, o th e r than  those enumerated in  A rtic le s  22 and 24, may be 
added to  th e  l i s t  o f  co n d itio n a l contraband by a  d e c la ra tio n , 
which must be n o t if ie d  in  th e  meaner provided fo r  in  the  second 
paragraph o f A rtic le  23*
AEfXClB 26
I f  a  Power waives, ®e fu r  as I t  i s  concerned, th e  r ig h t  to 
t r e a t  m contraband o f war an a r t i c l e  com prised 'in  any of th e  
c la sse s  enumerated in  A rtic le  22 and 24, such in te n tio n  s h a l l  be 
announced by a  d ec la ra tio n , which must be n o tif ie d  in  the  manner 
provided fo r  In  the  second paragraph of A rtic le  23 .
ARfXChl 27
Article® which a re  not su sce p tib le  o f use In  war may not be 
declared  contraband o f war*
ARSICXJ8 28
fhe follow ing may not be declared  contraband of war;
(1 ) Baw cotton* wool, s i lk ,  ju te ,  f la x , hemp, and o ther raw 
m ateria l* .
(2 ) 01.1 seeds and m ts ;  copra.
(3) Bobber, re s in s , gums, and lac s ; hops*
(4) Baw hides and horns, bones and ivory.
(5 ) N atural and a r t i f i c i a l  manures, includ ing  n i t r a te s  and 
phosphates fo r  ag ricu ltu ra l, purpose®.
(6 ) M eta llic  a re s .
(?) B arths, clays* lim e, chalk , stone, including  marble, 
b r ic k s , s la te s  and t i l e s .
(8 ) Okinawa?* and g la s s .
(3 ) Faper and paper-making m a te ria ls .
( 10) Soap, p a in t and co lo rs including artic le®  exclusively  used 
in  th e i r  m anufacture, and varn ish .
(11) Bleaching powder, soda ash, c au stic  soda, s a l t  cahee, am­
monia, su lphate  o f ammonia, and sulphate o f copper.
(12) A g ricu ltu ra l, mining, t e x t i l e ,  and p r in tin g  machinery.
(13) P recious and sem i-precious stone®, p e a r ls , m other-of-pearl 
and coral*
(14) Clocks and watches other than chronometers.
(15 ) fash ion  and fancy goods.
(16) fe a th e rs  o f a l l  kind®, h a irs  and b r i s t l e s .
(1?) Article®  of household fu rn itu re  and decoration ; o ff ic e  
fu rn itu re  and req u isite* .
ASSICIZ 29
Likewise the follow ing may be t re a te d  as contraband of wars
(1) A rtic le s  serving exclusively  to  a id  the  s ick  m d  wounded, 
they  can, however, in  case o f u rgent m ilita ry  n ecessity  and sub­
je c t  to  th e  payment o f compensation be req u is itio n ed , i f  t h e i r  
d e s tin a tio n  i s  th a t sp e c ified  in  A rtic le  30 .
(2) A rtic le s  intended fo r  the  use of the  v e sse l in  which they 
ax© found, a® w ell as those intended fo r  the  use of her crew and 
passenger* during the  voyage.
miOLM  30
Absolute contraband I s  l ia b le  to cap ture  i f  i t  i s  shown to  be 
destined  to  t e r r i to r y  belonging to  o r occupied by th e  enemy, o r 
to  the armed fo rces o f  th e  enemy* I t  i s  immaterial, whether the  
c a rriag e  o f the  goods i s  d ire c t  or e n ta i ls  transshipm ent or a  
subsequent tran sp o rt by land.
AETICLB 31
Froof o f the  d e s tin a tio n  sp ec ified  in  A rtic le  30 i s  complete 
In the  fo llow ing eases 1
(1) When the  good® are  documented fo r  d ischarge In  an enemy 
p o r t ,  o r fo r  d e liv e ry  to  the  armed fo rces of the enemy.
(2) When the  v esse l i s  t© c a l l  a t enemy p o r ts  only, or when 
she is  to  touch a t  an enemy p o r t .or meet the  armed fo rces o f the  
enemy before  reaching th e  n e u tra l po rt fo r which the  goods in  
question  a re  documented.
153
jm iC L S  32
Where a vesse l i s  carry ing  abso lu te  contraband, her papers 
a re  conclusive proof as to  the voyage on which she i s  engaged, 
un less she is  found c le a r ly  out o f the  course in d ica ted  by her 
papers and unable to  g ive adequate reasons to  ju s t i f y  mxch devi­
a tio n .
AETICLB 33
Conditional contraband i s  l ia b le  to capture i f  i t  i s  shown to  
be destined  fo r the  use  o f the  ansed fo rces o r o f a  government 
department of the  enemy S ta te , un less in  th is  l a t t e r  case the  
circum stances show th a t the  goods can not in  fac t be used fo r  th e  
purpose of the war in  p rog ress, *Uhis l a t t e r  exception does not 
apply to a consignment coming under A rtic le  24 (4 ),
AtflOLB 34
She d e s tin a tio n  re fe r re d  to  in  A rtic le  33 1© presumed to  
ex is te d  i f  th e  goods a re  consigned to  enemy a u th o r i t ie s ,  or to  a 
c o n tra c to r e s tab lish ed  in  the  enemy country who, as a  m atter o f 
common knowledge, supp lies a r t i c l e s  o f th i s  kind to  th e  'enemy.
A s im ila r presumption a r is e s  i f  th e  goods are  consigned to  a  
f o r t i f i e d  p lace  belonging to  th e  eaeray, or o ther p lace  serving 
as a base fo r the  armed fo rces o f th e  enemy. Kb such presumption, 
however, a r is e s  in  th e  case of a  merchant vesse l bound fo r one of 
th e se  p laces i f  i t  i s  sought to  prove th a t she h e rs e lf  i s  co n tra ­
band.
In  cases where the  above presumptions do not a r is e ,  th e  d e s ti­
n a tio n  i s  presumed to be innocent,
fhe presumptions se t up by th is  a r t i c l e  may be reb u tted .
A2SICLS 35
Conditional contraband i s  not l ia b le  to  cap tu re , except when 
found on board a  v e sse l bound fo r  t e r r i to r y  belonging to  or occu­
p ied  by the  enemy, or fo r  the armed fo rces o f the  enemy, and when 
i t  is  not to be d ischarged in  an in tervening  n e u tra l p o r t .
Th# ships papers a re  conclusive proof bo th  as to the  voyage on 
which the  vesse l i s  engaged and as to  the p o rt of d ischarge of th e  
goods, u n less  she i s  found c le a r ly  out of the  course in d ica ted  by 
her papers, and unable to  g ive adequate reasons to  ju s t i f y  such 
d ev ia tio n .
MMOLE 36
lo tw ith stsn d in g  th e  p rov isions of A rtic le  35, co n d itio n a l con­
traband , i f  shown to  have the  d e s tin a tio n  re fe rre d  to  in  A rtic le  
33, i s  l ia b le  to  cap ture  in  cases where th e  enemy country has m  
seaboard.
ABSICLS 37
A v esse l carry ing  goods l ia b le  to  cap ture  as abso lu te  or con­
d i t io n a l  contraband may be captured on the high seas or in  the  
t e r r i t o r i a l  w aters of th e  b e ll ig e re n ts  throughout the  whole o f 
her voyage, even i f  she i s  to  touch a t a p o rt o f c a l l  before 
reaching th e  h o s t i le  d e s tin a tio n .
ARSICUS 38
A vesse l may not be captured on the  ground th a t she has 
c a rr ie d  contraband on previous occasions o f  such c a rriag e  i s  in  
p o in t of fa c t a t an end.
ASflCLs; 39
Contraband goods a re  l ia b le  to  condemnation,
MTICW 40
A v esse l carry ing  contraband may be condemned i f  the. con tra ­
band, reckoned e ith e r  by value, weight, volume, o r fre igh t*  
forms more than  h a lf  the  cargo.
ABSIGLX 41
I f  a v e sse l carry ing  contraband Is  re leased , she may be con­
demned to  pay co sts  and expenses, incurred  by the  cap to r in  respect 
o f the proceedings In th e  n a tio n a l p r iz e  court and th e  custody of 
the  ships and cargo during the  proceedings*
Am c& s 43
I f  a  v e sse l i s  encountered a t sea w hile unaware o f th e  outbreak 
o f h o s t i l i t i e s  o r o f th e  d e c la ra tio n  o f  contraband which app lies 
to her cargo, th e  contraband can not be condemned except on pay­
ment o f compensation; the vesse l h e rs e lf  and the  remainder o f the  
cargoes a re  not l ia b le  to  condemnation or to  the  co s ts  and ex­
penses re fe r re d  to in  A rtic le  41* She came ru le  app lies i f  the  
m aster, a f te r  becoming aware- of the  outbreak of h o s t i l i t ie s *  or 
o f the d e c la ra tio n  o f contraband, has had no opportunity  o f d is ­
charging th e  contraband.
"'A v esse l deemed to  be aware o f the  ex is tence  of a  s ta te  o f 
war* or o f  a d e c la ra tio n  of contraband, i f  she l e f t  a  n e u tra l 
po rt subsequently to  the  n o t if ic a t io n  to  th e  Power to  which such 
p o rt belongs o f th e  h o s t i l i t i e s  or o f the  d e c la ra tio n  o f co n tra ­
band re sp e c tiv e ly , provided th a t such n o t if ic a t io n  was made In 
s u f f ic ie n t  tim e. A v esse l i s  a lso  deemed aware o f th e  ex istence  
of a s ta te  of war i f  she l e f t  an enemy p o rt a f te r  the  outbreak 
of h o s t i l i t i e s .
j y m c i i  44
A v e sse l which has been slapped on the ground th a t  she i s  
« r y l a g  contraband, and which i s  not l ia b le  to  condemnation on 
account o f th e  p roportion  o f  contraband #a board, may when th e  
oirmmateuaeos pe rm it, be allowed to  continue Iwr voyage i f  th e  
m aster I s  w illin g  to hand over th e  contraband to  th e  b e ll ig e re n t
th e  d e liv e ry  o f th e  contraband mast be en tered  by th e  can to r 
on th e , log-book o f th e  v e sse l shopped and th e  m aster m s t  g ive 
th e  cap to r id ly  c e r t i f i e d  copies o f  a l l  re lev an t papers,
?ha cap to r i s  a t l ib e r ty  to  destroy th e  contraband th a t  has 
been handed over to  him under those.conditions*  "
AEPMJXX C
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s a s o f ®  o a ia s s  i s  c o o to x l m i d  co w ia b a sd  fsc x m m sio h s
las mm i i  ssKik a a a  m  mansims m.
I S  t e s a a
( i )  osbse i»  o o o to il a t o t i h o  t o w  sh s  ? m s im  h o s t i l i t i e s  she  
js o v is ig s s  o f sis  cosvawios xhoss as shs  •BKJLA&arios or
LOSHffl* WISH iEBISIOSS AHB W & m cW lcm  (KEAOT50HY BOLES AHB
OBLEES, 19X4, So . 126c).
At the  Court a t Buckingham ra la o e , the  20th  &®y o f August,
1914.
PRES HUT,
She E ia g 's  Host S xce llen t Majesty i s  Council.
Whereas during th e  p resen t h o s t i l i t i e s  th e  Haval Forces o f His 
Majesty w il l  co-operate  w ith  th e  French and Russian Kaval Forces, 
and
Whereas i t  i s  desirable that the naval ©per&tions o f the a l­
l ie d  forces so for m  they a ffec t neutral ships and commerce 
should he conducted on sim ilar principles., and
Whereas the OeTerxaNmte of France and Bussia hare informed 
His Majesty1s Government that during the present h o s t i l i t ie s  i t  
Is th e ir  Intention to act in  accordance with the provisions o f  
the Convention known as the Declaration of London, signed on the 
26th day o f February, 1909* so far as may he practicable.
How, therefore, His Majesty, by and with the advice o f His 
Privy Council, i s  pleased to order, and i t  i s  hereby ordered, 
that during the present h o s t i l i t ie s  the Convention known as the 
Declaration o f  London sh a ll, subject to the follow ing additions 
and m odifications, he adopted and p it  in  force by His Majesty* s 
Government as i f  the same had been r a tif ie d  by His Majesty
fhe additions and modi flo a t ions are as fo llow s;-
1. The l i s t s  of absolute and conditional contraband contained 
in  the Proclamation dated August 4th, 1914, sh all be substituted  
for the l i s t s  contained in  A rtic les 22 and 24 of the said Declar­
ation.
2. A neutral vesse l which succeeded in  carrying contraband 
to th® enemy with fa lse  papers ©@y be detained for having carried  
such contraband i f  she i s  encountered before the has completed 
her return voyage.
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3, $h» destined referred to in A rtic le  33 may be inferred
from any e f f i c i e n t  evidence, and (in  addition to the presump­
tio n  la id  down in  A rticle  3A) sh all be presumed to ex ist i f  the  
good® are to  or for m  agent of the Steeagr State or to
or for a merchant or other person under the control o f the  
ffiithoritlet o f the Biemy State-.
h. The e x is t  one# of a blockade sh all be presumed to b© 
known*. -
(a) to a l l  ship* which sa iled  from or touched at an enemy port a  
su ffic ien t time a fter  th© notification of tho blockade to the  
lo ca l authorities to  have enabled the ©neasy Government to 
make teiowm the existence of the blockads,
(b) to a l l  ship# which ©ailed from or touched at a B r itish  or 
a ll ie d  port a fter  the publication of the declaration o f block- 
ads*
5 . lobwith-stmmdlng the provisions of ta t Id a  35 of the said  
Declaration* conditional contraband, i f  shown to hare the d esti­
nation referred to in A rtic le  33» 1® lia b le  to capture to what­
ever port the cargo i s  to be discharged.
6 , fh© General Report of th e  D rafting  Commit te e  on th© sa id  
D eclara tion  p resen ted  to  the  fe v a l Conference and adopted by th e  
Conference a t  th e  e leventh  plenary  meeting' on February 25th , 1909# 
s h a l l  b© considered by a l l  P r is e  Courts as an a u th o r i ta t iv e  s ta te ­
ment o f th e  mefffiiig and in te n tio n  of the  bald D eclaration , and 
such Court# s h a l l  construe and in te rp re t  the  provisions- o f th e  
sa id  D eclara tion  by th e  l ig h t  o f the  commentary given th e re in .
And the horde Commissioner# o f Eis Had ©sty's treasury, the 
Lords Commissioners o f the Admiralty, and each of El# Majesty1 * 
Principal Secretaries of State, the President of the Probate# 
Divorce and Admiralty D ivision  o f the High Court of J u stice , a l l  
other Judge# o f 11# Majesty*® P rise Courts, and a l l  Governors, 
Officer® and Authorities whom i t  may concern, are t© give the 
necessary direction# herein as to  then may respectively  appertain,
M rn sM . i i i .m s x 1
^Pyke, Che tay of Contraband War, gp. 282-83.
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ths or loidoi gmm n coubcil, so. 2, 1914
(SfAOTOIX m s s  AUB QEJSHSS, 1914, BO. l6 l4 ) .
At the Court o f Buohlnghs© Palace, the 29th day o f October,
1914.
m s a s * .
The King* s Meet to e l le & i Majesty in  Council.
Whereas by an Order in Council dated the 20th day of August,
1914, Hie Majesty was pleased to declare that daring the present 
h o s t i l i t ie s  the Convention k m m  m  the Declaration o f  London 
■should, subject to certain  additions and © edifications therein  
sp ec ified , he adopted and put in  force by His Majesty’ s Govern­
ment; and
Whereas the said addition® and modification® were rendered 
necessary by the sp ecia l conditions of the present war* and
Whereas i t  i s  desirable and p ossib le  now to re-enact the said  
Order in  Council with amendments in order- to minimise, so far a®
p o ssib le , the Interference with innocent neutral trade occasioned 
by the war*
lew, therefore, Hi® Majesty, by and with the advice of His 
Privy Council, t$  p le a se d -to order, and i t  i s  hereby ordered* m  
follows!-
1, During the present h o s t i l i t ie s  the provisions o f the Conven­
t io n  known as the Declaration of London sh a ll, subject to the ex­
clusion -of the l i s t s  of contraband and aoa-contraband, and to the  
m odifications hereinafter set out, be adopted and put in force by 
His M ajesty1® Government.
the m odifications are as fo llow s!-
( i )  A neutral v e sse l, with papers indicating a neutral destin ­
ation , which, notwithstanding the destination shown on the 
papers, proceeds to  an enemy port, sh all be l ia b le  to cap­
ture' and condensation i f  she i s  encountered before the end 
of her next voyage.
( i i )  She destination  referred to in  A rtic le  33 of the sa id  Declar­
ation sh a ll (in  addition to the presumptions la id  down in
A rtic le  34) be presumed to ex ist i f  the good® m e  consigned 
to or for an agent of the enemy State.
( i l l )  lo t  withstanding the provisions o f A rtic le  35 of the said
Declaration, conditional contraband, sh a ll be l ia b le  to cap­
ture on board a v esse l bound for a neutral port i f  the 
goods are consigned "to order, M or i f  the ship1® papers do 
not show who i t  the consignee of the goods or i f  they show 
a consignee of the goods in  territory  belonging to or 
occupied by the enemy.
( iv )  In the cases covered by the preceding paragraph ( i i i )  i t  
sh a ll l i e  upon ih® owners of the goods to prove that their  
destination  was innocent.
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2, Where i t  is  shorn* to the sa tisfac tion  of om of His Majes­
ty* s Principal Secretaries of it.at# tha t the sutngr Government Is 
d raw i^ a p p lie s  for i t s  armed forces from or through a neutral 
country, A rticle 35 of the said Declaration apply. Such d irection  
shall be no tified  in  the Mn&on Qmmk%.p mi. shall operate u n til  
the same is  withdraws* So l#$g as such direction is  in  fore#, * 
vessel which is  carry lug conditional contraband to a port im that 
country shall not he iw ane from capture.
3, the Order in Council of the 20th Jurist, 191%, directing 
the adopting m i  enforcement during the present hostilities of 
the ®mrm%U& known as the. Declaration of louden, subject to the 
ad d itio n s and modifications therein .specified, is hereby repealed*
%. th is  Order may he cited  as Hhe Declaration of London Order 
in  Council, Ho. 2, 191%* •
Jmd the Lord® Commissi oners of His Majesty1 s treasury, the Lords 
Commissioner* of the Admiralty, and each of His Majesty* s Principal 
Secretaries of State* the President of the Probate, Divorce, and 
Admiralty Division of the High Court of ju s tic e , m i  a l l  other 
Judges of His Majesty1® P rise Courts, m i  a l l  Governors, O ffic e rs , 
and Autheritl®# wham i t  may concern, are to give the necessary 
directions herein as to them may respectively appertain.
Mi&aM. M iM a C
2rt>ia.. pp. 284-85.
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OIDiE II  COUICIL Of MiltOE XI, 1915 
(immiSMi oium)
Wherea# tli# German Government has issued certain orders 
which, in violation of the usages of war, .purport to declare the 
waters surrounding the United Kingdom a military area, in which 
a ll British and allied  merchant vessel® will he destroyed irrespec­
tive of the safety  of the lives of passenger* sad crew, and in 
which neutral shipping will he closed to similar danger in r im  of 
the uncertainties of naval warfare} and
Whereas in a memorandum accompanying the said orders 
neutrals are warned against entrusting crews, passengers, or goods 
to British or a l l ie d  ships; and
Whereas such attempts on the part of the enemy give to His 
Majesty an unquestion&ble right of retaliation} and
Whereas Sis Majesty has therefor# decided to adopt further 
measures- in order to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching 
or leaving Germany, though such measure® will be enforced without 
risk to neutral ship® or non-combatant l i fe  m& in s tric t observ­
ance of the dictates of humanity} and
Whereas the M llm  of His Majesty are associated with him 
in the steps now to be announced for restricting further the com­
merce of Germany.
His Majesty is therefor# pleased, by and with the advis# 
of his Privy Council, to order.and i t  is hereby ordered m follows:
1. Mo merchant vessel which sailed from her port of de­
parture after the 1st March 1915 shall be allowed to proceed os 
her voyage to any German p o r t.
Unless the vessel receives a pass enabling her to pro­
ceed to som# neutral or allied  port to be named in the pass, goods 
on board any such vessel must be discharged in a British port and 
placet in the custody of the marshal of the Prize Court. Goods so 
discharged, not racjuisliioaed for the use of His Majesty, be re­
stored by order of the Court, upon such terms as the Court may in 
the circumstance# €em to be Just, to the person entitled thereto.
2, So merchant vessel which sailed from any German port 
after the 1st March 1915 shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage 
with any good® on board laden at such port.
i l l  good# laden at such port must be discharged in a 
British port shall b# placed in the custody of the marshal of the 
Prise Court, and, i f  not requisitioned for the use of His Majesty, 
shall be detained or sold under the direction of the Prise Court, 
fhe proceeds of goods sold shall be paid into Court may in. the 
circumstance# deem to b© just.
Provided* that no proceed#, of the sale of such goods shall 
be paid out of the Court un til the conclusion of peace, except on 
the application of the proper officer of the Crown, unless i t  be
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shown that t'm goods had become neutral property before the is­
sue of th is  Order.
Provided also, that nothing herein shall prevent the re­
lease of neutral property laden at such enemy port on the appli­
cation of the proper officer of the Crown.
3 . Svery merchant vessel which sailed from her port of 
departure after the le t March 1915 on her way to a port other 
than a German port, carrying goods with enemy destination or 
which are eaesgr property, may he required to discharge such 
goods in & B r i t is h  or allied port, Any goods so discharged in a 
British port shall b# placed in the custody of the marshal of the 
Prize Court# and, unless they are contraband of war, shall, i f  
not re q u is itio n e d  for the use of Sis Majesty, he restored by 
order of the Court, upon such terms as the Court may in the c ir­
cumstances deem to b® Just to the person entitled thereto.
Provided, that his Article ©hall not apply to any case 
falling within Articles 2 or 4 of th is Order.
4. Ivery merchant vessel which sailed from a  port other 
than a German port .after the 1st March 1915 having on hoard 
goods which are o f ezmy origin or are property may he required 
to discharge such goods in a British or allied port. Goods so 
discharged la  a British port shall he placed In the custody of 
the marshal of the Brig© Court» and i f  act requisitioned for the 
use of l ie  Majesty, ©.hall he detained or sold under the direction 
of the Brie# Court, the proceeds of goods so ©old shall he paid 
into Court and dealt with in such manner as the Court may in'* the 
oircmmstances dee® to he Just,
Provided, that no proceeds of sale of such goods he paid 
out of Court un til the conclusion of peace except on the appli­
cation of the proper officer of the Crown, unless i t  he shewn 
that the goods had Become neutral property before the issue of 
th is order.
Provided also, that nothing herein shall prevent the re­
lease of neutral, property of ernmy origin on the application of 
the proper officer of the Crown.
5. Any person claiming to be interested in, or to have 
my claim in respect of my goods (not being contraband of war) 
placed in the custody of the marshal of the Prise Court under 
th is order, or in the proceeds of such goods, may forthwith Issue 
a writ in the Prise Court against the proper officer of the Crown 
and apply for an order that the goods should be restored to him, 
or that their proceeds should be paid to Mm, or for such other 
order as the circumstances of the case require.
Tim practice and procedure of the Prize Court shall, so 
far as applicable, be followed mutatis mutandis in any proceedings 
consequential upon th is Order.
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6. A v e sse l which has c lea red  for a  u m tm X
p o rt from a  B r i t i s h  o r a llied , p o r t , or which has boon a l l  owed to  
pass h m tm  aa o h sten slb le  d e s tin a tio n  to  a  n e u tra l p o r t ,  and 
proceeds to  m  mm& port* shall,, i f  captured on any subsequent 
voyage, "be l ia b le  to condemnation.
7* lo t Mag in this Order shall be deemed to affect the 
l i a b i l i t y  of any vessel or goods to capture or eoudematiom in ­
dependently of this Order*
8. nothing in th is Order shall prevent the relaxation 
of the provisions of this Order in respect of the merchant ves­
sels of any cotmtiy which declares that no cosotero* intended for 
or originating in Germany of belonging to German subjects shall 
eajey the protect ion of i t s  flag* 3
3J*or. R el. ■ TJ.£., 1915, Suppl., pp. 143-145.
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fm CCWBABMD P£®GLAMjffZOKS 
(i) mmmKstox, jsm&s 4, 1914, otih iis m i m now
TO BE TRSATffl AS ComMBMD OF MM (STASUTffit 2U1SS MB 
C&B3RS, 1914, flD. 1250)*
BT fHB n * J .
A Proclamation specifying the A rticles to b© treated  as Confcr©?- 
baad of War.
t e l  t r b
Whcrea* a ©tat© of War exists between 0S on the one hand and
the German Empire on the other?
And whereas I t  is  necessary to specify the A rticles which i t  is
Chir intention to tre a t as Contraband of War?
How, therefor©, We do hereby Declare, by and with the advice of 
Our Privy Council, th a t daring the continuance of the War or u n til  
we do give fa rth e r public notice the a r tic le s  enumerated in  Sched­
u le  I hereto w ill be trea ted  as absolute contraband, and the a r t i ­
cles eactmerated in Schedule II  hereto w ill be treated  as condi­
tiona l contrabands-
M saftrin  1
The following a rtic le s  w ill be trea ted  as absolute contraband;-
1, t e e  of a l l  hinds, including arm® for sporting purposes, and 
th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component parts,
2. P ro jec tiles , charge®, and cartridges of a l l  kinds, and th e ir  
d istinc tive  component part®.
3* Powder and ©aspicsives specially prepared for use in war.
4. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, m ilitary  wagons, f ie ld  
forges, md th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component p arts .
5* Clothing and ©fulptaeut of a d is tin c tiv e ly  m ilitary character.
6. All kinds of harness of a d istinc tive ly  m ilitary  character.
7. Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.
8. A rticles of camp equipment, and th e ir  d istin c tiv e  component 
p arts ,
9. ATaour p la tes .
10. Warships, including boats, and th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component
parts  of such a nature that they can only be used, on a vessel of
war.
11. Aeroplanes, airship®, balloons, and a irc ra ft of a l l  kinds, 
'and th e ir  component p arts , together with accessories and a r tic le s  
recognisable a© intended for us© in connexion with balloons and 
a irc ra f t .
12. Implements md apparatus designed exclusively for the manu­
facture of suniiions of war, for the manufacture or repair of 
arms, or war material for us© on land and ©ea.
$*he following a r tic le s  w ill "be treated  as conditional eontra- 
band: -
1* foed-sbuffs.
2. forge and grain, su itab le  for feeding animals.
3. Clothing, fabrics fo r ©lobbing* and boobs and shoe®, su it­
able for us# in  war.
k. Gold and s ilv e r  in  coin or bullion; paper money.
J . TeMcles of a l l  kinds available for use in  war, and th e ir  
component p a rts .
6. Vessels, c ra ft and boats of a l l  kinds; floating  docks, parts  
of docks, and th e ir  Component p a rts .
?. Ballway material* both fixed and ro llin g  stock, and materials 
for telegraphs, w ireless te l  ©graphs, and telephones.
8. fu e l; lubrican ts.
9. Powder and explosives not specially  prepared for us® in war.
10. Barbed wire, and la$l*Msfcs for fixing and cutting the same.
11. lerse-shoea and shoeing m aterials.
12. Harness and saddlery.
13. fie ld -g lasses , telescopes, chronometers* and a l l  kinds of 
nautical instruments.
Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, th is  fourth  day 
of Jtagnst, la  the year of our lo rd  One thousand nine 
hundred and fourteen, and in the f i f t h  year of Our 
&»iga. k
God save the Elag,
^Pykc, c i t . . pp. 286-8?.
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JSOCUamoS, M I  S2 ?2a®2a 21, 1914, SPSCim se C3KSAI* 
ASBmofiAL AKSICLjS SO BS SHSASK) AS COBEHA&ABD Of MR 
(S»ffiOTOJtT AED GFJStEE, 1914, HO. 1410).
ST SHE KXHG
A rro c la n a tio n  specify ing  c e r ta in  ad d itio n a l A rtic le s  which are  
to  he tre a te d  as Contraband o f War.
I t e l .  !* !•
Whertas 021 the fourth d«y of August la s t  Wo did issue Our Eoy&X 
Proclamation spec i f 7 lug the a r tic le s  which i t  was Our intention 
to trea t as Contraband of War during the War between ITs and the 
Cerman Saperor:
And whereas on the tw elfth day of August la s t  We did "by Our 
Boy&l Proclaaation of that date extend Our Proclamation afore­
mentioned to the War between tie and the Umperor of Austria, King 
of Hungary:
And whereas by an Order in  Council of the twentieth day of 
August, 191^, i t  was ordered that during the present h o s t i l i t ie s  
the Convention known as the Declaration of London should, subject 
to certain  additions and modifications therein specified, b© 
adopted and put In force as i f  the same had been ra tif ie d  by TJs:
And whereas i t  Is desirable to add to the l i s t  of a r tic le s  to 
be treated  as Contraband of War during the present War:
AM whereas i t  is  expedient to introduce certain  further modi­
fications in the Declaration of London m  adopted and put In 
fore#:
How therefore, We do hereby Declare, by and with the advice of 
Our Privy Council, that during the continuance of the War, or un­
t i l  We do give further public notice, the a r tic le s  enumerated in  
the Schedule hereto w ill, notwithstanding anything contained in 
A rticle 28 of the Declaration of London, be treated  as conditional 
Contraband,
Schedule.
Copper, unwrought. Magnetic Iron Ore
Lead, pig, sheet, or pipe. Bobber
GrlyMrift*. Hides and Skins, raw or
Perroehrome. rough tanned (but not in-
laem atite Iron Ore. eluding dressed le&tbey)*
(riven at Our Court at Boofctaghaei Palace, th is  Twenty-first 
day of September, In the year of our Lord on© thousand nla® 
hundred and fourteen, and in the F ifth  year of Our Beign.
Cod save th e  King,**
5I b l d . . pp. 28?-86.
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m m j m m i m , i m m  o ® m m  2 9 , 1 9 x4 , w s n s im  Tim lish? 0 ? coh- 
« i 4 »  0 ? win ( m s j f o n  m i s  md obbiw , 1 9 x4 , m .  1 6 1 3 ),
BI TKB KM».
A Proclamation Borislag the L ist of Dostrahend of fa??.
Geor&e. &.£.
Whereas on the fourth dey of August, 1914* Wo did issue Our 
loyal Froclfpation specifying the a r tic le s  which i t  was Our in­
tention to tre a t as contraband of war during the war between tJs 
and the German Efeiperor; and
Whereas on the twelfth day of August, 1914, We did by Our B©yal 
Proclam&tion of that date extend Our Proclamation afoFomentioned 
to the war between tie and the fisparon of .Austria, King of Saogaryf 
and
Whereas i t  is  expedient to consolidate the said l i s t s  and to 
make certa in  additions thereto:
Mow, therefor©. We do hereby declare, by and with the advice of 
Our Privy Council, that the l i s t s  of contraband contained in  the 
schedules to Our Royal Proclamations of the fourth day of August 
and the tw enty-first day of September aforementioned are hereby 
withdrawn, and that in lieu  thereof during the continuance of 
the war or u n til  W® do give further public notice the a r tic le s  
©muaeratod in Schedule I hereto w ill be treated  m  absolute con­
traband, and the a r tic le s  enumerated in Schedule II  hereto w ill 
be trea ted  as conditional contraband.
gfttejalra 1
1. Anas of a l l  kinds, including  area for sporting purposes,
and th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component p a rts .
2. P ro jec tile s , charges, and cartridges of a l l  kinds, and 
th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component p arts .
3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in  war.
4. Sulphuric acid.
5. Gun mounting®, limber boxes* limbers, m ilitary  wagons, 
f ie ld  forges and th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component parts.
6# Range-finders and th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component part®.
7. Clothing and equipment of a d is tin c tiv e ly  m ilitary  charac­
te r .
8. Saddle, draught, end pack animals suitable for use i n  war.
9. All kinds of harness of a d istinc tive ly  m ilitary  character.
10. A rticles of cMp equipment and th e ir  d is tin c tiv e  component 
parts .
11. Armour p la tes .
12. Haematite iron or© and haematite pig iron.
13. Iron pyrites .
14. ilickel ore and nickel.
16?
15* Ferroehromeand chrome ore.
16. Copper, unwrought.
I f .  Lead, p ig , sheet, or pipe.
18. Aluminium.
19 * F c rro -s ilic a*
20. Jarbed wire, and implements for f ix in g  and cu ttin g  the *«*••
21. Warship®* including boats and th e i r  d is tin c tiv e  eoaponeai 
parts of such a nature that they earn -only be used on a v esse l o f  
war.
22. Aeroplanes, a irsh ip s, balloons* and aircraft, o f a l l  kinds, 
and their  component parts, together with accessories and a r tic le s  
recognissabl© as intended for use in connexion w ith balloons and 
a ir c r a ft .
23* Motor veh icles o f a l l  kinds and th e ir  component parts.
24. Motor tyres; rubber.
2 3 . M ineral o i l s  and motor s p i r i t ,  except lu b r ic a tin g  o i l s .
26. Implement it m d  apparatus designed exclusively  fa r  the manu­
facture o f munitions of war* far  the manufacture or repair of 
arms* or war mb ©rial for use on land, and sea.
1. fo o d s tu ffs .
2. fo rage  and feeding s tu f f s  fo r  animals.
3 . OlotMng* fab ric s  fo r  c lo th in g , and boots an t shoes su ita b le
fo r  use- in  war.
4. Gold m d  s i lv e r  in  coin  or b u llio n ; paper money,
5 . Vehicles o f a l l  k inds, o ther than  motor v e h ic le s , a v a ila b le  
fo r use In  war, and th e i r  component p a r ts .
6 . V essels, c r a f t ,  and boats o f a l l  kind®; f lo a tin g  docks* 
p a rt#  o f docks * m d  t h e i r  component p a r te .
7. Railway m aterial® , bo th  fix ed  and ro l l in g  stock:* and mater­
i a l s  fo r  te leg raphs, w ire le ss  telegraph®, and telephones.
8. fu e l , other t t o  mineral o i l s .  Lubricants.
9 . Powder m d  © p lo siv es not sp e c ia lly  prepared fo r  u se  in  
war.
10. Sulphur.
11 . G lycerine.
12. Horseshoe* m d  shoeing m a te ria ls ,
13. Harness and saddlery .
14. Hides o f a l l  k inds, dry o r wet; p ig sk in s , raw o r dressed; 
le a th e r , undressed or dressed* su ita b le  fo r  saddlery* harness, or 
m ili ta ry  boot®.
15. f i e ld  gleetea* telescopes* chronometer®, end a l l  k inds o f 
n a u tic a l instrum ents.
Given a t Our Court .at Buckingham Palace* th i s  tw enty-n in th
day o f October, in  the  year of our Lord on# thousand aim*
hundred cmd fourteen* and in  the  f i f t h  year o f Gar Eeign.k
God save the  King.
h t> ia . . pp. 228- 90 .
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momam i^oih M  msomsm 23, 1914, smisim  thb lx s s  o t  g g i-
&U&A2CD Of ¥AE (GMOTGBT 2SJX.S5 jUBB OHBSBS, 19X4, 10. 1775).
I t  $ 8 *  HHGL
4 P roe lgnatien  re v is in g  the  L is t of A rtic le s  to  be tr e a te d  as Con­
traband o f War*
t o a s t  &»!»
Whereas on th e  fo u rth  day of August, 1914, W© did  issu e  Our 
lo y a l Proclam ation specify ing  the  a r t i c le s  which i t  was Our in ­
te n tio n  to  t r e a t  as contraband o f  war daring the  war between I s  
and th e  German Bmperor; and
Whereas on th e  fo u rth  day of August, 1914, We d id  by our Our 
proclam ation o f  th a t da te  extend Our Proclamation, aforementioned 
to  the  war between Us and the  Jtaperor o f A ustria , King o f Hungary; 
and
Whereas on the  tw e n ty -f irs t  day of September, 1914, We d id  by 
Our B oyd  Proclam ation o f th a t da te  make c e r ta in  add itions to  the  
l i s t  ©f a r t i c l e s  to  be t r e a te d  as contraband of war; and
Whereas on the  tw enty-n in th  day of October, 1914, We d id  by Our 
Boyal Proclam ation of th a t date  withdraw the  sa id  l i s t s  o f contra­
band, end s u b s ti tu te  th e re fo r  th e  l i s t s  contained in  th e  schedules 
to  th e  sa id  Proclam ation; and
Whereas i t  i s  expedient to  make c e r ta in  a l te ra t io n s  In  and addi­
tio n s  to th e  sa id  l is ts *
low, th e re fo re , We do hereby d ec lare , by and w ith  th e  advice of 
Our Privy Council, th a t the  l i s t s  of contraband cost,aimed in  the  
schedules to  Our lo y a l Proclam ation of the  tw enty-n in th  day of 
October aforementioned are  hereby withdrawn, and th a t in  l ie u  
th e reo f during the  continuance of the  war or u n t i l  We do give 
fu r th e r  pub lic  n o tice  the  a r t i c l e s  enumerated in  Schedule I here­
to  w iH  be tre a te d  as abso lu te  contraband, and the  a r t i c l e s  enum­
e ra ted  in  Schedule IX hereto w il l  be tre a te d  as cond itiona l contra­
band.
Schedule I
1. Arms of a l l  k inds, including, arms fo r  sporting  purposes, 
and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component p a r ts .
2 . P ro je c t i le s ,  charges, and c a rtr id g e s  o f a l l  k inds, and 
th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component p a r ts .
3. Powder and explosives sp e c ia lly  prepared fo r  use  in  war.
4 . In g red ien ts  of explosives, v is .  n i t r i c  a c id , su lphuric  
ac id , glycerin® , acetone, calcium a ce ta te  and a l l  o ther m eta llic  
a ce ta te s , sulphur, potassium n i t r a te ,  th e  f ra c tio n s  of th e  d is ­
t i l l a t i o n  products of coal t a r  between baasol and creeo l inclu ­
s iv e , a n il in e , met h i a n il in e , dimet liy lan illn e  * ammonium perch lo r­
a te ,  sodium p e rc h lo ra te , sodium c h lo ra te , barium, c h lo ra l©,
ammonium n i t r a t e ,  ty m m id s , potassium  c h lo ra te , calcium n i t r a te ,  
mercury#
5 . See incus p r e s e t s ,  camphor* and tu rp en tin e  ( o i l  and s p i r i t )
6 . Ctaa meant Inge, lim ber boxes, limber®, m ilita ry  wagons* 
f i e l d  forge®, and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component p a r ts .
7* Bsnge-.fi nder® and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component p a r ts .
8 , C lothing and equipment of a  d is t in c t iv e ly  m ilita ry  charac­
t e r .
9. Saddle, d raught, and pack animals su ita b le  fo r  use in  war.
10 . A ll kind® of harness o f a  d is t in c t iv e ly  m ilita ry  c h a rac te r .
11. A rtic le s  o f camp equipment and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component 
p a r ts ,
12. Armour p la tes*
13. Ferro a llo y s , includ ing  f e r r 0- tungsten , ferro-molyMexsm, 
fo r  ro-manganes e , ferro-vana&ium, ferro-chroiae.
14. ffa* follow ing m eta ls ;—tungsten , molybdenum, vanadium, 
n ick e l * selenium, co b a lt, haem atite, p ig - iro n , manganese..
15 . th e  following o re s ;—W olframite, school I t* , molybdenite* 
manganese o re, n ickel ore, chrome o re, haem atite Iron  o re , sine 
o re , lead  o re , bau x ite .
id .  Aluminium, alumina, and s a l t s  o f aluminium.
17 . Antimony, to g e th er w ith the  sulphide® and oxides o f a n ti­
mony.
18. Copper, uawr ought and p a r t  wrought, and copper wire*
1 9 . Lead* p ig , sheet* or pip®.
20 . Barbed w ire, and implements fo r fix in g  and c u ttin g  the  
tame.
21. Warships, including boat® and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component
part® of such a nature  th a t  they can only be used on a v e sse l o f
m r .
22 . Submarine sound s ig n a llin g  apparatus.
23 . Aeroplanes, a ir s h ip s , balloons, and a i r c r a f t  of a l l  kind®, 
and th e i r  d is t in c t iv e  component p a r ts ,  together w ith accesso ries 
end a r t i c le s  recognisab le  &  intended fo r  nm  in  connexion w ith 
ba llons and a i r c r a f t .
24. Motor veh ic les o f a l l  kinds and th e i r  component part® .
25* fy re s  fo r motor v eh ic le s  and fo r  cycles , together w ith  a r t i ­
c le s  o r ■material.® ©speclaXly adapted fo r  us® in  the  tmmSm^mrn- 
or re p a ir  of ty re s .
26. Bobber (includ ing  raw* want®, and reclaim ed rubber) and 
good® mad® wholly of rubber.
27 . l'~on -y r  i t e s ,
28 . F in e ra l oil® and motor s p i r i t ,  except lu b r ic a tin g  oil®.
29 . Implements and apparatus designed exclusively  fo r th e  manu­
fa c tu re  o f munition® of war, fo r the  manufacture or .repair of 
arms, or war m ateria l fo r use on land  and sea.
Schedule II
1. .feedstu ff# .
2. Forage and feeding s tu ffs  far eatonl**
%  Clothing, f u r i e s  for c lo th in g , and beets and shoe* su ita ­
b le  for use in  war, and th e ir  component part®,
h, Odd and s ilv e r  in coin or bullion* pa^er money.
5 , fe h le ie s  o f  a l l  kinds, o ther %hm motor v eh ic les , avalla- 
h ie  for use in  war, « 4  th e i r  component parts.
6» F eesels, c r a ft , and hoet# o f n i l  kinds j fleetin®  docks, 
parts of docks, and their  coi^onest parts,
7# Hallway m aterials, "both fixed  and r o llin g  stock, and mater­
ia ls  for telegraphs, w ireless telegraphs, and telephones.
0, fu e l, other than mineral o i l s ,  lubricants.
9 . Pw&ar and. explosives not sp ec ia lly  prepared for us# la  
war.
10'. Horseshoes and shoeing m a te ria ls .
11, Harness and saddlery.
12, Hides o f a U  kinds, dry or wet; p igsk ins, raw or dressed; 
leather, undressed or dressed, sudta b le  for saddlery, harness, or 
m ilitary boots.
1 3 , F ield  g la sse s , te lescop es, chronometera, and a l l  kinds o f  
n m tlo a l instruments.
Given at Oar Court a t Buckingham P alace, th is  fweaby-IMrd 
day o f December, in the year o f our lord  on# thousand 
nine hundred and fourteen* and in the f i f t h  year o f Our 
Belgn.
7
Gro& save the  King,
7
.pjrM », pp. 290-93*
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BA® MAECK 11, 1915, 3?aCOTII© OWPill ABBXfXOlOL 
ASSXCLSS tQ 33 fM A ®  IS OOBfliSilB OB WAXt (SfifBfOEI BULBS AKD 
OEMS, 1915* 10. 305).
b t  Tm  n m .
1 Proclam ation adding to the l i s t  o f A rtic le s  to Be treated as
Contraband of War.
Whereas on the twenty-third o f Bccember* 191^* We did issu e  Our 
E©yul 'Pr-oelsaaatipn specifying the a r tic le s  which i t  was Our inten­
tion  to treat as contraband during the continuance o f h o s t i l l i lee  
or u n til  We did give further public n otice, and
Whereas It i s  ob ed ien t to make certain  additions to the l i s t s  
contained in the said Proclamation: 
how, therefore, We do hereby declare by and with the advice o f  
©gar Privy Council, that during the continuance of the war or u n til  
we do giv© further public notice  the following a r t ic le s  w il l  b© 
treated  as absolute contraband in addition to  those set out in  Our 
lo y a l Proclamation afcrementioned:-
Em  wool, wool tops end n o ils  and woolen and worsted yam s, 
f in ,  chloride of t in , t in  ore.
Castor o i l .
Paraffin  wan.
Copper iodide.
Lubricants.
Hides of c a tt le , bu ffa loes, and horses; skins o f ca lves, p ig s , 
sheep, goats, and deer; lea th er , undressed or dressed, su ita ­
b le  for saddlery, harness, m ilitary boots, or m ilitary  
clothing.
Ammonia and i t s  sa lts  whether simple or compound; ammonia 
liquor; urea, an ilin e , and th eir  components.
And We do hereby farther declare that the following article©  
w ill  be treated  m  conditional contraband in addition to those 
set out in  Our Boy©! Proclamation afor ©men t i  oxxed: -  
fam ing sub stance© o f a l l  kinds ( including extracts for us© in  
tanning}.
And We do hereby further declare that the terms ‘ foodstuffs* 
and ‘feeding s tu ffs  for animal s ’ in  the l i s t  o f conditional con­
traband contained in Our Bqyal Proclamation aforementioned sh a ll 
be deemed to  include oleaginous seeds, nuts and kernels; animal 
and vegetable o i l s  and fa ts  (other than lin seed  o i l )  su itab le  
for use in  the manufacture o f  margarine; and cakes and meals 
made from oleaginous seeds, nuts and kernels.
1?2
Gives, at Q\%v Court at Baokltighsaa Falace, th is  lltven th  day 
of March, in the year of our Lord out thousand nine hun­
dred and f ifteen , and in the Sixth year of Our Belgn*
8Mod save the King*:
& M - .  SP. 293-9^.
mKtoo.Lii'U5 ?ioi, d i s w  m x  2 7 , 1 9 1 5 , kixhig c m m i  v m s m  j m m o m  
to Mm m m & s m s  in  r m  l i s t  o f a h tig lss  to bs m m m  as o o m w r 
s j m  o f \m  (BTMUTom mmm m >  om m s-, 191 5 , no. 5 0 7 ) .
BT THU K im .
A Proclam ation making certain  further E d it io n s  to and Amendment® 
in  the l i s t  of A rtic les to he t r e a t s  m  Contraband o f War.
M>U&  £ • ! •
Whereas oa the  tven t^ -th ii-d  of Secssber, 193A, Vf# Sid Issue Our
loya l Froclsn&tion specifying the a r tic le s  which i t  was Our in ten ­
tio n  to treat as contraband during the continuance of h o s t i l i t i e s  
or u n til We did give further public notice; and 
Whereas on the eleventh day of March, 1915* We did by Our Boyal
Proclamation o f that date make certain  addition® to the l i s t  o f
a r tic le s  to be treated as contraband of war; and
Whereas i t  i s  expedient to make certain  further additions to 
fjnd onar&iaQnts in the sa id  l i s t :
F©w, therefore, We do hereby declare, by and with the advice o f  
Our Privy Council, that during the continuance of the war, or un­
t i l  We do give further p u b lic  n otice , the following a r tic le s  w il l  
be treated  as absolute contraband in  addition to those se t out 
in  Our Soya! Proclamation aforemejitiome&i-
Toluol, and mixtures of to lu o l, whether derived from coal-  
tar, petroleums, or any other source;
Lathee and other machines or machine-tools capable o f  being 
employee., in  the manufacture of munitions o f war;
Maps and plans of any place within the territory  of any bel­
lig e re n t, or within the area of m ilitary operations, on & 
scale o f four miles to one inch or on any larger sca le , 
and reproductions on any scale by photography or otherwise 
of such maps or plans.
And We do hereby farther declare that item 4 of Schedule I o f 
Our Boyal Proclamation of the twenty-third day o f December afore­
mentioned shall be amended as from th is date by the omission o f  
the words ‘and a l l  other m etallic acetates1 a fter  the words 
* calcium me©t at e1 •
And We do hereby further declare that In Our Loyal Proclamation 
of the eleventh day o f  March aforementioned the words 1 other than 
lin seed  oil*  sh all be deleted and that the following a r t ic le  w il l  
as from th is  date be treated as conditional contrabend;-  
Linseed o i l .
Given a t Our Court a t Buckingham rg lac e , th is  Twenty-seventh 
day of ivi&y , in  th e  year o f our Lord one thousand n ine 
hundred said f i f te e n ,  and in  the  S ix th  year of Our fteiga.
9God save th e  Bing.
^XM&. , pp. 29L-95.
mjpsoouKtfioH, n m m  august 2 0 , 1 9 1 5 , sp a o im sa  vjbsovs fobms 0 1  
e o ffo i s?o b i  fH iifiS) i s  absolute o tm B M m s ( s fm s r o m  boles j m  
0KD2RS, 1915, 10, 801).
BT SB3B Kim.
A P roc lea tttion  adding to  the  L is t of A rtic le s  to  be tr e a te d  m
Contraband o f war.
i m l 4 *
VJMraaa on th e  23r& day of Dec ember, 19iA, We d id  issue  Our 
Eoy&X Proclam ation specify ing  th e  a r t i c le s  which I t  was Our In ten ­
t io n  to  t r e a t  as contraband during th e  continuance of h o s t i l i t i e s  
or u n t i l  We d id  give fu r th e r  n o tice ; and
Whereas on th e  11th day of March and on th e  27th  day of May, 
1915 . We d id , by Our Boyal Proclam ation o f  those d a te s , make cer­
t a in  ad d itio n s  to  th e  l i s t  o f  a r t i c l e s  to  be tre a te d  as con tra ­
band o f war; and
Whereas i t  i s  expedient to make c e r ta in  fu r th e r  add itions to  
the  sa id  l i s t s i
low, th e re fo re , We do hereby d ec la re , by and w ith  th e  advice o f 
Our P rivy  Council, th a t  during th e  continuance of th e  war or u n ­
t i l  We do g ive fu r th e r  pub lic  n o tic e , the  follow ing a r t i c le s  w il l  
be tre a te d  as abso lu te  contraband in  ad d itio n  to those s e t  out in  
Our Bojral Proclam ations aforementio&sd:-
Haw c o tto n , co tton  H a te r s ,  co tton  waste and co tton  y am s.
And We do hereby fu r th e r  d ec la re  that, th is  Our Boyal Proclama­
t io n  sh a ll take  e ffe c t from th e  da te  of i t s  p u b lica tio n  in  the  
London G azette .
Given a t Our Court a t the  Eoyal P av ilio n , Aldershot Camp, 
th i s  Twentieth -day of August, in  the  year o f our Lord one 
thousand nine hundred and f i f te e n ,  and in  the  S ix th  Tear 
o f Our Beign.
10God save th e  King,
10iMa.. pp. 295-96.
PROOLJMJTXOS, MEED OCTOBER l k v 1915* &S9XSXE& T i l  LIST OF AOPICLSS
SO BB m i l T l B  AS CO lfS J M ID  O f WAE (SM O TO BT BULBS J®> QRMSS,
1915. 10. 99^).
b t  f s i  n m *
A Pro c l  anal ion rcvl.si.ag the  L is t o f A rtic le s  to  Be tre a te d  m  
Contraband of War.
&mm& I*X*
Whereas on th e  23rd  day o f Deoem'bor, IflA , We d id  Issue Our lo y a l 
Proclam ation specify ing  the  a r t i c le s  which i t  was Our in te n tio n  to 
t r e a t  as contraband during th e  continuance o f h o s t i l i t i e s  ©r un t.il 
We d id  g ive  fu r th e r  p u b lic  n o tice ; and
Whereas am th e  11th day o f March, and an the 27th day o f flay, 
and on th e  20th day of August, 1915> We did, by ©ur Boyal F reel* - 
n a tions of those d a te s , sake c e r ta in  ad d itio n s to  the  l i s t s  of  
a r t i c le s  to  be tre a te d  as contraband o f war; and
Whereas i t  i s  e%p®M emt to make c e r t t i n  fu r th e r  ad d itio n s  to 
and amendments in  the sa id  l i s t s :
low, th e re fo re , We to  hereby declare , by and w ith  the  advice o f  
Our Privy Council, th a t  th e  l i s t s  of contraband contained in  the  
Schedules to  Our Boyal Proclam ation of the  23rd  day of December, 
as subsequently amended by Our Proclam ations o f the  11th day .of 
March, and of the  2?th  day o f May, and of the  20th  day of August 
aforementiorned, a re  hereby withdrawn, and th a t in  l ie u  th e re o f, 
during the  coat inuamce of the  war or u n t i l  W® do g ive fu r th e r  
pub lic  n o tic e , the  a r t i c l e s  enumerated in  Schedule I hereto  w ill 
be tre a te d  as abso lu te  contraband, and the a r t i c l e s  enumerated i s  
Schedule 11. hereto  w il l  be t re a te d  as con 411iomal contraband*
Schedule J,
1 . Arms of e l l  kinds including arms fo r  spo rting  purpose®, and 
th e i r  component parts*
2. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively  fo r the  mama- 
fsctur®  o f munitions o f war, or fo r the  manufacture or re p a ir  o f  
arms or o f  war m ateria l fo r  us® on land or sea.
3 . Lathes and o th er machines or machine tool® capable of feting 
employed in  the  mumfa&ture o f munitions o f war.
b . Baery* corundum, n a tu ra l and a r t i f i c i a l  (alundum), and car­
borundum, in  a l l  forms*
5* P ro je c t l i e s ,  charges, and c a r tr id g e s  of a l l  k inds, and th e i r  
component part® .
6 . P a ra ff in  wax*
7 , Powder and explosives sp e c ia lly  prepared fo r  u se  in  war.
S, M ateria ls  used in  th e  manufacture of exp losives, in c lu d in g :— 
K itr le  m id  and n i t r a te s  o f a l l  k inds; su lphuric  ac id ; fuming su l­
phuric  a c id  (oleum) 1 a c e tic  acid  and a c e ta te s ; barium c h lo ra te  and
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perchdera te ; calcium a c e ta te , t i t r a t e  and carb ide; potassium. salt®  
and cans t i e  potash; amonim i s a l t s  and ammonia liq u o r; 'c a u s tic  
soda, sodium c h lo ra te  and p e rch lo ra te ; mercury; b o n sa it to luol*  
x y lo l, so lvent naphtha, phenol {carbolic  a c id ) , c r e e d ,  naphtha­
len e , and th e i r  m ixtures and d e riv a tiv e s ; a n il in e , and i t s  d e riva­
t iv e s ;  g ly ce rin e ; acetone; a c e tic  e th e r; e thy l alcohol; methyl 
a lcohol; e th e r; su lphur; u rea ; eyesuzmide; c e llu lo id .
9 . Manganese dioxide; hydrochloric acid ; bromide; phosphorus; 
carbon & isulphide; a rsen ic  and i t s  compound®; ch lo rine ; phosgene 
(carbonyl c h lo r i te ) ;  sulphur dioxide; prussl&t© o f soda; sodium 
cyanide; iodine and i t s  compounds#
10. C&psiuis and peppers#
11 . Sun mountings, lim ber boxes, lim bers, m ili ta ry  wagons, f i e ld  
fo rg es , and th e i r  component p a r ts ;  a r t i c l e s  of camp equipment and 
th e i r  component parts#
12. Barbed wire and the  implements fo r  f ix in g  and c u ttin g  the  
same.
13 . Hange-finder# and th e i r  component p a r ts ;  se a rc h lig h ts  and 
th e i r  component part®.
lh» C lothing and equipment of a  d is t in c t iv e ly  m ili ta ry  c h a rac te r,
15. Saddle, draught, and pack animals su ita b le , or which may be­
come su ita b le , fo r u se  in  war.
16. All kind® o f harness o f a d is t in c t iv e ly  m ilita ry  c h a rac te r,
I? . Hides o f c a t t l e ,  buffaloes* and ho rses; skin® of ca lves , p ig s ,
sheep, g o a ts , and deer; and le a th e r , undressed or dressed , su ita b le  
fo r saddlery , harness* m ili ta ry  boots, or m ilita ry  c lo th in g ; 
le a th e r  b e l t in g , hydrau lic  le a th e r , and pomp le a th e r .
IS , fanning substances of a l l  k inds, including quebracho wood 
and e x tra c ts  fo r  u se  in  tanning,
19. Wool, raw, combed or carded; wool waste; wool top® and n o ils ;  
woolen o-r worsted yarn®; animal h a ir  o f a l l  kind®, and to p s , n o ils  
and yam s o f animal h a ir .
20 . lew co tto n , l i n t e r s ,  co tton  waste, co tto n  yarns, co tton  
p iece  goads, ©M o th er co tton  products capable o f being used in  
th e  manufacture of explosive®,
21. f la x ;  hemp; rami#; kapok.
22. W arships, including boat® and th e ir  component part® of such 
a na tu re  th a t they can only be used on a  v esse l o f war#
23 . Submarine sound-signalling  apparatus,
2k. Armour plate® .
25 . A irc ra ft o f e l l  kind®, Including aeroplanes, a ir s h ip s , b a l­
loons and th e i r  component p a r ts ,  together w ith  accesso ries and 
a r t i c le s  su ita b le  fo r use  in  connexion w ith  a i r c r a f t .
26. Motor veh ic les of a l l  kinds and th e i r  component p a r ts .
2?. fy re s  fo r  motor vehicle® and fo r  cycle®, together w ith a r t i ­
c le s  or m ate ria ls  e sp ec ia lly  adapted fo r use  in  the  manufacture 
or re p a ir  o f ty re s .
28. Mineral o i l s ,  includ ing  benslne and motor s p i r i t .
29 . Eesinoiis products, camphor and tu rp en tin e  ( o i l  and s p i r i t ) ;  
wood t a r  and wood-tar o i l .
1?8
30* Bubber ( including  raw, waste, and reclaim ed robber, solu­
t io n s  and j e l l i e s  con tain ing  rubber, or any o ther p rep ara tio n s 
contain ing  rubber, b a ta ta , and gu tta -percha , and the  follow ing 
v a r ie t ie s  of rubber, v i s , : —Borneo, Ouayule, Je lu to n g , Folen- 
bang, Pontiaaac, and a l l  o ther substances con tain ing  caoutchouc), 
and goods made wholly or p a r t ly  of rubber.
31* B&tta&s*
3 2 . lu b r ic a n ts .
33* ^h© follow ing m eta ls:—tungsten , molybdenum, vanadium,
sodium, n ic k e l, selenium* c o b a lt, haem atite p ig - iro n , manganese, 
e le c tro ly t ic  iro n , and s te e l  con tain ing  tungsten  o r molybdemm.
34. Asbestos.
35. Aluminium, alumina, and s a l t s  o f aluminium.
3 6 . Antimony, together w ith  the sulphides and oxides o f a n ti­
mony.
37 . Copper, unwrought and p a rt wrought; copper w ire; a llo y s  and 
compounds of copper.
38 . Lead, p ig , sh e e t, or p ipe.
39 . Tin, ch lo ride  o f t i n ,  and t i n  o re.
hO. Ferro a llo y s , including  fe rro -tu n g sten , f©rro-molybdemaa, 
f  erro-mangaaese, f  er re-vanadium, and ferro-ckrorae.
41. The follow ing o re s :—Wolframite, e ch e e llte , m olybdenite, 
manganese or©, n icke l o re, chrome ore, haem atite iro n  o re, iro n  
p y r i te s , copper p y r i te s  and o ther copper"ores, sine o re, lead  
o re , a rsen ic a l o re, and bauxite*
42. Maps m d  plans o f m y  place  w ith in  the t e r r i to r y  of any 
b e ll ig e re n t,  or w ith in  th© area  of m ili ta ry  opera tions, on a  
sc a le  o f 4 m iles to  1 inch or any la rg e r  sc a le , and reproductions 
o f any sc a le , by photography or o therw ise, o f such maps or p lan s .
Schedule I I
1 . Foodstuffs.
2 . Forage and feeding -stuffs fo r  anim als.
3. Oleanginous seeds, nu ts sand kerne ls .
4 . Animal, f is h ,  and vegetab le  o i ls  and f a t s ,  o ther than 
those capable of use as lu b r ic a n ts , and not including  e s se n tia l  
o i l s .
5 . Fuel, o ther than  m ineral o i l s .
6 . Powder and explosives not sp e c ia lly  prepared fo r u se  in  
war.
7 . Horseshoes and shoeing m ateria ls .
8 . Harness and saddlery .
9 . The follow ing a r t i c l e s ,  i f  su ita b le  fo r use in  war:— 
Clothing, fa b r ic s  fo r  c lo th in g , sk ins and fur® u t i l l s a b le  fo r  
c lo th in g , boots and shoes.
1 0 . Y©hides o f a l l  k inds, o ther than motor v e h ic le s , a v a ila b le  
fo r  use  in  war, and th e i r  component p a r ts .
11 . Hailwey m ate ria ls , both  fix ed  and ro l l in g  stock , and mater­
i a l s  fo r te leg raphs, w ire le ss  te leg rap h s, and telephones.
m12. T asse ls , c r a f t ,  and boats o f a l l  k inds; f lo a tin g  docks and
th e i r  component part®; part® of dock®.
13. F ie ld  g la sse s , te lesco p es , chronom eters, and a l l  kinds of 
n a u tic a l instrum ents.
Ill-, Hold and s i lv e r  in. co in  or h u ll  ion; paper ©on® .^
§ive& at Our Oomrt at ^ckingham -&&*#*• th is  fourteenth
day of October, in  the year o f our herd one thousaad
min#  hundred and f if te e n , and in  the Sixth year o f  Our
tsigu.,
Ood save the l in g .* 3.
Um a . . pp. 296-99.
